




No. 2. May 1914

The CANDID Quarterly Review of Public Affairs: Political, Scientific, Social and Literary.

Conducted by Thomas Gibson Bowles.

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The Weather and its Prophets
National Finance, 1914
The Discredited Treasury—The Prospect for 1914-15

Published by Frederick Henry Garratt at 26 Maiden Lane, Lonaon, W.C.

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The Candid Quarterly Review

No. 2. May, 1914

THE aim of this Review is to deal with Public Affairs faithfully and frankly, and to treat them with candour, having sole regard to the Public Welfare.

The attempt, often promised, rarely made, and yet more rarely continued, to review Public Affairs impartially and without Party bias will here be renewed. The effort will be to search out the quality, character, and fitness for the Public Welfare of things done or proposed, whether in the political, the scientific, the social or the literary domain, and to present them on their merits without partisan prejudice.

To do this is not easy. But the effort to do it will be honestly made by candid men writing for candid readers.

In Politics it will be remembered that the men of to-day are as well sons of the past as fathers of the future and that from the past we have inherited a settled system of governance, which, having endured and survived the stresses of time, is not to be put away without a certain assurance of something better.

To Science, whose widening domain touches with increasing success and rapidity every part of life, will be assigned the place that has now become due to the great deeds already done and the greater soon to be expected. Social and Literary Subjects, so far as they belong to Public Affairs, will also have their due recognition.

To sincerity will be extended respect and sympathy. But wherever there may appear insincerity, dishonesty, corruption, or aught that may bring danger or dishonour to the State, every effort will be made to discover, display, and denounce it, and to destroy it, together with its originators.

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THE SOVEREIGNTY

“Let us take heed what we yield
“unto.”—SIR EDWARD COKE.

“**M**AGNA Charta is such a fellow that he will have no “Sovereign,” said Sir Edward Coke. By this he meant a Sovereign such as the King then claimed to be, exercising absolute and uncontrolled power. It was a declaration that, in England, that supreme, final, unchecked, unlimited power which is the Sovereignty, resides in no single man, whether King or Minister, but elsewhere. Sovereignty somewhere there manifestly must be in every State. Somewhere there must be that pre-eminent, supreme, ultimate authority whose power is beyond question or appeal to any other authority whatever. Where then does the English Sovereignty reside?

It resides in Parliament and nowhere else. It resides in Parliament as a whole, in Parliament consisting of the King, the two estates, spiritual and temporal, of the Lords, and the third estate of the Commons. To make the Sovereignty effective, to put it into action, all three, King, Lords and Commons, must concur. The King alone without Lords and Commons, the Lords alone without King and Commons, the Commons alone without King and Lords, can do nothing. Each one can stop the other two. No one alone, nor any two of them together, can change the Law of the Land; the Common Law that is and that was of old; no one can lay a charge upon the People; no one alone can cede or sell the territory of the Kingdom; no one alone can actually wage war or make peace. All three together can do any of these things, can do all things within the limits of

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natural possibility. That great Statesman and Constitutional jurist, Sir Thomas Smith, a principal Secretary to Queen Elizabeth, wrote in 1589, "the most high and absolute power of the Realme of England consisteth in the Parliament . . . that which is done by this consent is called firm, stable and *sanctum* and is taken for law." And he gives the reason for it thus:

"The most high and absolute power of the Realme of *England* consisteth in the Parliament. For as in Warre, where the King himself in person, the Nobilitie, the rest of the Gentilitie, and the Yeomanrie are, is the force and power of England: So in peace and consultation where the Prince is to give life, and the last and highest commandement; the Baronie or Nobilitie for the higher: the Knights, Esquires, Gentlemen and Commons for the lower part of the Common-wealth: the Bishops for the Clergy be present to advertise, consult and shew what is good and necessary for the Common-wealth, and to consult together; and upon mature deliberation, every Bill or Law being thrice read and disputed upon in either House, the other two parts, first each a part, and after the Prince himself in presence of both the parties, doth consent unto and alloweth. That is, the Princes and whole Realmes Deed: whereupon justly no man can complaine, but must accomodate himselfe to find it good and obey it. . . . For every Englishman is intended to be there present either in person or by procuration and attorney, of what preeminence, state, dignitie or qualitie soever hee be, from the Prince (be he King or Queene) to the lowest person of England. And the consent of the Parliament is taken to be every man's consent."*

The vast practical difference is manifest between a Sovereignty exercised by the wisdom of one alone, possibly without due knowledge or due consideration, conceivably upon the device or through the influence of a favourite or a wife, on a decision hastily, unadvisedly or passionately taken; and a Sovereignty exercised by the wisdom of many, arrived at only after solemn deliberation, subject to settled

* *The Commonwealth of England*, by Sir Thomas Smith, London. Pp. 72, 73, 74.

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rules, and requiring the concurrence of three separate and independent authorities. In the former case the Sovereignty is subject in its exercise to every sort of chance and accident; in the latter to few or none except those that no one can remove from human affairs. The latter system ensures deliberation before action; the former does not. The danger of action by the Sovereign power before deliberation is infinite. And where the Sovereign power is exercised by an individual it is unavoidable. Sovereignty must always be absolute; from that there is and can be no escape. But herein lies the difference; that when exercised by a single person it may at any time, and will certainly at some times, be also arbitrary—exercised undeliberately, unadvisedly, without or against any rule or principle, wantonly or recklessly; but when by many its exercise will necessarily be deliberate and advised, and probably in accordance with rules and principles held by all those many. To prevent the absolute Sovereignty from degenerating into arbitrary power has been the end and purpose of our Constitution. To that end it is that the Sovereignty has come to be lodged in Parliament, and that the concurrence of all the different elements of Parliament must be expressed before the Sovereignty can be exercised. Should King alone, or Lords alone, or Commons alone attempt to set up for absolute Sovereign, that would be a denial of the only English Sovereignty known to our Constitution. Were the attempt to succeed it would be the setting up of a new and hitherto unknown Sovereignty, and therewith a destruction of the Constitution in its very essence.

In the Constitution it is expected that the King, the Lords and the Commons will check each other. For each being jealous of its own powers, desirous to add thereto and prevent all diminution thereof, must be disposed to resist any encroachment by either of the other two. It is therefore expected that whenever one of the three tries to usurp any portion of the sovereign power belonging to either one of the other two, those two will join in resisting the

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attempt, will probably defeat it, and will thus maintain the Constitution in its balance. Should the Commons disclose tendencies to Revolution, they will probably be resisted both by King and Lords. Should the Lords prove reactionary or obstructive, they will usually be resisted by King and Commons. Should the King show a desire to grasp at absolute power, he will usually be resisted by Lords and Commons. The resistance will be led indeed at first by one of the three, and by that one at first apparently alone; but the alliance and support of the second against the third, perhaps unavowed at first, must always come. Against usurpation by the Commons the Lords at first may lead; but in course of time the King must follow or lose some of his power to the usurper. Against usurpation by the Lords the Commons may at first lead; but in course of time the King must join in. Against usurpation by the King the Commons may at first lead; but sooner or later the Lords must join them.

In such a constitutional system, although from time to time animosities not only may, but must, arise between two of the three component parts of the Sovereignty, yet each one of them is necessary to the permanent maintenance of the others. Each in its turn is dependent on, and secured in its due powers by the support of one of the others; and if at any time there has appeared to arise a deadly and irreconcilable quarrel between, for example, the Lords and the Commons, there has always hitherto been found, and probably always will be, in both, men prudent enough and persuasive enough to compose the quarrel before it has gone too far; men who foresee that, at any moment, even Lords and Commons joined together may not be too powerful to defend themselves and the Constitution. So far from there being anything like a necessary and permanent antagonism between the two, neither could permanently exist without the other, nor the Constitution without both.

The expectation that, in the long run, King, Lords and Commons would so check each other as to be a practical

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security against evil government, has on the whole been justified.

If we examine the character of each of the three constituent parts of the Sovereignty as shown by their history, it will be found that all three together do fairly express the character of the English People. On the whole and in the long run the Commons stand for change, the Lords for stability and the King for himself. The King has generally sought to increase his own power and importance. The Commons have sought to increase theirs and to claim that theirs is really the power and importance of the free People. The Lords have sought to maintain what is essentially the Conservative element—indeed the only purely conservative element—of the Sovereignty; for while the tendency of the People at large is to change in one direction and of the King to change in another, the Lords alone look with disfavour on all change. They alone have no tendency to increase their powers, but are content if they can only maintain them.

When Sir Edward Coke said “Magna Charta is such a fellow that he will have no Sovereign” he understated the case. Had he said “The Englishman is such a fellow that he will have no Sovereign” he would not have overstated it; he would only have completed it. Magna Charta was not the beginning of English “customs and liberties”; it was but their recognition and solemn re-affirmation. They had existed long before that. William the Conqueror had been conquered by them. He attempted to normanize England, but England englished him; so that, in the end, the laws he gave to the land he had won by conquest were, and professed themselves, not new laws of his own dictation but “the good old laws of Edward the Confessor.”

Many similar attempts have since been made to set up the absolute Sovereignty which the Constitution will not have. Plantagenets, Tudors, Stewarts, the Mob in the Long Parliament, and the House of Lords, have successively renewed them. But where William failed they could not

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succeed. In the end the old customs and liberties have always in their essentials been restored. In the end the English People have always claimed and won back their birthright.

Another attempt on the Sovereignty is now apparent. It is the attempt to make the Minister Sovereign. For two centuries it has proceeded by secret minings and sappings. Now it has come out in the open, and we are asked to believe that the vast change it implies is already achieved, and the Sovereignty permanently removed from the stately halls of Parliament to the chamberings of Downing Street, there to be exercised by the casual Minister of a casual majority of the House of Commons. It is not yet so; and were it so, it would not long so remain.

But the Sovereignty is once again challenged. The great conflict over the question whether it is in the King alone or in the King and the Parliament together, was fought out and decided in the fourteenth century. It was revived, fought out and decided again in the seventeenth century. Whether the Minister is to have and to retain so preponderant a share in the Sovereignty as was refused to successive Kings by successive Parliaments will have to be decided in the twentieth century.

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THE Minister indeed does not now openly claim the Sovereignty for himself. He claims it for the Commons' House alone; but for a House so trammelled and fettered and controlled by himself that the Sovereignty, if once acquired for it, could only be exercised by himself alone.

That is the attempt which, now made, is boldly alleged to have already succeeded.

It behoves us, therefore, to ask what the House of Commons now is, and how far the Minister has acquired so complete a control over it.

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Never perhaps in our history has the House of Commons seemed so powerful, important or unrestrained as it seems to-day. It has apparently wrested from the Lords all power of performing any part of the functions of a Second Chamber in the vitally important matter of Finance, by depriving that House of its undoubted and repeatedly exercised right of amending the so-called "Money Bills," more properly known as Bills of Aid and Supply. It has claimed that any other sort of Bill whatever may be passed and become an Act, by itself alone, with the King's Assent. It has, through the mouth of its Minister, approved and supported by a plurality of its members, denied the Royal Prerogative in its royal depositary; has claimed it for its own ministerial nominee; has even menaced the Throne with destruction should the King attempt to do his duty, or hesitate to accept the abolition of the Kingship. And it has bribed itself, out of the taxpayers' money, with £400 a year to all its non-ministerial members (excepting only the eight just men who, as we were told in February, 1913, refuse to take the bribe) to resist its own dissolution at any time short of the five years for which it is now elected. Apparently all this is accepted as final. Apparently the two superior parts of Parliament hitherto necessary and indispensable to its constitution, are gone for ever, so that the Commons alone remain. The inheritance is apparently now theirs, the Sovereignty theirs, complete, unlimited, unrestrained. Not what a Parliament of King, Lords and Commons does, but what the Commons alone do is henceforth to be held for "firm, stable and *sanctum*, and taken for law." In the Commons alone, and no longer in the whole Parliament, is now to be found (as is alleged) what Sir Thomas Smith called the "most high and "absolute power of the realme of England." The Commons alone, it is now asserted, "representeth and hath the power "of the whole realme, both the head and the body."

Were the House of Commons still what it is presumed to be, or even so like to that as it was no more than thirty

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years ago, were it still a deliberating assembly, debating every question brought before it, fully, freely, and many times before coming to a decision; were it still that, there would yet be vast danger in its assumption of the Sovereignty; its exercise thereof at its own unchecked discretion would still be destructive of the central principle of our settled Constitution. But it is now far from being such an assembly.

The Standing Orders, rules of debate and forms, which once secured deliberate and repeated debate and the right of Private Members to make themselves heard, are all but gone—they are indeed completely gone except for such Members (who are very few) as can discover and pierce the joints in the rigid harness of Procedure. The right to move the adjournment of the House or of the Debate; the three readings of every bill, with the right to speak and divide on each of them; the right to move, speak and divide upon every motion that the Speaker do leave the Chair; the right of unlimited debate on the Estimates for Supply to the King; together with an infinite number of other rights, have during the last thirty years been either completely abolished, or so restricted by Standing Orders and Speaker's rulings as to have become practically incapable of exercise. The motion for leave to introduce a bill has been got rid of altogether, except for such as are desperately brought on under what is called the "ten minutes rule"—which rule by the way has no existence, though it is applied as if it had. The first reading of a bill and all possible debate thereon have been suppressed and no longer exist even for bills of the highest Constitutional importance. Thus on 5th March, 1914, three such bills—the Home Rule Bill, the Welsh Disestablishment Bill and the Plural Voting Bill—were "presented" to the House by three Ministers without any motion made for First Reading, or any opportunity given to any member to say a word on any one of them. They were thus smuggled into the House, were "deemed" to have been read a first time, the House being thus deprived for ever of one-third of its principal opportunities

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for pronouncing upon them. The confusion and loss of power to the House arising from the smuggling into it of Bills by "presentation" without motion or opportunity given to the House of refusing them a first reading, was aptly illustrated on 1st April last by Lord Hugh Cecil who, on that day, under the bad new rule, "presented" to the House a Bill for the reform of the divorce laws avowedly with no other purpose than to "block," and thus prevent debate upon, a motion by Mr France upon that very subject of divorce. The Speaker being appealed to, plaintively said: "Under the old system, where a Member had to ask for leave to bring in a Bill, I have very little doubt that the House would have refused leave in a case of this sort, because it would see that the Bill was a bogus Bill, and was only presented for the purpose of preventing the Motion coming on. In this case there is no Motion to put."*

The deadly Closure and the outrageous Guillotine, with or without compartments, and with their monstrous corollary the Kangaroo, have completed the work. The true House of Commons is composed of the unofficial or Private Members, who form the immense majority on both sides, and whose duty it is to speak with the voice of the country so far as they can; in contradistinction to the few official Members who can only and may only speak with the voice of the Minister. But this vast unofficial majority of the House is now practically silenced. Only the actual and future official Members now have any importance. The rest have none.

The claim that Mr Speaker Lenthall made nigh three hundred years ago on behalf of the Commons that they should have "free liberty of speech without confinement, "with a full and free debate," is still solemnly made of the King in the House of Lords at the opening of each Session, and the right thereto as solemnly granted and affirmed. But no sooner has the Speaker returned to the

* Parliamentary Debates. Official Reports (Wednesday, 1st April, 1914). Vol. 60—No. 37.

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Commons, than he himself becomes the instrument for putting into effect new Standing Orders which include Closure, Guillotine, and even closure of Guillotine, whereby liberty of speech is confined, and full and free debate rendered impossible.

When Free Speech was contested by Tudor and Stuart Monarchs it was exercised in spite of them. Now that it is no longer questioned, it is no longer exercised at all. When Mr Speaker returns from the bar of the Lords, one of the first things he does is to stop free speech by granting the Closure to the debate on the Address to the King in answer to the Royal Speech, whenever he himself thinks that a sufficient number of subjects (selected by himself out of all proposed) have been debated on amendments to the Address; and often when some of those subjects have not yet been reached. In this very year, on 19th February, after the debate had lasted no more than seven and a half days, and when Lord Robert Cecil had actually opened the discussion on his amendment concerning "the growing de-
"basement of the accustomed standard of purity in public
"life," Mr Speaker Lowther allowed the Closure to be put and carried, and thus cut off all speech whatever on that occasion upon the undenied and undeniable prevalence of corruption which touches the very honour of Parliament. He avowed on 18th February, that he held amendments on Road Boards, Local Taxation, Land Legislation, Tariff Reform, and Mine and Railway Accidents (amendments touching all which he allowed to be moved and debated) "deserving of more immediate attention" than this which concerned the honour of the House and of public life—a view which may provoke wonder as well as regret, but which, under the present Standing Orders, he had full authority to enforce.

The free right to put down an amendment to the Address is one of the few rights that are still left to the Private Member. But, as this incident shows, it is only left to him to be withdrawn at the very moment when his opportunity

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of free speech arises; and when, as in this case, he is about to raise a question touching the very essentials of Parliamentary life, on which the country most rightly feels far more strongly than on any Road Board or railway accidents. The right of the Members to free liberty of speech is thus arbitrarily withdrawn at the very moment when they are about to exercise it.

Speech of any kind is at present almost completely confined to the subjects the Minister initiates and to the Ministers themselves speaking on those subjects. Ex-Ministers and expectant Ministers on the Opposition side are indeed allowed by what may be called the Comity of the Front Benches to have a share of free speech; but there the freedom ends. All the profit enures to the two Front Benches, but the major part to the Ministerial Front Bench.

These now number thirty-six. The Opposition Front Bench may be put down at the outside to twenty—fifty-six altogether out of the six hundred and seventy—and those fifty-six between them—as any newspaper reader is well aware—monopolize most of the speech, and almost all the free speech, left in the House; leaving the other nine-tenths of the members to silence and voting, after arguments which few of them have heard, on questions which still fewer of them understand enough to be able to vote “aye” or “no” without the direction of the “Whips.” That is what has become of freedom of speech in the House of Commons.

This is not understood outside the House. It is understood as little by the Member who for the first time takes his seat, full of the generous enthusiasm which his own election speeches have aroused in him, as well as in those who voted for him, and desirous to serve his country by taking part in the debates in the House. He very soon discovers what an empty vision it is that made him leave his ease to become a Candidate. At the first step he is arrested. One of the three Clerks at the table smiles indulgently at him and explains gently that the great affirmation of principles of primary

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national importance which he wishes to put upon the paper can never come on for debate, or for any attention whatever, unless indeed it happens to be a "blocking" motion, whose sole function is to prevent some other motion from being debated. He learns, however, that he may once at the opening of each session put down an amendment to the Address embodying his great principle—or any other—but that there is no chance whatever of its coming on for debate before the Speaker has granted the Closure of the debate itself. He learns later that there is a second avenue to speech open to him. It consists in "putting his name down for the ballot." This means a gamble for glory with a 670 to 1 chance against him. It is not a ballot at all that then ensues. It is a blind lottery. If in the lottery his name is drawn, he obtains, as a special personal privilege—what, when the House was still free, would have been his right without any lottery at all—the power of putting down his principle, either in a substantive motion, or as an amendment to the Speaker leaving the Chair, or for the reading of a bill. Even then, unless he is drawn first in the ballot, this privilege is subject to the man before him not putting down that same principle himself. Thirdly, he may attempt distinction by addressing questions to Ministers, though with the risk of either getting no answer at all, or only that official reply which is another term for falsehood and evasion. If he escapes these risks and his question is "in order"—which the Table Clerks will often tell him it is not—and is also very astutely drawn, he may elicit some information. Fourthly, and finally, he may ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, but only with Mr Speaker's permission, which he has little or no chance of obtaining.

This is all he can do on his own initiative. There remains the chance of distinction by taking part in a debate initiated by others. He soon finds out that this is not easy. Twenty times in the debate will he rise, and twenty times Mr Speaker will fail to see him. When in twenty debates the same strange Chair-blindness has occurred, he may ask

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his own "Whips" to put him down "on the list" of speakers for that debate, which they have given to Mr Speaker and which, though it does not bind that final authority, is suggestive and assisting to him. But the "Whips" in most cases will tell him that the time for debate is limited, and that when the two Front Benches have exhausted their rights, with which no interference is possible, there only remains time for so many speakers, all of whom and more are already on the list. Or, worse still, if he is on the Ministerial side, he is told that the understanding and indeed the order is, that no Member of that side is to speak at all—except, of course, the Front Benches—and that all the debate—for which as usual there is all too little time—is to be left to the wicked and incapable Opposition to do their worst till they are closed. By this time, unless he is of that unscrupulous impudence, resource and self-conceit which mark him for a future Front Bencher, the new Member has found his level. He resigns himself to passing weary afternoons and evenings in the Smoking Room, relieved only by chess and the evening papers, and by walking through the lobbies, not to assert or deny anything he knows of, but to obtain a good place in the list of divisions. He has learnt that, for him, there is no free speech left in the House of Commons, no initiative, and no means of serving his country, otherwise than by waiting and voting, varied very occasionally by a period of sitting and listening. He becomes a Wit, a Butt, a Bore, a Champion Chess-player, a retailer of Party rumours and Smoking Room stories—anything but a Member of the House exercising the ancient right of free and unconfined speech.

All this is no older than our own generation.

There are indeed—as there always will be—some independent Members who still struggle in the toils, some who, to the rage of the Minister and the concern of Mr Speaker, sometimes find among the knots a slippery hitch and escape from them. There are men who resist as far as they can the new tyrannies, men even who look first to the public

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good and only next to their Party's present interest or desires. But they are few. They are repressed while the Parliament lasts, they are got rid of, if possible, at the next General Election. When, if ever, they become numerous, the House of Commons will regain its importance.

What remains upstanding is the Minister. All the power the House and its Members have lost goes to him.

By the Standing Orders of the House so lately as 1901, only four-tenths of the time of the House was allocated to the Government, and the remaining six-tenths to "Private Members," namely to Members not Placemen. But in 1902 the Standing Orders were so amended as to give the Government nine instead of four-tenths of the time, leaving the Private Member with but one-tenth instead of six. Moreover that one-tenth was thenceforth disposed of by lot, so that however important may be his bill or his motion, no Member can succeed in bringing it forward unless the jade Fortune has proved his friend in the drawing of the lot. Thus, the Private Member, deprived of five-sixths of his initiative, finds the remaining sixth so hampered as to be almost negligible.

Take again Supply, the very Citadel of Parliament. The necessity for obtaining by the Appropriation Act the whole Supply for the year before the session could be ended was, until 1902, the great hold the Opposition had over the Government. It was this that enabled it to make with the Government bargains and compromises, affecting not Supply alone but bills and motions. It was the great opportunity of the Private Member to win his spurs. But in 1902 Mr Balfour, to whose New Rules of that year the House owes much of the curtailment of its power, procured the adoption of a New Standing Order, limiting the time to be given to Supply to twenty days (or with the consent of the Minister to twenty-three) and providing that on the last of those days the votes then undecided should be "guillotined," or put and forthwith voted upon without further debate. One effect has been that, of the short time allotted to a given vote,

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the Member of the Government in charge of it often takes up the greater part—for he is now using up, not as formerly the Government time, but that of the Private Members and the Opposition. Another effect is that most of the votes, and among them often those which most need discussion, get no discussion at all; while the final choice of those few chosen out of the whole to be discussed, even imperfectly, is left to the Government itself which alone can “put down” the vote to be taken.

In addition to his Standing Order share of time, the Private Member formerly had other opportunities of initiative. He could move an amendment to the necessarily oft-repeated motion that the Speaker do leave the Chair. That, since 1882, has been strictly limited to one motion by one Member on each of the three classes of Supply, or on a vote of credit; and the Member who may make the motion is chosen by lot. Liberty to move the adjournment of the House, liberty to speak to the motion for adjournment when made—in short, every liberty of the Private Member has been so cut down, that at present there is scarcely any liberty left, except to the Government, which may riot unrestrained in nine-tenths of Parliamentary time and even a good share of the remaining tenth.

As some slight residue of the unlimited right to move the adjournment at any time there has been presented to the Private Member a right to submit (at the end of questions but at no other time) for Mr Speaker's decision, a motion for the adjournment of the House in order to call attention to a “definite matter of urgent public importance.” It is a rudimentary survival of the Monkey's tail after the Monkey and most of the tail have been rubbed off. If the Speaker decides that the motion is in order, and if forty Members rise in support thereof, the Member may move it at nine o'clock that evening, when it will be debated for the short remaining period till the House automatically adjourns. If moved and carried it means nothing, and has no effect whatever beyond “calling attention.” But it

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very rarely is moved. Successive Speakers have so increasingly restricted the meaning they attach to "definite," to "urgent," to "public," and to "importance," as to have entirely wrested this guarded opportunity from its original purpose of preserving in a limited form the previously unlimited power of debating matters of urgency outside the programme of the day. They have thus now so limited it as almost to abolish it. In the majority of cases, therefore, the Member who proposes to move the adjournment is brought to a premature end by the Speaker's refusal to accept the motion.

Besides all this there has since 1887 been established the "Closure," whereby a Minister—and he alone, for he alone commands the majority—may at any moment peremptorily stop debate and take the division on the question. To this has been added the "guillotine by compartments," or the peremptory closing of debate and taking the division at a given hour of the clock, named beforehand, for certain portions of a Bill, arbitrarily fixed by the Government. It is true that a special Resolution is required for this curtailment of the few rights left to the Commons; but that is met by applying the closure to that special Resolution itself.

In short, at any moment the Minister, though created by the British House of Commons, may, with the assent of the Speaker, or Chairman in Committee—all too rarely withheld—say to it: "Assez parlé"—"That's enough; you shall debate no more. Shut up."

All who know the House of Commons know that when debate is worn threadbare and suggestion has been apparently exhausted by its leading men without any issue being found from a difficulty, or perhaps without the real difficulty having been pointed out, the words of wisdom are often found to come from the despised back benches supposed to be occupied by those who are only capable of voting and of nothing more. Again and again it is seen, especially in Committee on a bill when some unforeseen difficulty of detail has arisen. The difficulty is recognized;

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all desire to overcome it; nobody sees exactly how to do so. Hours of debate ensue without the solution being discovered. Reasoning and resource are alike in a tangle and the House at a standstill. At last there arises on the back benches some unknown man who has never yet opened his mouth in any session of Parliament. But he happens to know that thing. He utters the word of wisdom. The difficulty is solved. The issue from the tangle is seen to be that very issue the unknown Back-bencher has suggested—that and no other. All jump at it with relief, and there only remains the easy task of putting it into a form of words, which is forthwith found by the verbal experts of both sides working together. The clause, perhaps the bill, certainly the House, has been saved by the obscure Back-bencher. And if, by Closure, or by any other denial to him of free speech, he is prevented from uttering his word of wisdom, the House will repeatedly be left to flounder through verbal quicksands to legislative confusion. All the wisdom or all the understanding of the House is by no means to be found only in the glib speakers who always catch the Speaker's eye; it is very often found in the one man whom the Speaker has never yet seen and called upon, and whose name he scarcely knows. To refuse and repudiate it by refusing to listen to it, is to cut off the resources of the House, and to impair its action in a degree only to be appreciated by those who have often seen it rescued by its babes and sucklings from enacting contradictions, impossibilities or absurdities.

One illustration of the vast difference of practice wrought in a few years will suffice. In 1894 the Finance Bill embodying the New Estate Duty introduced by that great Parliamentarian, Sir William Vernon Harcourt, was (because of his own respect for the traditions of the House and his refusal to resort to the Closure) never closed, still less guillotined, and was debated for some three months, with great advantage to the Bill, and the result of great smoothness in the working of the Act. In 1908 the Old Age Pension

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Bill, a measure of infinitely greater novelty and importance and requiring infinitely more debate if it were to be made coherent, reasonable and workable, was by the successors to Sir William Harcourt, who had none of his scruples, "guillotined" so that no more than nine days all told were allowed to it—with the result that the Act only works at all by submission to frauds of all kinds.

Were it necessary numerous other instances might be given of the way in which Parliament is now prevented, in the interest of the Minister, from parleying.

The financial control of the House—the very foundation of its power—has been so gravely impaired by successive abuses in practice as to have been in some respects almost destroyed, though always, it is right to say, with its own assent at the bidding of the Party leader predominant at the time.

Thus the anticipating Votes of credit or advances to the Government on account, with power to issue and spend them forthwith, which formerly—so lately as 1896—were usually for no more than three to five millions and covered no more than a period of one or at most two months, are now habitually for over 20 millions and cover a period of five months, while this vote, as introduced this year on 6th March, was for the immense sum of £34,700,000. All which is as manifestly for the lesser control by the House as much as it is for the greater convenience of the Minister, who now gets the power to spend thirty millions where, eighteen years ago, he only got power to spend three.

Then again, the aggregate of the Revenue granted for ever by permanent enactments without obligation to submit it annually to the House has greatly increased. In 1873-4 it was 68 millions, in 1906-7 it was 88 millions, in 1907-8 it was 91 millions, and in 1912-13 100 millions. The loss of Parliamentary control and the gain to the Minister of the day are manifest.

The forced construction of Standing Orders, wrested from their manifest intention and purpose to a more formal

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meaning, has brought a long series of losses in power to the House and gains to the Minister. Thus the wholesome rule laid down in 1667 "that no motion or proposition for an aid "or charge upon the people should be presently entered "upon," and that, as expressed in the existing Standing Order, "the consideration and debate thereof shall be "adjourned till such further day as the House appoints," is manifestly intended to give the House time, after the motion has been made and the sum stated, to consider deliberately the proposal and the sum, before it sanctions the proposal. In our days this provision is evaded and its purpose defeated, by making in the first instance a bare motion that the House will on such a day resolve itself into a Committee to consider of a grant, without any statement of its amount. This is abusively treated as the motion for an aid or charge, though no aid or charge is proposed or sum mentioned. And so, when the "further day" is reached, the grant or charge is for the first time sprung upon the House, its amount—often of many millions—for the first time revealed, and the House called upon then and there to decide upon it. The letter of the Standing Order is declared thus to be kept; the intent and meaning of it are none the less destroyed.

The House has now become merged in the Minister. The Minister, who during two centuries has sought to usurp the powers and impair the dignity of the King, and has to no little extent succeeded in so doing, has during the one present generation even more successfully and more completely usurped the powers of the House of Commons.

The leaders of both Parties are equally guilty. The House itself which has tamely accepted their behests in this respect is guiltiest of all, for it has parted not only with its own rights but with those of its successors. It could not have been done but for the absence of the conviction that the liberties of Parliament are superior to the interests of Party. But it is done. And the effect of it is that the House of Commons has all but ceased to be a deliberating assembly.

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It is hurried and hustled through bills it has scarcely seen, much less considered or debated. It has become little more than a register of the will of the Minister. It has ceased to do its most important business.

Into the hands of such a Commons' House we are told the Sovereignty of England ought to be and now is and is to be committed. This, it is asserted, is the proper and natural development and final form of our Constitution—that the Will of the People shall always prevail over all. If there be anywhere a Divine right formerly claimed for the King it is now in the People. In any case the Sovereignty is in the People, to be exercised at their will. Their will, however, is unknown. Some of them will one thing, some another. Their will, therefore, must be guessed at. This, we are asked to believe, can be guessed at accurately by virtue of what are called Representative institutions. You poll the constituencies; you take the nominee of the majority in each, even though that majority be only one more than the minority—it matters not, that is the plan—and you then take the majority of these 670 nominees, now called Members of Parliament, and by the same process you ascertain, or guess at, *their* will. But you need not take the majority of all the 670. You have decided that forty of them alone, and no more, will suffice to alter the Constitution or change the succession, to do in fact everything that all the 670 may do. So that although there be no more than the forty present you take a majority of them. Should they be forty-one, and nearly evenly divided, a majority of one will suffice. That one will suffice to decide the question. That is to be taken for the Will of the People, however important the matter on which it is declared. In effect that one man will have alone declared it. In effect the Divine Right of Kings has become the Divine Right of the Odd Man. Not the People's Will, but the will of the Odd Man is Sovereign. In so extreme a case the common sense of all would probably revolt, the vote be somehow rescinded, evaded or set aside, and another vote

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be taken in the hope and with the probability that there would result a majority of more than one. But suppose it to be three—as was the case in 1913 in a division critical for the Government—or suppose it to be thirty or sixty—the principle and effect are just the same. It is still neither the People nor the House that has decided but only the three, the thirty or the sixty odd men composing the majority. The rest of the eight millions may be indifferent, they may even be for the most part hostile, to the decision thus reached. It matters not. They are bound by the Odd Man. In that Odd Man, according to the claim now made, resides the supreme Sovereignty. There is—as is claimed—no longer any appeal—as once there was—from him to the House of Lords or to the King. There is none even to the People. King, Lords and People have all gone under and disappeared. The Odd Man has come to his own.

Nothing can be more absurd than such a claim, nothing more contrary to the Constitution, nothing more dangerous and full of risks. For the Odd Man of the House of Commons—whichever side he votes for—is rarely honest. His vote is scarcely ever given out of a sole regard for the public welfare. It is given almost always from passion, prejudice or self-seeking; usually because he is committed to a faction, which he is therefore bound to support and does support, even against such conscientious convictions as he may have, through thick and thin; occasionally because he is ignorant; sometimes because he confidently looks for a reward—be it no more than a Knighthood—for an unbroken career of “voting straight,” or because he has already an actual promise of that reward on that condition.

Such a Sovereignty so asserted and exercised would not alone be absolute; it must also be arbitrary. It must be shifting in notion, fitful in intent, varying in action, destitute of principle, impulsive, passionate. For that is the character of the whole House of Commons itself as well as of its Odd Man. Saturated with Party spirit, and honey-combed by the corruption always inseparable therefrom,

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swept by gusts of passion into unconsidered courses, bought and sold beforehand by the perpetual, astute, unprincipled intrigue for manufacturing and keeping the Odd Man, the absolute Sovereignty of such an Assembly would be intolerable to the subject and destructive of the Kingdom.

It is true that the Sovereignty would only last as long as the Parliament, that is to say for five years at the outside, and would then be replaced by another Sovereignty of another House of Commons, which would then perhaps, or probably, exercise its power in a different way. It is true that on the next ascertainment of the Will of the People by a General Election, that Will may declare for a new path or at least for new ways of walking in the present path. For one or the other it usually does declare. But that itself is a great danger. For it renders the Sovereignty the sport of the prevailing popular passion of the moment. A War, a Pestilence, or a Panic will return a Sovereign House of Commons of a kind wholly different from that which would result in ordinary times. In a month a wholly new Sovereignty with new passions, motives and purposes is established, and enters violently upon its novelties—which perhaps were never intended by the voters who returned the members. Unchecked and uncontrolled the Sovereign House rushes impetuously in the new direction, without regard for the past or care for the future. The Sovereignty has become the unimagined creature and tool of blind chance.

Moreover, the voters who have created the new Sovereignty have never had the chance of expressing their real Will. The two Party Caucuses, with their octopus tentacles spread over the whole country and with the bottomless Party Fund behind them, have in advance rendered that impossible. No constituency is ever allowed so much as to choose its own Candidate. No Candidate is ever allowed so much as to disclose his own principles or convictions—if he has any. The Candidate is indicated by the Caucus, and no other is allowed. The Party Cry, which is to stand in place of principles or convictions, is formulated by the Caucus in

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some cast-iron phrase, not one word whereof must suffer the least change. In 1906 the Conservative Party Cry was Protection with new Food Taxes; in 1910 it was Protection with new Food Taxes subject to a Referendum; in 1914 it is Protection without Food Taxes subject to no Referendum—and a free hand for all else. In 1906 the Liberal Party Cry was Free Trade and no Home Rule for that Parliament; in 1910 it was Free Trade, the People's Budget and a reformed House of Lords; in 1914 it is Free Trade, Home Rule and no House of Lords. On each occasion those who would or could not accept the Cry, the whole Cry and nothing but the Cry, were proscribed and, except in the rarest cases, were debarred even from candidature. One of the two Cries every voter had in each case to accept or to lose his voice. And in each case he voted, on the whole, not for the Cry he most loved but against the Cry he most feared. As he will do again and always. The Caucuses alone decide which of the two sauces he is to be cooked with. He may prefer a third sauce, or even not to be cooked at all. It matters not. He is left to his sole choice between the two. Stewed in the one or devilled with the other he must be; and sorrowfully recognizing this sad truth, he votes to be stewed rather than devilled. So it is that the Will of the People never finds true expression, but only the desire of the People to choose the lesser of two evils; and so it is that the Sovereign House of Commons is never more than the expression of that desire, never anything else than one of the horns of a dilemma—that one which has most voters impaled thereon.

The character of the English People expressed—if it could be expressed—in terms of Party, is this: they are of Cautious or Tory temper with adventurous or Liberal Leanings and Monarchical traditions. Engrossed in their business and their pleasures, they are scarcely informed at all of their own history or of its teachings, and their information of the politics of the day is wholly derived from the statements made by Partisan leaders and instruments whose main, whose sole object is to accredit themselves and

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to discredit those of the opposite Party. These statements are echoed and reinforced by a raging, roaring and often unscrupulous Press. Being (contrary to the common belief and their own) highly emotional and impulsive, the People fall a ready victim to what seems to them the more plausible of the two sets of denunciations reciprocally made against each other by the Parties or their Press. They are fearful and easily alarmed. When at a General Election they find an opportunity of expressing themselves, they vote, on the whole, against what seems to them the danger of the moment and the Party that embodies that danger. They vote therefore for the contrary Party. In 1832 they voted against the House of Commons as then constituted. In 1906 they voted against the Conservative Party as then led. It is not that they love the Party they vote for but that they fear the other Party. The cultivation of Fear is therefore the business to which Party Leaders and the Party Press most particularly devote themselves. The People are moved and the House of Commons is created by successive Panics—mostly unfounded. And it is always the Panic of the moment only. It is not a judgment founded on knowledge of the various acts of the condemned Party. Those acts are forgotten as though they had never been. For the People have no memory beyond a few weeks.

Even were the Will of the People truly and exactly expressed it could not avail to set up, contrary to the Constitution, an uncontrolled Sovereignty. But when thus evaded, cheated, falsified and poisoned, the House of Commons resulting from it is not truly entitled even to the authority of a free House of Parliament, much less to the supremacy of a Sovereign Power.

Our practical ancestors would never have consented to leave the Sovereignty in the uncontrolled hands of a single House. And wherever that has been attempted in any one of the many countries that have sought to copy our Constitution without understanding it, experience has justified their prudence. Nay, our own experience has justified it.

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For there did once exist for a space in England a House of Commons that usurped and exercised the Sovereignty and the Executive as well. It was called at successive stages of its career the Long Parliament and the Rump. It abolished the Lords altogether as "dangerous" and "useless." It made itself indissoluble except with its own consent, it confiscated estates, evicted clergymen, levied taxes and armies, commissioned Admirals and Generals, beheaded an Archbishop and a King, and left itself a Shame and Reproach to our history and a warning to all time. It declared its absolute Sovereignty by resolving (2nd January, 1648) that "whatsoever is enacted or declared for law by the Commons in Parliament assembled hath the force of law, and all the people of this nation are concluded thereby, although the consent and concurrence of the King and the house of peers be not had thereunto."

That is exactly what is claimed for the Commons' House now. The difference between the Commons' House of to-day and that of the Long Parliament is that the latter passed a self-denying ordinance prohibiting any of its members from accepting any office, civil or military; while the former has made all its members paid placemen with at least £400 a year each.

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THERE is this further difference: that the Long Parliament did itself exercise the Sovereignty it claimed, and that while it invaded and destroyed the freedom of all others, it at least kept its own freedom untouched by strangling Standing Orders and stifling rules. The present House has lost its freedom; and however absolute and uncontrolled a Sovereignty it might have, it would in the moment of obtaining it, part with it all to the Minister of the day.

The Royal Prerogative, to restrain and restrict which was

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so long the battle of the Constitution, has now become merely a convenient cloak for the Minister; wherefore the effort of the modern Minister is rather to enlarge than to narrow the Prerogative.

A claim has recently been set up that the exercise of the Prerogative, either in the making of treaties with Foreign Countries or in the bestowing of honours, is altogether beyond the purview of Parliament. Thus, although the Commercial Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 was submitted to (and rejected by) Parliament, as was also the French Treaty of 1860 and the Sugar Convention of 1902, Mr Asquith has claimed that it is not the custom to go to Parliament for assent to such a treaty, and that the Sugar Convention Additional Act, 1907, which restricts the export of Russian sugar, may be, and ought to be, made by Royal Prerogative alone without reference to Parliament. To repel the charge of a fictitious creation of dear sugar by laying the fault on the King is to invite an unmerited blame upon the Sovereign; for in fact it is not the Sovereign at all, but the Minister who made the Convention.

So, too, with Honours. Although Lord Oxford was impeached by the House of Commons for improperly recommending the making of twelve peers, the Minister now claims irresponsibility for any similar misdeed. And the claim is admitted. It has been laid down by Mr Speaker Lowther that a Minister may not now even be questioned in Parliament as to the advice for which he is responsible touching the bestowal of honours; which seems to propound the contradiction that, although responsible, the Minister may not be called on to respond, and which in any case carries the Prerogative further than it was ever hitherto held to extend. Here, too, it is not the Sovereign but the Minister whose power is enlarged. Perhaps this ruling will receive the reconsideration it needs. No peerage can be bestowed without the consent and concurrence at once of the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, who countersigns the Warrant, and the Lord Chancellor, who affixes the

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Great Seal to the Patent; and though a recent Prime Minister has privately assured his friends that he did not recommend two peerages which at the time caused great scandal, it remains that he must have agreed to and concurred with the preparation and issue of the Patents which bestowed them.

In Foreign Affairs the Minister covers himself completely with the mantle of Prerogative, shrouds in secrecy his acts until they are irrevocable, conceals often his policy itself, and carries on unchecked in the recesses of the Foreign Office those intrigues and conspiracies which go by the name of Diplomacy.

One of the most notable of recent changes in legislative practice is the increasing tendency to commit to the permanent Departments large powers to make "orders" having the effect of Acts of Parliament. In some instances—especially as regards the Army—those powers are committed to the King, in the shape of an authority to make "Orders in Council"; but in reality such orders are royal orders only in name, being, in fact, prepared and elaborated by and in the Departments concerned, and, in fact, the orders of the Minister. The practice is an unjustifiable delegation of Parliamentary authority, a confession that Parliament holds itself incompetent to do by its Acts what is needed; and to that extent it amounts to Parliamentary abdication.

But it all adds to the power of the Minister. The claim that Ministerial acts are acts in exercise of the Royal Prerogative, if it throws discredit on the throne, is thus made of the highest convenience to the Minister; for it enables him to escape all censure and even question. It sets up the doctrine that the Minister is the King and that being the King he can do no wrong and be called into no question. It acts as a shield for the Minister against Parliament.

Since 1714 the Cabinet Council has been the uncontrolled secret conclave of the Party in power at the moment. It is composed of the nominees of the Minister. The Privy

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Council which still, by law, is everything, has been in practice reduced to nothing; the Cabinet Council which by Law is nothing, has become everything. It is now the most powerful of all the elements of sovereignty, clothing itself with the name, the authority, the very oath of the Council it has displaced. One of the unwritten rules formerly was that it should have in it a preponderance of Peers, so that in his own Cabinet of 1783, William Pitt was the sole Commoner of the whole seven. Recently the rule has been that of equal division between Peers and Commons. Now it is the Commoners who preponderate in the proportion of 16 to 4 of the whole 20.

Such a body as the Cabinet was, indeed, the final and crowning need of a Minister who was thenceforth to reign alone—out of the knowledge even of the King, out of the control and securities of the Privy Council, and directing, as the nominee of a Party Cabinet, associates taken by himself from his own Party alone. Thenceforth the Minister was almost uncontrolled and all but irresponsible.

Hallam says: “All ministers speak loudly of their responsibility and are apt, upon faith of this imaginary guarantee, to obtain a previous confidence from parliament which they may in fact abuse with impunity. For should the bad success or detected guilt of their measures raise a popular cry against them, and censure or penalty be demanded by their opponents, they will infallibly shroud their persons in the dark recesses of the cabinet, and employ every art to shift off the burthen of individual responsibility.”* The Minister can no longer be impeached, he can no longer be punished in any way, however great his guilt, except by being ousted from office till the next turn of the wheel brings him back. The opposite Party have no desire to inflict on a misdoing Minister any penalty that might in after times be applied to themselves. They only desire to oust him in order to take his place.

* Hallam's *Constitutional History of England*, vol. III, p. 185. John Murray, 1867.

The Minister

Whenever the Commons' House has parted with its powers, all those powers have gone to the Minister. All the time, the initiative, the free liberty of speech that it has lost the Minister has gained, for use in the furthering his own Inventions, and those of his master the Caucus. To that extent the House has ceased to be. To that extent the Minister has replaced it and substituted himself for it. To that extent—and it is now nearly the whole—the House has become One Man. The wisdom of its many has become the arbitrary power of that One. It has lost its end and purpose. It has betrayed its trust. It has given to itself a Dictator. If at any moment it desires to know whither it is being led, it will be told to wait and see; when wait it must, for its powers are gone.

The House itself, for reasons already given, is eminently unfitted to exercise the absolute and final power of uncontrolled Sovereignty. But the Sovereignty under these conditions is not in the House at all. It is in the Minister. The Sovereignty of Parliament as a whole—King, Lords and Commons concurring in its exercise—has been replaced, not even by the One-House Sovereignty, which would be bad enough, but by the One-Man Sovereignty, which is worse. And, what is worst of all, is that the One Man is now himself the bond-slave of the Caucus that created him and maintains him. At last then we come to this, that, in these our days, neither Parliament, nor Commons' House, nor Minister is Sovereign, but in fact the One Caucus of the One Party dominant at the moment. That alone in the final resort is now absolute. And being absolute it is also from its nature arbitrary. In it Richard II is come again, who said "My laws are in my mouth and I alone can make and change the laws of my Kingdom." Whatever fantastic scheme it may have elaborated in the secrecy of the Back Parlours for bamboozling the electors, must be adopted, and is. For it is backed by the Machine with all its far-flung powers, enforced by the sanction of the Cash-Box bursting with the price of dishonouring Honours.

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The Ministry of the present Commons' House of Parliament seem to have taken to themselves David's adjuration to the Saints—with "a two edged sword in their hand to "execute vengeance upon the heathen, and punishments "upon the people; to bind their kings with chains and their "nobles with fetters of iron." With the one edge of their sword they have already executed such vengeance upon the heathen landlords that these are letting their homes to the stranger, selling their land to the speculator, and running to and fro to borrow money to pay their death duties; and such punishments upon the people that the humble charwoman and the small shopkeeper are at their wit's end to find their insurance pence. The other edge they present to their King to enforce his submission to chains which would forbid to him all movement or even thought, except so far as the chains and their will may allow; the Lords have already their fetters riveted upon them; and the saints, joyful in all this glory, are already singing loud songs of triumph upon their beds.

It is true that the saints have some obstacles still to surmount. The charwoman has revolted in Bethnal Green. Scots Sheriffs have been deforced over the sale of the Turriff Insurance Cow. That Cow, restored to freedom, has even given birth to a Calf. Ulster is armed and refuses to have vengeance executed upon it, while the Army is reluctant to be led to dragoon a loyal province. The King's chains begin to look like wisps of straw, the Lords have slipped one of their fetters and are threatening therewith to brain a saint or two of those who shackled them. There is a hint of resistance throughout. The saints are still joyful in glory, they still sing aloud upon their beds. But they are a trifle less glorious and there is a tremor in their song.

For there are Portents and Omens abroad.

"Unless the Members of this House are gentlemen the "business of this House cannot possibly be conducted," said Mr Speaker Peel. Whereby he presumably meant that,

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if not gentlemen by birth or breeding, they must at least so far behave as such as to be always honourable and fair and usually considerate and gentle—in a word that they should be mannerly. In those days there were—as there always should be—men of the People in the House. But they behaved as gentlemen. That cannot be said now of all the Members. The manners of the House have become bad.

The respect in which the House is held has vastly diminished. “How are you getting on?” said one to a small Hampshire farmer, thinking to hear of weather and crops. The answer was “We should get along well enough if it “weren’t for those Fools in Parliament.”

The general public interest in the proceedings of the Commons’ House, once so great, is well nigh lost. It subsists still in the menaced wealthier classes and accordingly there is still a fairly full report of the Commons’ proceedings in *The Times* and the *Morning Post*, though even in them much less full than formerly was the case. But it scarcely exists at all in the great mass of the people whom the halfpenny papers provide with news. A short paragraph of Parliamentary report or no report at all, suffices for them, while columns and pages are filled with prize fights and football matches. Only when the proceedings in the House resemble a prize fight or a football match is any detailed account given of them by those who cater for the tastes of the people at large.

When the Commons’ House has ceased to be the slave and vassal of the Minister, it will begin to recover the esteem it has lost. When the Minister has ceased to be the creature of the Caucus and the instrument of Corruption, he will begin to resume the faculty of Statesmanship. When both have resumed their due rights both may be trusted to exercise their due powers for the common welfare of the State.

But neither then nor ever can either the House or the Minister be trusted with the Sovereignty of the Kingdom.

REASON

THE KING: "Show Me that Jurisdiction where
"Reason is not to be heard."

BRADSHAW: "Sir, We show it you here, *The Commons of*
England."

(Trial of King Charles I before the Court of Justice presided over by John Bradshaw, as Sergeant-at-Law. 22nd Jan., 1648-1649. Clarendon's *History of the Grand Rebellion, Completed*. pp. 757-758. London, 1715.)

HOME RULE—SO FAR

WHAT UNDERLIES IT

THE House of Commons rose for the Easter recess in avowed general conspiracy to block its own business, and separated jesting elaborately over its own degradation—a sad spectacle for all who would still respect it.

In truth the House cares nothing for Public Affairs. It cares for nothing else and takes no interest in anything else than the struggle for office, pay, power and consideration between the two sets of gentlemen sitting on the two front benches.

Recently, indeed, certain Back-Benchers, suddenly appalled at the prospect of civil war apparently impending, have begun, not indeed to assert themselves as members of Parliament having a duty to themselves as well as to the country and determined to do it, but timorously to hint that if “the Party Whips are taken off” they may for once contribute a suggestion for a settlement of Home Rule by consent, and vote thereon according to their conscience. This request will, of course, only be received with an arrogant Front Bench smile. The Back-Benchers may bleat as they will. They will, in the end, tamely follow their bell-wethers through the gap. The Whips and the Caucus will see to that, as they always have done. Thus the Front Benches argue. The old game will go on.

For the purpose of this game it is that there are invented from time to time what are called “questions,” thought likely to interest the country and cozen the electors. Griev-

Home Rule—So Far

ances, real or imaginary, public or private, scandals political and personal, panics real and imaginary, are set up one after the other, solely for the purpose of enabling the Front Benches to play a plausible part in the game.

Sometimes, in the search for such "questions," it chances that a real question is accidentally blundered into. Such is the Home Rule Question. For centuries the need of Ireland for a government which would fit her better than that with which England provided her, has been genuine and pressing. Only the shallow politician, or the casual tourist who relies upon the pleasing utterances of a soft-spoken jarvey, believes that the Irish of the south are contented with their existing form of government, or that absolutely nothing need be done.

But this is not why Home Rule has become the "question" of the hour in its most aggravated and distressing form. That is merely as a move in the Party Game, due to the fact that the Nationalist vote could determine a majority in the Commons.

The members of the present Government are men of parts and dexterity, at once more audacious, more reckless and more able than those by whom they are confronted. They have shown unexpected resources. They have put the Constitution into abeyance and the House of Lords in a cupboard until such time as, without hindrance from either, their own revolutionary plans have been enacted. They have thus slipped two aces up their sleeve and, as Mr Labouchere said of Mr Gladstone, claim that "they have been placed there by divine decree for a high and holy purpose." With advantages so entirely novel the Ministry could not fail to pass whatever it might desire through the House of Commons. The merits of the Home Rule Bill have nothing to do with its success there. What the Bill is has mattered nothing to the mixed Coalition which the Prime Minister has kept together by concessions all round—often of principle and sometimes of his own honour. They, on every occasion, declare it to be wholly

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perfect. Nor have its merits mattered more to the Opposition. They, on every occasion, have declared it to be wholly infamous and disastrous. Neither side believes what it says; both sides are determined to use the Bill for their own purposes.

Nevertheless the merits of the Bill are not without importance to those who may have to live under it. Such fragmentary and occasional references as have been made to those merits have usually been marked by a careful avoidance of that which underlies the Bill and explains the bitter resistance to it offered by Ulster. That which does underlie it is the deep-rooted Protestant hatred of priestly interference in civil and social affairs, and the grave apprehension felt that, under the proposed system of Home Rule, there will be established in Ireland a State more completely clerical than has ever existed in the most bigoted and priest-ridden country yet known.

The Church of Rome has deserved well of this world. It was the first nurse of Christianity, the first missionary of that assuredly divine revelation that the duty of men is to love one another. Throughout the dark ages it was—although the enemy of philosophy and science—yet the sole guardian of learning, and all but the sole depositary of knowledge. It is to-day still the great pillar of Conservatism. But whenever it has sought to add to spiritual teaching the exercise of mundane authority it has failed. The failure is attested by the ruins of every state that has ever been brought to submit its subjects to the complete political and social domination of the priesthood. To free and high spirited peoples that domination was from the first odious. It was not that they questioned the religion which the Church had promulgated, or doubted its dogma. It was that they would not admit the impracticable spiritual Priest into the practical, actual, immediate control of their mundane, political and social affairs. As early as anywhere this repudiation of the Church from secular affairs was made in England. It began long before the Reformation separated

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the Church of England in the sixteenth century from the Church of Rome. In the eleventh century the Church was deprived of secular jurisdiction. In the twelfth century the Constitutions of Clarendon took from Clerks their special immunities and brought them under the secular law. In the fourteenth century, the Statutes of Provisors, of Mortmain and of Præmunire further checked the encroachment of the priest; while John of Gaunt and Wycliffe boldly assailed the abuses of the clergy and claimed full secular independence for the State. The Reformation had made itself long before Henry VIII. He only recognized it, formulated it, and carried it through; wherein he did but do as his people had long desired. And neither then nor ever was it a denial of the essential dogma of the Church of Rome, but only the expression of the English resolve that England would not have its secular affairs ordered by any priests, however good, or governed by any Church, however venerable.

The resistance which began with the Conqueror continued up to William III, whose acceptance as a Protestant King marked the triumph of Protestant resistance to secular priest-craft. It was because James II “did endeavour “to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion, and the “laws and liberties of this Kingdom,” that he was deprived of his crown. It was because the English people were determined thenceforth to take securities against priestly rule that the Bill of Rights called upon all those who had to take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy to swear that “I do from my heart abhor, detest, and abjure, as impious “and heretical, that damnable doctrine and position, “that princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, “or any authority of the see of Rome, may be deposed or “murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever. “And I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, “state or potentate hath, or ought to have, any jurisdiction, “power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm.” It was because of this that the same statute declared it “inconsistent with the

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“safety and welfare of this protestant kingdom, to be governed by a popish prince, or by any king or queen marrying “a papist.” And it was because of this also that the Act of Settlement required the Sovereign to make that uncompromising and designedly offensive and insulting declaration against papacy which has only within the last few years been abandoned. All this took its completion in the year 1700, little over 200 years ago; since when priest-craft has been so ousted from England that the English people, with their short political memories, have almost ceased to believe that it ever existed. Nevertheless the determination to resist it still lies deep down in their hearts and is felt by them as strongly as ever—as was seen a few years ago when their feeling was aroused by a threatened Roman Catholic procession in Westminster. The feeling is latent, but it exists in all its strength, and should it ever be seriously challenged again in this country it will burst forth more strongly than it has ever done in Ulster.

We, in England, who so long entertained the same fears as Ulster, who made the same resistance and who, with much pain and tribulation, effected a Revolution to ensure its success, cannot but understand the existence there of the passions which once existed here. Ulster is where England once was. There the fear of sacerdotal government is still entertained. There it is believed that the Roman Catholic archbishops, bishops and clergy will, in effect, be the governors of the State so soon as the Home Rule system is there established. In England there certainly is not now any hatred or condemnation of the Roman Catholic religion as a religion. Though there always was, and still is, the same resistance to allowing priests (of that or of any other religion) to share in the civil government and the family life of the country, yet there never has been any detestation of the Roman Catholic Church as a Church, but, on the contrary, a grateful acknowledgment of the many benefits derived from it. That is not so in Ulster. The hatred of priest-craft has grown there into a hatred of the religion itself,

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met on the other side by a greater love for that religion, provoked and intensified by Protestant expressions of animosity. "To hell with the Pope" and "To hell with King William" are cries which do really represent the bitterness of the antagonism between the two sets of Irishmen. Such hatred Englishmen now find it hard to understand, though such they themselves once felt. That is why there is so strenuous a resistance in Ulster to the Home Rule Bill, which Ulster rightly or wrongly believes will throw down in Ireland the structure of civil and religious liberty, of which the foundations were laid, there, as in England, by what is still known as the "great and glorious Revolution."

This feeling the Opposition in the House of Commons has never sincerely shared. But it has taken advantage of it. The Conservative Party while it existed, and the Unionist Party now its successor, have always given great prominence and power to those who represent the Protestant ascendancy in Ulster. In the Party, in all its clubs and social fields of distinction, there will infallibly be found an Irish ascendancy peer put forward in a prominent position and exercising an authority to which no ordinary English gentleman of the same quality can attain. and with passions playing their parts, and the prospect of civil war in Ireland at hand as a new asset, the Opposition has found itself strongly reinforced, and much encouraged in that game for place for which alone it really cares. Had it not been shackled in its efforts by its own foolish mistakes in the past, still more foolishly persisted in at the present, and most foolishly threatened to be continued in the future, the Opposition would have had a great opportunity of defeating the Bill and of thus winning its game. But the monomania of Tariff Reform which has struck it as with the palsy, has deprived it of its best men and has enabled the remaining second-best men to use the Caucus in order to keep out of Parliament all those who might compete with them for the posts of office. This has been fatal.

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The Opposition has been as weak and incapable in action as it has been violent in language. Ulster alone has shown itself strong, capable, unbending—and successful. And if, as now seems possible, the Carson compromise of leaving Ulster out of the Bill until Parliament, upon an expression of her own desire, brings her into it, be adopted, then indeed it will be seen how one strong man may stiffen up a weak Party.

The opportunities for coming to an agreement which were opened up in September last have been wantonly thrown away by the Ministry. Seven precious months which might have brought us nearer to peace have been lost. And meantime all the passions that make for Civil War have necessarily been rising. The Army has broken in the hands of the Government—nay, has been broken by the Government itself to its own sole discredit. The Ulster forces, so long and so dangerously denied and ridiculed, have completely outmanœuvred and beaten the Minister. Allowed to organize and drill and prepare their plans without let or hindrance, and vainly and timidly challenged with a Royal Proclamation forbidding the importation of arms into Ireland, which was promptly declared by the Courts to be ineffectual, they suddenly tripped the Ministers and threw them on the flat of their backs by that most extensive, complete and successful importation of arms achieved by the “Fanny” under the very eyes, and in the very presence, of coastguardsmen, police and custom-house officers appointed to prevent it. It may be suspected that even these officials secretly joined in enjoyment of the hugest Irish Joke ever perpetrated to the shame and confusion of any Government. It took place on 25th April. This was the day of St Mark, the Evangelist who records the miracle of making the blind to see. It may, perhaps, make Mr Churchill see that in the Irish game he is no match for Sir Edward Carson. It may perhaps convince the War Office that in spirit and in brains, and even in organization and tactics, it will always be far behind the

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Ulster Council. It has shown that a British Army sent under War Office generals to coerce Ulster will—unless it fraternizes with the “rebels”—be outmanœuvred at every point. It has shown that General Macready has been made Military and Civil dictator of Belfast for nothing. And it has been hailed with shouts of scorn and laughter by all Europe. This is final proof of the impotency to which the Government is reduced. Yet this too may make, not for Peace but still for Civil War, unless the Ministry will, even now at the eleventh hour, accept the one issue from the situation, always hitherto rejected, of an appeal to the people by a dissolution, either of Parliament or of themselves. For the tardy acceptance, hinted at and proposed—of all people—by Mr Churchill, can but leave Federation still to be invented and formulated, and the Home Rule Bill to be completely altered into a Federal measure. With every day and every incident we seem to be drifting more surely to a catastrophe.

In despite of the Opposition the Constitution has for the moment been destroyed and set aside. In their despite the House of Lords has been denied its rights and removed from its authority. In their despite we are now threatened with the destruction of the Kingship and therewith the removal of all that may stand in the way of the Minister, the casual creature of a single House. We may yet see the Minister sovereign in England and a priesthood sovereign in Ireland. We may yet see the resistance to such a sovereignty culminating in a civil war, extending not to Ireland only but to England. Neither is yet certain. Both are at present conceivable.

Nevertheless, it is possible that a new, great, and so far unexpected event may change the whole situation. The resources of the Constitution are not yet finally exhausted. The House of Lords still exists. So does the King.

An Appeal

AN APPEAL

FROM one week to another, almost from one day to another, the chances of an Irish settlement ebb and flow. How it will end no man can tell, but the unimaginative English mind is becoming gradually impressed by the extreme gravity of the position into which we have drifted. How can it be otherwise when we are called upon to lay a ghost which has haunted us and our fathers for centuries? All the crimes and follies of our rulers since the days of the Plantagenets, the invasions, the confiscations, the merciless extirpation and treacherous revenge, the proscription of race and creed, and the long stubborn resistance—these are the relics of an unforgotten past which stand between the two nations in Ireland at the solemn moment when we are trying to bring them together. It is something to have come to realize that there are realities in front of us such as were not dreamt of twelve months ago either by the “Knights harbinger” of the Primrose League or by the Nonconformist grocers who attended Mr Lloyd George’s meetings and roared with merriment at the “wooden guns” of Ulster Protestants. These worthies are less demonstrative now. Every one recognizes that our present difficulties are the consequence of old mistakes. Our great anxiety must be to avoid committing new mistakes.

There are at this moment two most formidable dangers. One is lest Home Rulers may be so infatuated as to think that this Irish question can be settled by force. The other is lest Unionists may be so blind as to suppose that the Irish question can remain unsettled any longer. Let all sides have the grace to see that now is the time and that whatever is done must be done by consent. Otherwise we shall only be opening a new chapter in the sad history of Ireland with a fresh stain of blood; and shall revive in England also old troubles—the relations of the Army to Parliament, the slumbering antipathy towards Roman

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Catholics, the prerogative of the Crown. By the side of such issues how small must appear the differences which now seem to excite the House of Commons beyond the limits of self-control! What in comparison does it matter whether a dissolution takes place next month, or six months hence, or a twelvemonth hence? What does it really signify whether parts of Ulster are to be excluded until Parliament otherwise decides, or are to be included in so many years unless Parliament otherwise decides, seeing that Parliament at any time can decide anything it pleases?

What we want is a little time and a little quiet reflection and a little good will. What we have is a House of Commons lashed to fury by party hatred and in a large degree disabled by party pledges from supporting what it knows to be the true need of the nation.

In this predicament those who love their country have been looking in vain for some way of safety. It is very difficult to find. Very few could make themselves heard in the din which prevails, and if any person other than an accredited spokesman of one or other of the half-demented crowds were to try, his voice would be drowned in a whirlwind of insolent invective. Possibly some accredited spokesman will come to his senses and pluck up courage to tell his followers the truth. He would find an echo among millions. But no such hero has yet appeared.

Failing individuals can we find help in our Institutions?

It is natural that men should look to the Crown in the hour of danger ; but in a crisis of this kind every decent man's first prayer should be to keep the Sovereign out of the fray. What has an honest gentleman to do with the intrigues and manipulations and manœuvres of parties in their endeavour to wriggle out of their public or private pledges? The Crown has far too momentous an influence upon public opinion to be warranted in placing it in hazard by the least departure from strict constitutional usage. Can anything then be hoped from the House of Lords? A singular chance enables that Assembly within two years of

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its humiliation to render the most signal of all services, to save us from shedding one another's blood. If the House of Lords will lay aside personal feeling and party feeling and will honestly try to amend the Bill in a spirit of sympathy with both sides in Ireland, so as to make it a workable measure, it might even now bring peace. It would not be possible more nobly to avenge whatever wrongs the House of Lords may think they have endured. Will they rise to the occasion? Their actual power is of the smallest. The lapse of a month leaves them defenceless against the Parliament Act. But some of the greatest things done in all our history have been done with the smallest resources. Everything depends upon the spirit. If a loyal attempt is made without bitterness, without thought of their own grievances, without regard to the bonds by which the House of Commons is manacled, then a just and manly compromise may be procured at the last moment, and generations to come may, in all sincerity, still thank God that they have a House of Lords.

London, 1st May

ARMS

“**T**HE Lords Spiritual and temporal and Commons
“ assembled at Westminster . . . do in the first place
“ (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the
“ vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties,
“ declare: That the subjects which are protestants may have
“ arms for their defence, suitable to their conditions, and
“ as allowed by law.”

(*The Bill of Rights*, 1688—Section I.)

THE ARMY AND THE MINISTER

PUTTING MATTERS TO THE PROOF

“And really rather than I would
“have this kingdom break in pieces
“before some company of men be
“united together to a settlement, I will
“withdraw myself from the army to-
“morrow and lay down my commission.
“I will perish before I hinder it.”

Oliver Cromwell at the General
Council of Officers, Putney, 28th
October, 1647. Stainer's *Speeches*
of Oliver Cromwell.

FROM his place upon the front Ministerial bench in the House of Commons Mr Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and a Great Officer of State, has proclaimed that the new banner of party warfare is to bear the words “The Army *versus* the People.”

It is high time that the situation which has brought about this notable utterance be examined critically and candidly. What does this battle cry mean? Why has it been raised? Whither does it lead?

The facts that have provoked it, clouded as they are by the quibbles and prevarications of the party politicians, are fairly simple.

A giant parliamentary majority was obtained by the Liberals in 1906. They attempted to deal with the ever present Irish question in the way which commended itself to them. The ill-fated measure of Mr Birrell, known as the Irish Council Bill, was the considered solution of the

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Government at a moment when they were still free and before they had fallen under the heel of the Irish Nationalists. It was a good solution. But it was abortive. It fell still-born as the result of the hostility, not of the parliamentary leaders of the Irish Party, but of the Caucus which governs them. The People's Budget followed; the House of Lords opposed it and after the first General Election in 1910 the Liberals remained in Office. They were, however, no longer masters in the House; they were but a minority dependent for retaining office upon the adherence of two other parties one of which was the Irish Nationalist Party. The House of Lords bowed before the storm, consented to their own exclusion to save the King, and the Parliament Act became law.

Then there followed, as the first fruits of the Parliament Act, the Home Rule Bill of 1912. Whether or not the question was before the electors in 1910 is a matter of strenuous dispute between the Parties. Whatever may be said as to this, no one can suggest that any single elector could have prophesied the form of legislation to be promulgated. Indeed it is obvious that the moulding of the Bill took place in consultation between the Liberal Ministers and their Nationalist allies after the election was over. Since then the Nationalists have accorded single-hearted and diligent support to other Ministerial measures for which they had admittedly no liking and it is suggested that this is the result of a compact. Concerning this compact the dispute is rather as to the ethical judgment to be passed upon it than as to its existence. Is it in writing? What are its terms? These questions have been asked but not conclusively answered. The Conservatives have suggested that the mere existence of any such alliance is base, and unworthy of the dignity of an Imperial Government, that the Nationalists are avowed enemies of the country and that any compact with them must be dishonourable. To this the Liberals reply that a coalition necessarily involves some give and take upon both sides, and that when the Liberals

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(as Mr Birrell says) "love" Home Rule there is nothing dishonourable in their standing shoulder to shoulder in an agreement with those for whose benefit it is to be accorded to do so. These questions must remain unsolved until the terms, form and nature of the compact are made known.

In any case the Home Rule Bill has progressed upon its course. It has been twice rejected by the House of Lords and has re-appeared unaltered upon the table of the House of Commons—unaltered and unalterable except by agreement with the despised and suppressed House of Lords, to whom, in this concourse of ironies, the last word thus belongs.

During these years since its first appearance other things have happened. The bulk of the Irish people are proud of their Celtic blood and of the Roman Catholic faith to which they belong. One quarter of the population of Ireland belongs to another race and to another faith. For centuries the hatred between the two has been fierce and well merited. The people of the North live sufficiently closely together and are sufficiently united to form a unit which is conveniently termed Ulster, although a frontier delimitation would not be coterminous with that of the old province of the name.

Ulster has deliberately and seriously prepared to resist by force the application of a law which would transfer its allegiance from a government in which it has full confidence, and towards which it feels the deepest loyalty, to one which it regards with terror and detestation.

Whether it was wise or unwise of Ulster to talk of resistance, talk she did, and more. She organized and armed a force of troops amounting, it is said, to over one hundred thousand men. All too slowly it dawned upon the Government that this was not a mere jest. The signs of that dawn were two-fold.

One body of Liberal thought, recognizing the appalling seriousness of the situation, appealed for settlement by consent. The first important utterance of this idea came

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from Lord Loreburn in his letter of September, 1913, to *The Times*. The highest expression of it was in the words of the King's Speech upon the opening of Parliament. The Prime Minister has at times seemed to favour this idea, at others to be averse from it, and somewhat the same may be said of the chief speakers on behalf of the Opposition. As an observer in the Commons remarked, "all seems going on well till they get near to one another and then, in an instant, they leap apart and all hope is over." One wise thing was said by the Prime Minister, he deprecated as utterly useless the shouting of offer and counter-offer from platform to platform. But what is now being done—the shouting of offer and counter-offer from one side of the House of Commons to the other, amid the cheers and counter-cheers of heated partisans—is ten times worse. Such shoutings are but incidents in the Party Game for which the House cares more than for Home Rule or the Kingdom of Heaven.

The other movement evolved by the recognition of the seriousness of Ulster's preparations for resistance was what may be termed the bellicose movement. At first this feeling was subdued, or at least confined to the humbler members of the Liberal Party. It found faint utterance on the lips of the Prime Minister at Leeds and still fainter during the first skirmishes in the Commons. After the Government had made their offer of temporary county exclusion, and after some of the leading organs of the Liberal Press had urged the extension of the offer to what Sir Edward Carson had promised to submit to Ulster, it appeared to the bellicose section of the party that a stiffening process was necessary, and steps to effect this were instantly taken. What these steps were we shall endeavour to describe.

The Ulster arming movement had not resulted in riots or disorder; quite the contrary. The customary rows and "ructions" had been rigorously suppressed, and the Province was unusually free from disturbance or breach

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of the peace. Perhaps it was the consciousness of strength which restrained the people, perhaps the sage advice of their leaders. Whatsoever the cause, the worst provocation which Mr Birrell could suggest that the Nationalists of the border line had suffered was that "volunteer sentries "pop out upon them" and "ask them for watchwords." The importation of arms had been forbidden by a Government order of more than doubtful legality; but it had been resisted only by appeal to the law. The difficulty of proving illegality in the action of the leaders had prevented their arrest. A proposal to resist a future law is not even a technical breach of an existing law. All was quiet along the Boyne.

Then occurred what was said by the Conservative Party to be a plot on the part of the bellicose members of the Cabinet to intimidate or coerce Ulster. This suggestion has been hotly repudiated by the Liberals concerned and attempts on both sides have been made to distort words and to whip up feeling in the matter. What is not denied is asserted as though it were, and what is not asserted is feverishly denied.

Let us see what are the bare facts.

A Cabinet council was held on 11th March, 1914, at which certain naval and military movements were authorized by the Cabinet presided over by Mr Asquith.

Upon Saturday, the 14th March, Mr Winston Churchill delivered a defiant and provocative speech at Bradford in which he declared that "there are worse things than "bloodshed even on an extensive scale" and added "let "us go forward together and put these grave matters to "the proof."*

On the 18th March a meeting took place between the then Secretary of State for War, Col. Seely, and Sir Arthur Paget, the Commander in Chief in Ireland, at which Lord Morley, Mr Birrell, Mr Winston Churchill, Sir J. Simon,

* *The Times*, 16th March, 1914.

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Sir John French, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Spencer Ewart, then a member of the Army Council, and other officers were also present, and at which Sir Arthur Paget received verbal instructions not as yet published.

On Thursday, the 19th March, there ensued that Debate in the Commons wherein Mr Asquith showed himself so uncompromising that Sir Edward Carson, holding it for "the last word," said that he felt he ought to be in Belfast and thereupon departed for that town that very afternoon.

That same day a second meeting was held between Col. Seely and Sir Arthur Paget at which Sir John French and Sir Spencer Ewart were present. As to the instructions given to Sir Arthur Paget at that interview we have also no information.

On that very afternoon Mr Churchill telegraphed to the Vice-Admiral commanding the 3rd Battle Squadron to send all the Squadron, except the "Britannia" (that is seven battleships manned by over 5,000 men) to Lamlash, and himself to go to London for instructions, while the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet was the next day ordered to send two divisions of the 4th Flotilla to join the 3rd Battle Squadron at Lamlash on Monday, the 23rd March.*

That these orders were to be given was alleged by Mr Churchill to have been known to Mr Asquith upon 11th March.† Nevertheless, upon the 25th March Mr Asquith said in the Commons:

"The *utmost* assistance which the Navy afforded in this
"very moderate and modest military operation was to send
"two small cruisers to assist in the movement of troops
"from one point to another. That operation was ordered,
"as I have said, as far back as the 14th March."‡

* Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 373.

† See Mr Churchill in the Commons, 2nd April, when he said that on 11th March "authority was given by the Cabinet for such a movement to be "made, the Prime Minister being present at the time" (Official Report, 2nd April, 1914).

‡ Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 409.

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And what is even more startling is that, when more seriously challenged on 22nd April, and asked "on what date he first became aware of these orders to the fleet," he replied: "I became aware that these orders had been given on the morning of the 21st, and at my suggestion they were countermanded."

The story of the orders seemed now complete. They were not authorized by the Cabinet nor by Mr Asquith. They were issued by Mr Churchill on the 19th and 20th without Mr Asquith being yet aware of them. On the 21st when the third battle Squadron was two-thirds of its way to Lamlash, Mr Asquith first became aware of what it was doing, countermanded the orders, and the Navy was "returned to store."

But on these facts Mr Asquith on Thursday, 23rd April, put a new gloss. He now said that the movement of the Battle Squadron was decided on the 11th March, but that "the date and details" were left to Mr Churchill, and that in any case the movement "was not and was never intended to be a part of the precautionary measures."

Every craftsman who knows how Governments work, must see what happened. Mr Asquith was in fact not aware of what had happened at the Cabinet on the 11th. He was there, but was either asleep (as we know has often happened in Cabinets) or was inattentive. Mr Churchill proceeded with his plan. But on the 20th it became apparent that neither officers nor men of the Army would play their destined part in it. Then Mr Asquith was fully informed for the first time. He stopped the Navy on the fateful Saturday. And on the fateful Monday following his Army Council accepted the refusal of the Army to act. It was all over, and now, when Mr Churchill's audacious part is become manifest, Mr Asquith, true to that so-called loyalty which prescribes the sacrifice of candour to an erring colleague, tries to cover him by explaining away his own self and his own words. This kind of procedure is old and well known.

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It is a part of what is called the honour of public life. It is, in fact, a part of the dishonour of public men. Among other than public men it is called shuffling.

It is useless to pretend that the Navy was not intended to take part in the ringing round of Ulster. The Vice-Admiral of the Battle Squadron ordered to Lamlash knew well what was meant, for, on receiving his orders, he suggested that H.M.S. "King Edward VII" should embark at Devonport, "four or eight field guns for exercising the men during the bad weather which may be expected." "Bad weather!" There was none due or threatened, and if there were it was not then that such exercises could be carried on. "Bad weather" was apparently a code expression really signifying "fighting in Ulster." This fact alone, apart from the mysterious orders that naval officers were to communicate secretly with Sir Nevil Macready, already appointed Military and Police Dictator at Belfast, and were to "wear plain clothes ashore" all show what was meant and how far it had all gone.

But to resume the narrative. On Friday, the 20th of March, Sir Arthur Paget, who had returned to Ireland, sent for and spoke to General Gough, who as the result of the conversation appears to have considered himself dismissed the Service. Sir Arthur then held a Military Council of the Seven Generals of Brigades and Divisions to whom he gave instructions and certain questions to be put to the officers of their commands. The generals including General Gough made communications to their commands, and it is openly asserted that all these communications included a definite statement that the Government were on the point of undertaking a large expedition of 25,000 men to coerce Ulster, and further that among these communications the words "battle," "engage the enemy" and "campaign" were used. However this may be, the officers of the cavalry division, practically to a man, chose the alternative of dismissal, which was offered to them, and General Gough sent to the War Office the following letter:

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“With reference to the communication from the War Office conveyed to me verbally by the Commander-in-Chief this morning, I have the honour to report the result of my interviews with the officers of my brigade. The officers are of unanimous opinion that further information is essential before they are called upon at such short notice to make decisions so vitally affecting their whole future, and especially that a clear definition should be given of the terms ‘Duty as ordered,’ and ‘active operations’ in Ulster.

“If such duty consists of the maintenance of order and the preservation of property, all the officers in this brigade, including myself, would be prepared to carry out that duty.

“But if the duty involves the *initiation* of active military operations against Ulster, the following number of officers by regiments would respectfully and under protest prefer to be dismissed.”*

The same evening Sir Arthur Paget telegraphed to Col. Seely:

“Officer commanding 5th Lancers states that all officers, except two and one doubtful, are resigning their Commissions to-day. I much fear same condition in 16th Lancers. Fear men will refuse to move.”†

And later on the same evening he telegraphed:

“Regret to report Brigadier and fifty-seven officers, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, prefer to accept dismissal if ordered north.”‡

The reply to Sir Arthur Paget was sent at midnight as follows:

“... You have authority of Army Council to suspend from duty any senior officers who have tendered their resignations or in any other manner disputed your authority. . . . Direct Gough and Officers commanding

* White Paper, Cd. 7318 of 1914.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*

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“5th and 16th Lancers to report themselves to the Adjutant-General at the War Office without delay. They should leave by first possible boat. They should be relieved of their Commands, and officers are being sent to relieve them at once.”*

At the same hour Col. Seely telegraphed:

“Your second telegram just received. It is not clear whether any officers of the 4th Hussars implicated or whether you have any reason to complain of officers commanding that regiment. Please reply at once.”†

And at 6 a.m. on Saturday, the 21st March, received the reply:

“All officers 4th Hussars doing duty are implicated. Believe Colonel is present, but will wire again.”‡

At 10.37 a.m. Col. Seely further received a telegram to the effect that Sir Arthur Paget was going to the Curragh Camp and on Saturday (21st) he went. Again we have no authoritative or official statement of the words used by him, although again it is confidently asserted that he spoke of “massacres,” of “battles” and of “bumping into the enemy.” Whatever words he may have used it is clear that he confirmed every officer in the opinion that a campaign in Ulster was intended, and in the determination to accept the dismissals offered to them as an alternative to engaging therein.

To this there was an exception—Col. Hogg of the 4th Hussars. This officer, while withdrawing his own resignation, consulted with General Gough and with his approval sent the following personal telegram to his old brother officer, Mr Winston Churchill:

“Personal.—To-day all officers Cavalry brigade required to decide whether prepared to accept liability active opera-

* White Paper. Cd. 7318 of 1914

† Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, 2nd April. The 4th Hussars is Mr Winston Churchill's own old regiment.

‡ Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, 2nd April.

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“tions in Ulster on pain of dismissal. Enormous majority
“ready to accept dismissal, but later adopted proposal that
“authorities should be asked to define employment. Brigadier and great majority ready to undertake duties of
“preserving order and property provided no initiative in
“offensive action against Ulster contemplated. Convinced
“if tactfully handled Brigade can be saved, but if unconditional service demanded from outset Brigadier and
“practically all officers will accept dismissal. Appeal to you
“to ensure sensible handling.—Hogg.”*

Mr Winston Churchill made no reply. The “Sensible handling” which the Brigade received will be shown hereafter. Colonel Hogg reported himself with the other Colonels and General Gough at the War Office on Monday morning.

On the fateful Monday, 23rd March, the thing came to a head.

There was a meeting at the War Office between Col. Seely, Field-Marshal Sir John French, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Sir J. S. Ewart, Adjutant-General of the Forces—which three were a quorum of the Army Council competent, as Colonel Seely said, “to send an Army Council letter or to make an Army Council decision”†—on the one side; and General Gough and Sir Arthur Paget on the other. Colonel Seely tells us that on his asking General Gough “How has this difficulty arisen?” General Gough replied:

“Because we thought we were going to be asked to
“coerce Ulster, and that an immediate movement was to be
“made in which we were to take the initiative . . . that
“seemed to us to go outside of the lawful orders which we
“are bound to obey.”‡

Upon this Colonel Seely began to “back down.” He said to the General:

“I think it proper to tell you clearly that H.M. Government have no intention whatever to take advantage of

* Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, 21st April.

† *Ibid.*, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 397.

‡ *Ibid.*, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 393.

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“the right to protect the civil power whenever attacked,
“or however attacked, in order to crush political opposi-
“tion.”*

Upon this General Gough said:

“There have been so many misunderstandings already,
“would it not be better that this clear statement should
“be put in writing to me?”†

Agreeing that this was “not only desirable, but necessary,” Colonel Seely departed and left the Adjutant-General “to make a rough draft for me to consider.”‡ Colonel Seely stated the situation to the Cabinet and went away to report to the King. The Cabinet deliberated upon the matter. The rough draft was then sent for by the Cabinet and was found to consist of many paragraphs. It was not, we are informed by Mr Winston Churchill,§ redrafted by the Cabinet, but the Prime Minister, who knew the mind of the Cabinet, himself shortened it to three paragraphs in Mr Churchill’s presence after the Council had broken up. Lord Morley, who was present throughout the Cabinet Council, wanted to know what answer he was to give on the Government’s behalf in the House of Lords. This answer, delivered the next day, was as follows:

“The Government must always retain without any
“qualification, the right to use all the Forces of the Crown
“to uphold law and order and to support the civil powers
“and authorities, though we have no intention whatever,
“as things now stand, to take advantage of that indisputable
“right against any opposition to the principle and policy
“of the Government of Ireland Bill.||

As to this answer, Lord Morley said, in the Lords, on the 30th March, that it had been sanctioned by the

* Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 394.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Col. Seely in the Commons, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 394.

§ Official Report, Monday, 30th March, 1914.

|| *The Times*, 24th March, 1914.

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Cabinet,* but upon the following day he corrected this as a misstatement.† Whether sanctioned by the Cabinet in terms or not, this statement coincided not merely with their views as understood by Lord Morley but also as expressed in the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor, who, on the same 23rd March, said:

“No orders were issued, no orders are likely to be issued,
“and no orders will be issued for the coercion of Ulster.”‡

Colonel Seely on his return from the Presence arrived after the Cabinet Council had dissolved, but was met by Mr Asquith and by Lord Morley, who wished for further information connected with his proposed answer in the Lords and received from Mr Asquith the corrected draft of the proposed memorandum for General Gough. To this draft after Mr Asquith had left, Colonel Seely proposed to add two paragraphs and, after mere verbal corrections made by Lord Morley, the two paragraphs were added as representing the decision of the Cabinet. They ran as follows:

“His Majesty’s Government must maintain their right
“to use all the forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere,
“to maintain law and order and to support the civil power
“in the ordinary execution of its duty.”

“But they have no intention whatever of taking advantage of this right to crush political opposition to the policy
“or principles of the Home Rule Bill.”§

As to these two paragraphs says Lord Morley, speaking in the House of Lords on Wednesday, the 25th March:

“The Secretary of State drafted the form of words in
“consultation, as he mentions, with myself.”||

* *The Times*, 31st March, 1914.

† *Ibid*, 1st April, 1914.

‡ *The Times*, 24th March, 1914. The Official Report of this sentence, although admitted to be what was said, was privately “corrected” by the Lord Chancellor by adding the word “immediate” to precede and qualify “coercion.” No notice of the correction was given to anyone until he was questioned in the Lords over a week later!

§ White Paper. Cd. 7318 of 1914.

|| *The Times*, Thursday, 26th March, 1914.

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Again speaking in the same House upon the 30th of March, he said of these "peccant paragraphs":

"I did not perceive then, and I do not perceive now, that those paragraphs differed in spirit and substance either from the previous paragraphs already sanctioned by the Cabinet or from the words I had myself used in this House . . . and my answer was sanctioned by the Cabinet."*

On the 31st March, after correcting the mistakes as to the sanctioning of his answer, he added: "So far as I recollect when I prepared that answer my mind was rather full of the 'peccant paragraphs,' and I do not repent of stating them as my own views of the policy."†

The Memorandum was then, "peccant paragraphs" and all, signed by Colonel Seely, General Sir John French, and the Adjutant-General (forming a quorum of the Army Council), and was handed to General Gough.

Colonel Seely tells us that the General then asked Sir John French:

"Whether the document meant that he would not be called upon to order his brigade to take part in the coercion of Ulster in order to compel them to submit to the Home Rule Bill, and across that document Sir John French wrote: 'I should read it so.' "‡

While it appears that General Gough took the further step of writing on the same evening to the other member of the Army Council—the Adjutant-General—as follows:

"On thinking over the points raised by the Secretary of State this morning, the question has arisen in my mind, and it will undoubtedly be one of the first questions asked me by my officers, when I see them, viz.:

"In the event of the present Home Rule Bill becoming law can we be called upon to enforce it on Ulster under the expression of maintaining law and order?"

* House of Lords, Official Report, Monday, 30th March, 1914.

† *The Times*, 1st April, 1914.

‡ Parliamentary Debate, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, pp. 395, 396.

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“This point should be made quite clear in your draft letter, otherwise there will be renewed misconceptions.”

“Yours sincerely,

“(Signed) H. P. GOUGH.” *

This letter although said to have been written after the interview at the War Office is inserted in the White Paper (Cd. 7318 of 1914) immediately before the document signed at that interview by the three members of the Army Council and Colonel Seely “did not pay much attention “to it.”†

All these things having taken place on Monday, the 23rd March, and General Gough having returned to Ireland with the Treaty of Bargain in his pocket, Lord Morley came down to the House of Lords on Wednesday, the 25th March, and made the astounding announcement that :

“The Government have decided that those two paragraphs ” (namely the two last on the document) “ are to “be considered as inoperative.”‡

What now was the character, and what the authority, of this document? Lord Haldane speaking in the House of Lords on Wednesday, the 25th March, said :

“I think the last two paragraphs undoubtedly conveyed “to General Gough that there had been something like “a bargain.”§

It was infinitely more than that. It was a document surrounded with all the sanctions of the highest authorities in the Army. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff had signed it; the Adjutant-General had signed it; the Secretary of State for War had signed it. It had in all respects the authority of the full Army Council, and among the signatories one was himself, a member of the Cabinet, with full power to engage its responsibility as he did. It was more

* White Paper. Cd. 7318 of 1914.

† *The Times*, Thursday, 26th March, 1914.

‡ Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 412.

§ *Ibid.*

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indeed than "something like a bargain." It was a bargain, complete in all respects, and in Colonel Seely's judgment it was so proper a bargain that if he regrets having added the two fatal paragraphs to the Cabinet draft he says:

"It is not at all because I recede by one inch from the principles laid down in the last two paragraphs; and
"I would ask any Hon. Gentleman of this House to give me
"any reasons why I, or anybody else, should recede from
"those two paragraphs which are perfectly clear."*

Yet two days after this bargain—made not only by Colonel Seely, but by the Army Council with the concurrence of Lord Morley—the whole bargain is thrown overboard; and the Government, one of the parties thereto, without consulting or asking the permission of the other, impudently declares it to be inoperative. That declaration, indeed, amounts to little if anything. For, operative or inoperative, it is manifestly impossible for the Government to break the bargain; and the pleasant part of it is that, while declaring it inoperative, they avow that in fact they mean to abide by it.

It may indeed be suggested that the alarm of the officers thus expressed was without grounds. But on the Saturday preceding the Monday of the War Office conclave, Mr Lloyd George made at Huddersfield a speech still more provocative than that made by Mr Churchill at Bradford, and declared on behalf of the Government that they meant "to confront this defiance of popular liberties with a most
"resolute, unwavering determination whatever the hazard" might be, with more to the same purpose.† And this was in the hands of the generals who met the Army Council at the War Office on that fateful Monday. But there was more also in their minds of more importance than the speech by Mr Lloyd George, there were the movements of troops already prepared and ordered and partly proceeding.

* Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 396.

† *The Times*, 23rd March, 1914.

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To Sir Arthur Paget and to Colonel Seely as well it appeared that :

“ Although these movements were of a purely precautionary character, there was a possibility that a state of excitement might be caused which would result in “ civil commotion in all parts of Ireland ” *

Sir Arthur Paget had indeed already expressed this view so far back as the evening of the 20th March when he telegraphed the substance of what he had said to his officers, *viz.*:

“ Sir Arthur Paget felt that the outcome of precautionary movements might be misinterpreted and lead to a situation demanding further action, and he felt that the time had come when he must ascertain upon what general officers “ and others he could rely.” †

while it further appears that at the interview in question he said that he thought that

“ the moves would create intense excitement, and that the country—and if not the country, then the Press—would “ be in a blaze on the following day.” ‡

To this Colonel Seely himself adds :

“ These officers believed that there was a plan to treat “ Ulster as an enemy’s country, and to overwhelm her with “ a surprise attack.” §

while he claims to be absolutely justified in

“ accepting the suggestion of Sir Arthur Paget and of “ all the competent soldiers, that we ought to be prepared “ for a state of disorder following upon these necessary “ movements.” ||

* Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 388.

† *Ibid*, Wed., 25th March, 1914, pp. 390, 391.

‡ White Paper. Cd. 7319 of 1914, p. 15.

§ Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 391.

|| *Ibid*.

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To this must be added that General Gough referred to something said that made him think

“that there was to be some attack upon Ulster in order to
“crush her by force of arms before she was ready.”*

As a result of the outcry in the Liberal Press against the bargain made with General Gough and his officers, Colonel Seely resigned his office. His resignation was refused. Thereupon, however, the bargain being repudiated, the other members of the Army Council who had signed the repudiated document also resigned and despite all pressure to retain their offices refused to do so. After three days' fruitless negotiations, their resignations, together with a second consequential resignation of Colonel Seely, were accepted. The Prime Minister took over the burden of the War Office and the Ministry contentedly faced continuance in office with its pledges repudiated and its honour, in its own opinion, unsullied.

The Army Council on the 27th March, 1914, issued an Army Order upon discipline, in the following terms:

1. No officer or soldier should in future be questioned by his superior officer as to the attitude he will adopt or as to his action in the event of his being required to obey orders dependent on future or hypothetical contingencies.
2. An officer or soldier is forbidden in future to ask for assurances as to orders which he may be required to obey.
3. In particular it is the duty of every officer and soldier to obey all lawful commands given to them through the proper channel, either for the safeguarding of public property, or the support of the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty, or for the protection of the lives and property of the inhabitants in the case of disturbance of the peace.

No rational man can suppose that nothing but the protection of stores was ever intended, or that the field guns were required for the diversion of the battleship crews dur-

* Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Wed., 25th March, 1914, p. 393.

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ing rough weather. It was perhaps hoped that the Ulster volunteers would submit without resistance to any "firm" measures adopted. That civil commotion in all parts of Ireland was "possible," but not "likely" is admitted by Colonel Seely. The degree of possibility or probability must be left for history to determine. It must, however, be avowed that the man who said "there are worse things" than bloodshed even upon an extensive scale" and added "let us go forward together and put these grave matters" to the proof" was not unprepared to face the probable possibility of the civil war which his acts and those of some of his colleagues might provoke.

And now to the Army. Here complete stillness reigned. Not an order had been disobeyed. The whole history of the Gough episode is one of admitted blundering. It was desired to ascertain how far the Army could be relied upon to suppress the resistance of Ulster. The Government could have found this out quite well by consulting quietly with the officers commanding units. But the brilliant idea occurred to some one that it would be well to try to bully the soldiers. So General Gough and his officers were sent for by the G.O.C. in Ireland and offered the option either of promising that they would act in a certain way if thereafter they received certain orders, or of instant dismissal. What the hypothetical question put to them exactly was we do not know. It is, however, clear that they took it to be "Would you obey" orders to coerce Ulster?" And it is clear from the letter of the 20th March above cited that the phrases "Duty as" ordered" and "active operations in Ulster" were both employed. It is odd that the idea of bullying the soldiers should have appealed to Colonel Seely or to Mr Winston Churchill, the two members of the Cabinet who have had some knowledge of soldiering, and might, one would have thought, have retained some recollections of what soldiers are like. At any rate the inevitable occurred, the choice of instant dismissal was accepted and other officers

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were appointed to the vacant places of the Divisional Commander and the two colonels. The Government had blundered, and admittedly so, for the first clause of the new Army Order of 27th March, 1914, expressly states that no such hypothetical questions should be put to troops.

The dismissed officers were then instantly summoned to London and called before the Army Council, while the Cabinet deliberated elsewhere upon the situation. They were asked why they resigned and explained their reasons and were informed that their resignations had arisen from an "honest misunderstanding."

Here again it is hard to read the new Army Order as a reproof to the officers. They should not "ask for assurances" "as to orders which they may be required to obey." True, but, when asked whether they wish to be dismissed, and then dismissed at their own request; and then further asked to withdraw their resignations on the ground that the Government's intentions were not what they supposed, they have certainly the right to ask what those intentions are. The insistence upon written explanations at first appears hardly seemly as between gentlemen, but in this instance it is surely justified by the instant repudiation of the writing.

This repudiation is equally astounding whether judged by the standards of political prudence, army discipline or common honesty. The supreme Government and command of all the forces by sea and land is vested in the Sovereign by prerogative right. The King, however, gave up the personal command of the Army in 1793 when the first Commander-in-Chief was created, but the Crown is still expressly authorized by the Army Act* to make regulations as to the persons to be invested with command. In all military matters the Crown now acts upon the advice of the Secretary of State for War and by a recent Royal order,† when the Commandership in Chief was abolished, the

* Army Act, 1881, s. 71 (1).

† Letters patent 6th Feb., 1904 (*London Gazette*, 12th Feb., 1904).

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present Army Council was created to exercise his administrative power.

In the administration of the Army the Secretary of State is in no wise subordinate to the Prime Minister or to the Cabinet, except only in the sense that his appointment or dismissal may be the result of advice given to the King by the Prime Minister. If, therefore, the Secretary of State consults the Cabinet as to his acts, it is as a matter of prudent foresight in his own interest. No such consultation is necessary to give authority to any act of the Army Council. If therefore, wisely or unwisely, with or without the approval of the Cabinet, the Army Council put their names to a written promise, it is the word of the Sovereign which they have the authority to pledge for the observance of their bargain.

One new fact was learned, not only by the Cabinet but also by the Public, as the result of this injudicious, but fortunate, excursus into the realm of hypothetical inquiry. That fact was the percentage of officers who were unwilling to be dragged into the arena of party politics. It was probably well known that some officers would resign if called upon to coerce Ulster. But before the fatal 20th March few persons of the public would have supposed—though the Government at least should have known it—that the number would be greater than ten or at most fifteen out of sixty-four. In fact, it was fifty-seven out of sixty-four. This knowledge is the great first fruit of the effort to “put these grave matters to the proof.”

It is clear from what has been stated that there can be no ground for any suggestion that in the matter of the Curragh dismissals the officers concerned have been guilty of any—even the smallest—dereliction of duty—however *Kaiserlich* be the standard by which military duty is to be judged.

Where then is there any issue of the Army *versus* the People?

The view which some Liberals take of the matter is as follows. They say that the Army has chosen to decide

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for itself whether or not it will enforce certain particular laws ; that the Army is politically conservative ; that the claim to select the Home Rule Bill as a Law not to be enforced amounts to a claim to veto Liberal Legislation and that this must be resisted at all costs and the supremacy of the Parliament and the Minister over the Army maintained. They add that this result has been arrived at by the machinations of Conservative politicians, who, by their speeches, have encouraged the aristocratic Army to support their opposition to this beneficent measure.

Now it is not enough to say that there has been, as is patently the fact, no mutiny. That we have learned how near we were to the point at which the compliance of our Army will break, and that we have done so without a mutiny, is due to the blundering of the Cabinet. But it may now safely be asserted that if, after the passage of the Home Rule Bill into Law, that Bill were resisted in Ulster by civil war, the Army could not be used to suppress that resistance without a mutiny so grave as to amount to a general refusal to fight the Ulstermen. To this extent, then, the facts stated may be admitted. That this refusal would render the Home Rule Bill unenforceable is clear, and that this refusal would be applauded by the Conservative Party is also clear. It is, however, as clearly untrue that this is because the Army has taken sides in politics. It is, on the contrary, precisely because the Army (and here be it noted there is no distinction between officers and men) is unwilling to take sides in politics. Where civil war breaks out because of what is deemed to be the oppressive nature of legislation, legally defensible, the power of the Army, unless composed only of men of one side in politics, must always dissolve. The soldier will refuse to be led out to war upon his fellow subjects where he will not refuse to suppress sporadic rioting, little as he may enjoy the latter task. The record of our own Army at the "glorious" Revolution of 1688 tells, abundantly, the same story. It was not that King James's Army was mutinous or whiggish, but merely that

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the soldiers were not, in grave political disputes between their countrymen, willing to be called upon to shoot their fellows at the behest of the Sovereign or Minister in order to bring about the triumph of either side of the quarrel. Their feeling, then as now, was that they were the King's soldiers, sworn to fight his enemies, and not to join in civil war at the behest of faction. And the law of England, Civil or Military, makes no provision for Civil War.

If the Army cannot be induced to shoot down the men of Ulster, it is then fruitless and vain to declare that they "should" do so, or that it is "their duty," and recriminations and angry words only diminish the value of the Army for its legitimate purpose—the defence of the Realm and the defeat of the King's enemies. The doctrine of passive, unthinking obedience is of value only if it corresponds with the fact; and then it becomes superfluous. If it does not correspond with the fact, it is useless for its avowed purpose and fatal to the true utility of the Army.

And who are those who now preach this Byzantine and Napoleonic doctrine, these tyrants who must be obeyed without thought or question? Are they the old traditional supporters of the prerogative and of Law and Order? Are they those who have always upheld the duty of soldiers rigorously to support the civil power? No! they are the children of the Whigs who no longer recollect the "glorious" Revolution, the Independent Labour Party oblivious of Tonypany, and the Irish Nationalists who have forgotten Mitchelstown. *Et nos mutamur in illis!*

For two things, perhaps two things only, amid the bitterness of our humiliation and the ugliness of faction which have been proclaimed to the world, we have to be grateful.

In the first place, the situation with regard to the Army has been made clear without mutiny on the part of the troops. They have been severely and prematurely tested, but they have stood the test. The Army has not been, and cannot be, used for Party purposes. No harm has been

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done to the Army for its legitimate purpose and the King's enemies need have no cause for unholy rejoicing. That a British Army can stand a worse test than this and emerge unhurt will be clear to those who recall the history of the days when it marched to the tune of "Lillibulero." It was not many years after the refusal of the men of King James's Army to fire upon their fellow subjects that they swept back the French upon the bloodstained fields of Blenheim and Malplaquet.

And lastly, the knowledge that the Army cannot be used to enforce the Home Rule Bill in its original form removes the bar to some intelligent settlement by consent of the eternal Irish question.

It must surely now be recognized that such a settlement of the fate of the two Irish nations cannot be effected without the consent of both of them, and that the furtherance of any scheme so detested by one of them that her sons are ready to die rather than submit to it, is a hindrance rather than a help, to such a settlement.

Certain things are, by the official avowals, and particularly by the White Paper (Cd. 7329 of 1914) published on the 23rd April, and quite independently of the statement by the Ulster Unionist Council, now made so plain that no rational and candid man can any longer doubt them.

First, that there was in fact a plan (which should not, perhaps, be called a "plot"—perhaps never would have been so called if it had been straightforwardly admitted) to surround Ulster with armed forces both by land and by sea.

Secondly, that this plan was conceived by Mr Churchill, and imposed by him upon his four colleagues of the Cabinet Committee—Colonel Seely, Lord Crewe, Mr Birrell and Sir John Simon.

Thirdly, that the plan was concealed from the Prime Minister, who first was made aware of it on Saturday, 21st March, when he showed his disapproval of the orders to the fleet by causing them to be countermanded.

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No rational man could fail to foresee that to draw such an armed ring round Ulster must inevitably lead to a collision between the armed forces of the Crown thus menacingly arrayed, and the Ulstermen. The suggestion that the Government intended to bring about such a collision, however blusteringly repudiated, was, therefore, not unreasonable. We may more charitably, though with more difficulty, believe that the Government's intention was so to overawe the Ulstermen as to make them lay down their arms and accept the Home Rule Bill peaceably. But the probable effect of their intended menace must have been palpable to them.

What is most surprising and most discreditable is that, before deciding to make the ring they did not inform themselves whether the Military and Naval forces could be relied upon to make it. That a certain number of officers would send in their resignations rather than fight against Ulster was common knowledge. The Government should have known how great a proportion this was. They did not know it. And their plan was broken at the very last moment because, contrary to their mistaken beliefs, not a few but practically the whole of the officers intended for the task, chose rather to be dismissed and ruined than to carry out the plan.

So unexpected, so complete and disastrous a break-down in so bold a plan found the Government appalled and surprised. They could hit upon no other way of meeting the very discrediting disclosures of the failure than by that last Ministerial resource of fencing with the facts and shuffling in the avowals.

By its projects, by its failure in them, and by its defence of projects and failure, the Government is profoundly discredited and the Opposition, despite its opportunities, is in no stronger position.

The only one of our institutions which comes out of the abortive adventure with honour unimpaired and credit increased is the Army.

SLEEPY CABINETS

“**T**HEY all seem conscious of the diminution of
“Palmerston’s energy and power. He is always
“asleep, both in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons,
“where he endeavours to conceal it by wearing his hat
“over his eyes.

“Clarendon made me laugh heartily the other day at his
“account of the Cabinet, where one-half of them seem to
“be almost always asleep, the first to be off being
“Lansdowne, closely followed by Palmerston and Charles
“Wood.

“I remember his giving me a very droll account of
“Melbourne’s Cabinet, and of the drowsiness which used
“to reign there, more particularly with Melbourne him-
“self.”

(3rd February, 1858. Greville’s *Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria*, 1852-1860, Vol. II, page 160.)

THE SOLDIER

MUST HE EVER THINK?

THE modern conception of an absolute Monarch involves the postulate that an Army is an instrument for doing absolutely everything the Monarch orders, without any sort of question; and whether the order be given by the Monarch himself or by any of his Army Officers from a Field Marshal to a Corporal. There must not be at any point in the military hierarchy, from the Field Marshal to the drummer boy, the least question of any order given, the least exercise of reason, the least doubt, the least hesitation in literal obedience; for any one of them is an infraction of "military discipline" properly punishable with death itself. A soldier ordered to shoot his own father or his own brother—as German soldiers have been repeatedly told in so many words—must do it, and every officer ordered to order him to do so must give the order and see it executed, under pain of being himself shot for mutiny. Obedience is to be absolute, instant, unquestioning, without regard to the character of the order, whatever it may be, and however contrary to the laws of nature, of reason, of God, or of man. It is an assumption by the absolute Monarch, and a delegation to all his officers, of the attributes of the Almighty Himself. To the absolute Monarch this conception seems a manifestly necessary part of the order of the Universe. It is his business, appointed to him by the divine decree, to do all the thinking for all his subjects—as

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well as for other Monarchs' subjects when the occasion serves. And it follows as the night the day that, so long as weak and foolish human nature is what it is, he must have some instrument to ensure acceptance of the results of his thinking by such as might be so wicked as to make a wry face at them. For however regrettable it may appear to a true-balanced mind, there are always to be found such people, even in the happiest and best drilled nation, most completely blessed with the most absolute Monarchy. To put down, and keep down, by axe, gibbet, halter, bullet or bayonet all those who, at Zabern or elsewhere, "appear to be about to smile" or otherwise to set their faces awry, is as much the business of the Army as to win laurels against the foreign foe—nay, that is its most immediate, constant, every-day business. And for this business a complete, unbending, unbroken "military discipline" is even more necessary than for the occasional campaigns against national enemies across an imaginary chalk-line frontier, in which the Army wins its greenest laurels and covers itself with its brightest glories. Disobedience to orders when, as happens sometimes, it wins a town from the foreign foe, may be pardoned, nay—such is sometimes the mercy and generosity of the Monarch or the General—it may even be rewarded. But disobedience to orders to slay the fellow-citizen decreed for slaughter, is a crime against military discipline for which there is no forgiveness either in Barrack or Palace.

The whole conception, and all its principles and methods, are as simple as may be. Nobody need trouble his head about anything—nobody except the Monarch; all that the rest of his tens of millions of subjects have to do is simply to go on doing exactly as they are told. There is no need for ethics, politics, reason or brains. The millions have only to obey. And this is made excusable even when it seems least so, because all the able-bodied men of those same millions are wrenched away from business and family and set apart with arms in their hands to enforce the obedi-

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ence of all the rest. Absolute Monarchy and the military discipline which requires instant, implicit obedience to all orders, right or wrong, are the necessary complements the one of the other. Without either the other could not endure. They are the two pillars of the House of the Lords of the Philistines—if one of them goes the other goes too, and the House falls in ruins.

Sometimes it is said that this habit of constant obedience is necessary in order to secure steadiness in the field. It may have been so under the Prussian drill-system which broke in failure at Jena. It is no longer so in an era when initiation and resource are expected of every private soldier.

Such a system has never been accepted in England. It could only be imposed on men without any spirit or any love of freedom; and the English have always had both. Moreover it could only be imposed on men endowed with the blessings of an absolute Monarch and a standing army; and the English have never had either. The English system lacks at the one end the Monarch of unlimited authority, free to give any order he pleases, and at the other end the permanently segregated caste of armed men always ready to obey whatever order may be given. Englishmen, as Lord Beaconsfield once said, have always been a martial, but never a military, people. For the love of fighting and of their King they would follow him to France to win lands for him and plunder for themselves. It was not the pay that drew them to Crécy, for the 15,000 English archers who fought there were paid but threepence a day and the 4,000 Welsh archers no more than twopence a day each; it was their own free will and affection. Where these were lacking, the King got no help. "By God, Sir Earl," said King Edward I to the Earl of Norfolk, "You shall either go or hang." "By God, Sir King," replied the Earl, "I will neither go nor hang." And he did neither. This was in the days when the Earl held his land by the feudal tenure which bound him to military service, though not, as he held, to the particular kind of service demanded on that particular occasion. He had no

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idea of doing exactly as he was told without asking whether it was right and lawful and reasonable that he should be so told. And when on the abolition of the feudal tenures, Charles II in 1676 employed the shameful bribes he had received from the French King to raise an army of 80,000 men, it was hardly endured, and provoked the famous declaration by the Bill of Rights (1689), "that the raising "or keeping of a standing army within the Kingdom in time "of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament is "against law." In a truly English spirit of compromise, however, that which the Bill of Rights had forbidden is now allowed in practice. By an annual Act called the Army Annual Act all those military powers of punishment for military offences detailed in the Army Act (44 and 45 Vict. C. 58) are revived for one year only, ending on 30th April within the United Kingdom and on 31st July in the King's dominions elsewhere. Thus there is in fact an Army which is only tolerated with the necessary power to keep it together as an Army, for one year—an Army which stands so long as the Annual Act subsists, but which if once the Act should come to an end without being renewed, ceases to stand and dissolves to atoms. It is an Army complete in all respects, but it is only leased to the King for one year by the Act, which, while granting the necessary powers for that period, expressly declares that, apart from these temporary powers, "no man can be forejudged of life or limb "or subjected in time of peace to any kind of punishment "within this realm by martial law, or in any other manner "than by the judgment of his peers, and according to the "known and established laws of this realm." There is therefore still no standing army in England but only a one year's Army. There is no permanent soldier-caste, only a body of citizens who, willing and uncompelled, have agreed to superadd to their rights and duties as free men and citizens the duties of soldiership for the limited period of one year, and to subject themselves to forejudgment of life or limb by martial law, in addition to their still un-

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touched subjection as citizens to any other judgment by their peers according to the known and established laws of this realm. Now the laws of this realm are declared and assumed to be, and in fact mainly are, the perfection of Reason. Martial Law is the perfection of Discipline. The British Soldier is always bound to Reason; he is also bound, during the one year that the Army is allowed to exist, to Discipline. Discipline does not oust Reason, it is but super-added thereto for a limited period. Where the two conflict Discipline must give way and Reason be vindicated. The soldier who, in obedience to orders, shoots and kills a man may be tried and hanged for murder, despite the order, if there was no reasonable justification for that killing, and if, without asking whether the deed was reasonably called for, he nevertheless committed it. The British soldier *must* reason.

The Monkish Man who lives in the metaphysic web he has woven, spider like, out of his entrails across the corner of some University cell, assumes now and again to tell us what we ought to think the issues of the ways in which we stand, and whither we ought to go. Nobody can be more incompetent to do so. He lives monkishly in his cell and has no part or action in the world. He never does any deed. He only delivers lectures—lectures from which his undergraduates are left to recover if ever they begin to do deeds. He looks at the world through his narrow cell window without being of it. He is no Craftsman. He has his uses. But when he begins to tell the Craftsmen, as though they too were undergraduates, what to do, and to shout through his cell-window advice to the Men in the Street outside, he is capable of uttering nothing else than solemn twaddle or arrogant irrelevancy. And another Monk can always be found on the other side to destroy his irrelevancy. There is no guidance or leadership in either of them, nor ever can be.

They begin now by saying with great solemnity what everybody who knows anything knows already, that it is the bounden duty of the soldier, whether officer or private,

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to obey all "lawful commands." Of course it is. And it is equally his duty to disobey all unlawful commands. For if he obeys an unlawful command the law will hang him or otherwise punish him for so doing, without allowing the excuse that he was ordered to do what the law forbids. In the last resort he must judge for himself whether the command is lawful or unlawful. Nobody and no order can save him from that duty. A soldier's duty is not, as some suppose, easier than that of the civilian but harder—for he is both citizen and soldier, with the duties and responsibilities of both, and the obligation to choose between them when they conflict.

The British soldier has entered into his engagement to serve in the Army under no duress. He has not been forced to enlist. He has not been torn from his home. He has assumed his service voluntarily with all its obligations; and he cannot complain because of the difficulty, often very great, of deciding what is his duty as a citizen, when he has himself voluntarily assumed the further duty of considering what is his duty as a soldier.

In practice and in fact, and in the British Army, there is only on the very rarest of occasions any difficulty. Not one order in one hundred thousand given to the soldier is otherwise than lawful. The ordinary business of the Barrack Square, the ordinary or even extraordinary operations of a campaign against a foreign enemy, produce orders which pass as a matter of course unquestioned. But when we come to civil disturbance and, further, to civil war, the case is different and harder. It is an awful thing to take human life. To take the life of a fellow-citizen is the most awful of all. Such an act cannot be carried out by any humane or honest man without hesitation. The order to do such an act is only lawful, and must only be obeyed, when the circumstances render it imperative and the only resource left. "If," said Lord Mansfield speaking on the Gordon riots, "they "could not otherwise have prevented" certain felonies then committed, the soldiers "might lawfully have put

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“to death” the felons. Certainly. But if not, not. If the felonies could otherwise have been prevented the order to slay the felons would have been unlawful. And in such a case the Law will hang the slayer, holding him bound to disobey, instead of obeying, an unlawful order. So that at last the soldier has to decide for himself whether he is justified in slaying or not. If he is, the order is lawful and to be obeyed; if not, it is unlawful and to be disobeyed, and it is a jury of his peers which will decide the question.

Still stronger is the case when no felony, no riot, no disorder, no disturbance of the peace and no irregular act whatever has been committed. One of the Professors has recently had the assurance to say that if any persons “are going to attempt to paralyse the activities of the civil power,” then “the Army can be, will be, and indeed “legally speaking must be, employed against them.” This is the doctrine justified by the Prussian Courts which upheld the cutting down of the lame Zabern cobbler because an officer held that he looked as if he were going to smile. It is no English doctrine and never was. No “going to” will suffice. There must be overt acts, a great, perilous and threatening emergency before anybody, whether soldier or civilian, can be justified in using lethal arms against his fellow-citizens; and even then the Law requires the exercise of discretion and fortitude, and the incurring of manifest peril before one man proceeds to slay another. The Law requires every man to use his brains before knocking out the brains of other people.

The Army Act itself* as revised to 1906 expressly recognizes the soldier as a human being with the right to think. For it provides him, whether officer or private, with a remedy (secs. 42 and 43) if he “thinks himself wronged in any matter,” by “any officer or other soldier,” and makes his mere thinking it the basis of a whole system of procedure. That same Act, moreover, knows nothing of obedience to any orders whatever unless they are (sec. 9) “lawful

* 48 and 49 Vict. c. 8.

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“orders,” which is a very limited term indeed. And even as to lawful orders, it makes an important distinction between one kind of disobedience and another. If the disobedience is such as to “show a wilful defiance of authority,” then the officer or private is “liable to suffer death”; but if it be mere disobedience, the offender, whether officer or private, is (if on active service) only “liable to suffer penal servitude,” and if not on active service, is merely liable, if an officer “to be cashiered” or if a soldier “to suffer imprisonment.” Thus there is no cast-iron rule of equal obedience or disobedience to all orders. There are three kinds of disobedience to lawful orders with three different penalties, the last infinitely less severe than the first; and consequently three kinds of obedience—that which is necessary, sanctioned by a penalty of cashiering or imprisonment, that which is *more* necessary, sanctioned by a penalty of penal servitude, and that which is *most* necessary, sanctioned by a penalty of death. For disobedience to unlawful orders there is no penalty at all. Moreover the Act (sec. 144) recognizes the Law of the Land and the subjection of itself and of the soldiers thereto, by acknowledging that any soldier is “liable to be taken out of His Majesty’s service” and to be tried by a non-military Court of Law on “a charge or conviction for crime” i.e. “felony, misdemeanor, or other crime or offence punishable according to the law in force in that part of His Majesty’s dominions.” With all this it is impossible to pretend that the Army Act deprives the soldier of his brains, forbids him to think, requires an equal and equally unreasoning obedience to all orders whatever, or divests him either of his soul, his reason or his quality as a citizen.

The Mutiny Bill of 1759 provided that half-pay officers should be kept under military law. This was represented as highly dangerous to the Constitution. But “what danger,” said Mr William Pitt*—who knew something about

* Debates and Proceedings of the British House of Commons from 1746 to 1749, p. 333. London, 1770.

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the cavalry—"can happen by obliging a half-pay officer "to continue upon the military establishment? It is admitted on all Hands, that while he is in Full Pay, he must employ his Time, his Study and even his Sword as his officers shall direct. There may possibly be danger in this, but it never can happen till the Direction becomes wicked, nor be prevented, but by the virtue of the Army. "It is to that Virtue we even of this Time must trust . . . "it is to that Virtue we must have trusted, had this bill "been modelled as its warmest opposers could have wished; "and, without this Virtue, should the Lords, the Commons, "and the people of England intrench themselves behind "Parchment up to the Teeth, the sword will find a passage "to the vitals of the Constitution."

Exactly. The Virtue of the Army it is that maintains the balance of the State. That power of discriminating when the Direction is wicked is accurately the balance-wheel of the Constitution. Within limits the Army will move at command. But if it is plain to the common sense of the Nation and to the soldier himself that "the Direction is wicked," the Army, which is drawn from the Nation's core, will, like the prophet's ass, amaze its rider with an unexpected and emphatic voice.

Disobedience to orders may sometimes be an imperative duty in an Army. It may be a duty to the Army itself, necessary to its own preservation from evils which the giver of the order has not perceived, or indispensable in order to comply with the laws of War, whereof the giver of the order has taken no account, but which all armies soon learn to know must be observed if they are to fight at all. There never was a more reckless soldiery than that which France raised when at the outset of the Revolution all Europe threatened her. Yet when the Convention, after full debate, unanimously issued its order in 1794 that no English or Hanoverian prisoners were thenceforth to be taken either by land or sea, but that every such prisoner was on his capture to be forthwith shot, all the French armies and

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every ship of the French Navy refused to obey the order. Their refusal was not due to humanity. It was due partly to the necessary respect for the laws of War which the order violated, but even more to a regard for the French soldiers and sailors who, had they carried out the order, would undoubtedly have been themselves visited, on capture, with a similar fate. They were ready to fight according to the laws of War; they were not ready to be massacred whenever they might, by the fortunes of War, be made prisoners. Generals and admirals alike therefore refused to obey the order, though given by the supreme authority in the State. Nor was the order ever executed.

What blind implicit obedience means and to what enormities it leads was shown no longer ago than June, 1903, in Servia. Certain military officers, incited thereto, as we are told,* by "a few of the extreme Radicals and a military "clique" including a colonel who "had served as military "attaché in Vienna and was Servian delegate to the Peace "Conference at The Hague," conceived a dislike of their King Alexander and of their Queen Draga. They ordered "four line regiments and a battery of artillery" to surround the Palace at Belgrade at night. The soldiers implicitly obeyed the order. A number of officers entered the Palace. King Alexander "rushed to the window and, seeing the "court-yard crowded with soldiers, smashed the window-pane and called loudly for assistance. But the men believing that they had been brought there solely to protect the King, gazed stolidly up at the window but made "no sign." They were blindly obeying orders. Meantime the conspirators, breaking into the room where the King and Queen were, shot them both. "Then followed a series of "outrages too revolting to describe. Bullet after bullet was "fired into the now lifeless bodies by their maddened "assailants, and the faces of both King and Queen were "mercilessly gashed with pistol-butts, hatchets and sabres "until not a feature remained intact. The corpses were then

**Through Savage Europe*. By H. de Windt. (Collins, London.)

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“ thrown into the gardens below, where they lay until the
“ Russian Minister found them at daybreak. The King had
“ lost the fingers of both hands, and had received no less
“ than thirty-six bullet wounds, the Queen only sixteen,
“ but her body was literally hacked to pieces and had been
“ subjected after death to an unmentionable outrage.”
When the awful deed became known “ men and women seem
“ to have been terrorized from the very first into a state of
“ passive obedience.” The Army continued to give blind
obedience to orders. “ All day long regiments of cavalry
“ and the line and batteries of artillery paraded the streets,
“ horses and guns being decorated with evergreens”;
and as though to crown and glorify this signal triumph
of “ military discipline,” the narrator of these abominations
tells us that a “ little cross of white enamel ” was instituted
as “ an order of merit worn only by the actual assassins of
“ their late King and Queen.” This was assuredly the
final symbol of that military discipline which consists
in a blind, unquestioning, unreasoning obedience to orders.
This, and such as this, will never be impossible in any Army
of any country where that slavish doctrine is once accepted.
God forbid that we in England should ever entertain it!

There are indeed those who would claim for the casual
head of the Party casually in power an unquestioning, un-
thinking passive obedience, not only from the Army but
even from the King, for any and all purposes.

The notion is new. Our liberties have been built and
buttressed on the contrary notion that, in extreme circum-
stances and in the face of unlawful orders, including orders
monstrous, unreasonable or destructive of the Constitution,
the duty of both Army and Navy is to disobey. The Navy
disobeyed and deserted Charles I. It then disobeyed and
deserted the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Army
did the same when Monk marched to London with 6,000
men to restore Charles II. The Army (led by Marlborough)
not only disobeyed James II, but went over to the rival
who had invaded his kingdom. That disobedience and de-

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sertion it was that made the glorious Revolution a success, altered the succession to the Throne, and endowed us with a new reigning family. But for that disobedience and desertion not King George V but a Catholic Queen would sit on the Throne to-day.

The truth is that we have never known of or accepted such a slavish conception as unquestioning Passive Obedience—neither in the subject, nor in the soldier, nor even in the King. They are all expected to use their brains, to do their duty and to play their part in all circumstances as reasoning human beings with the traditions of Free Men. There is a point beyond which men cannot be made to go, and beyond which we expect them to refuse to go. That point was reached when James II endeavoured to subvert the liberties of the country. It is reached when soldiers are called upon to shoot down their fellow citizens, including perhaps their own fathers and brothers. In so cruel a situation the soldier will yield no passive obedience. He will hesitate and question. He cannot avoid it. He has no absolute Monarch to do all the thinking for him. He is not a segregated man taken forcibly to be part of a ruthless machine acting automatically. He has become a soldier voluntarily of his own free will. He has not thereby forfeited his humanity, his conscience or his reasoning. And he still remains a free citizen and a human being with human duties, scruples and affections. He should, he must, hesitate. He must ask whether that order consists with his duty to God and Man and the Law. He must use his brains. He must think.

THE SALE OF HONOURS

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

SINCE the Parliament Act became law the discussions of the House of Lords have not contained very much that is either instructive or diverting. But a pleasant exception may be found in the debate upon Party Honours which took place on 23rd February last and must leave in the minds of every one who reads it a delightful sense of the gaiety and skill with which delicate questions can be evaded in a well-bred assembly.

Readers of THE CANDID QUARTERLY will not need to be reminded that in its first number this very business was handled under a somewhat blunt heading: "The New Corruption." We pointed out that in both of the great Parties an organism had grown up gradually and stealthily which had pushed its ramifications all over the island under the pretence of advocating the "great principles" espoused on either side. Numberless honest men throughout the country regard the Unionist or Liberal Associations in their midst as the principal, indeed the sole, instrument by which they can procure the necessary co-operation of a multitude of electors in support of a common cause. They give to these associations their time, their interest, their money, and believe that they are thus discharging their duty as citizens. So they are. But they little know the hidden springs by which in many cases candidates are selected, and the Press tuned, and members of Parliament secretly coerced, and even ministers hoisted into notoriety

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or artificially depressed according as they favour or resist the dirty work of the handful who pull the strings. It is the "Machine," the "Caucus," which has its agents everywhere and pays them, which has its confederates in the Government and supports them, which has its adherents in the Press and supplies them with "copy" or with little inside views, gossip and insinuation as to the current affairs or the conflicts of personalities, always directed to glorify its favourites and disparage its opponents.

For the moment it would be beside the purpose to pursue this side of the subject. What the Caucus does, how it degrades public life and has brought it into contempt in America, where the system is fully developed, is well known. How the Caucus procures the great sums of money necessary for perfecting the Machine and bringing its influence to bear in every constituency is what concerns us here. The answer is simple. By far the greater part of the money is derived from the sale of Honours. When a Party is in opposition its machinery becomes rusty, its agents are underpaid, its Press is unsubsidized; its hope is to get its friends into office again that the Honours list may again be ample and the golden stream derived from that source may again fertilize the parched soil. All this and more also was fully exposed in the February number of this Review. No one has denied it. In the same month of February came this entertaining debate in the House of Lords which proved it.

Their lordships, no doubt, have great advantages for discussing this subject. Many of them know by recent experience what is the market price of a peerage, or rather what have been the fluctuations in the market. For the price varies. Men who have a great deal of money and very little merit will no doubt have to pay very heavily. No less than £250,000 is said to have once been paid by a millionaire whose name had never been heard of before; but that, if credible, is a very extreme case. A man who had

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served in some modest way the interest of his Party would no doubt obtain a large reduction. On the other hand a political opponent (and it is certain that political opponents can buy these things at a price) would have to pay handsomely. There are agents for the sale of these baubles, especially of baronetcies and knighthoods, who have a commission which, perhaps, they are obliged to share with others, and something has to be added for that. A Baronetcy has been known to cost as much as £25,000 and as little as £6,000. A Knighthood has been sold for £4,000 and another as low as £1,250; but there was much haggling over this last-mentioned "deal," and the new Knight must have been a capital bargainer. It was a real bargain. Upon the whole the price depends upon a combination of elements—the wealth of the aspirant, the degree of his service (if any) to the Party as a make-weight, his skill in driving a bargain, and above all the balance of the Party Fund at the bank at the particular moment. Perhaps £40,000 or £50,000 may be, or rather may have been, a sort of ruling price for a Peerage, but always in rather a speculative market like the market for pictures at Christie's. We can never know for a certainty, because both parties to the contract have the utmost inducement to conceal it; but there are always cynics who do not mind blurting things out and chatter-boxes who blab to a friend in confidences which are never kept, and to them we are presumably indebted for the limited information available upon this subterranean subject.

The House of Lords ought to know about this if anyone does, for no less than sixty-three barons, apart from the Lords of Appeal, have been created during the last eight years, and forty-one during the preceding eight years. No doubt some of them have been ennobled for real services. There must certainly have been a great many created, to put it in the most delicate way imaginable, contemporaneously with a munificent contribution to the Party Fund. That does not exhaust by any means the sources of accurate

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information available to their Lordships, if only the principals could be induced to reveal their secrets. Several noble lords sit in that House who have served as Chief Whips of their Party in the House of Commons. To them all things are known. It is of course perfectly clear that they cannot be expected to say anything. After all, it would be a hard thing to cast too much blame upon them in regard to transactions of this kind, for though few think about them, and great care is observed never to talk about them, the knowledge that these things go forward has been pretty general in parliamentary circles for more generations than one. There has been a conspiracy of silence all round, and it has been passed over with a shrug of the shoulders, as was the case in the old days with electoral corruption. No one would blame the Chief Whips who now sit in the House of Lords for holding their peace. But if anyone doubts, and surely no one can doubt, that Honours are sold, ought he not to be convinced by the fact that no one of these gentlemen got up to deny it? Reticences are sometimes more significant than actual avowals.

A few words now as to what actually was said in this Debate. Lord Selborne opened it in a very manly speech. He made not the slightest attempt to treat this form of corruption as a peculiar failing of either side, but dealt with it as a notorious practice which had grown out of our Party System and for which all alike were responsible. His Lordship, who by the way was himself the Liberal-Unionist Whip in the House of Commons as a young man, declared that the whole of this controversy centred round the Whips and the Whip's Office. They, as the phrase is, "have to get the stuff." Money they must have, more and more every year, to educate a democracy which, in his opinion, "takes no interest in politics, knows nothing about politics, and would not take the trouble to vote unless a refusal to do so became more irksome than acquiescence in going to the poll." It was therefore necessary to educate this large part of the democracy, however superficially, and above all

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to have "such a machinery as will bring the last man to the poll, however unwilling he may be." This requires money and thus "mere wealth without responsibility has the most opportunity of illicit and secret influence." It has happened in other countries "that those who have found the money for a Party have eventually also dictated its policy," and the very worst fate that could befall any nation is "to be governed by an alliance of the caucus and the plutocrat." So spoke one of the leaders of Unionism in the presence, and with the express approval, of Lord Lansdowne and his friends. The whole of this speech, moderate and fair in every line of it, deserves close attention. The speaker left not the smallest doubt that the money thus required to replenish the enormous Party Funds comes very largely, if not almost exclusively, from the sale of Honours, and then revealed the amusing and artless expedient by which the aforesaid democracy and, what may perhaps be of equal importance, the honest citizens of this country are humbugged and hoodwinked in this business of the sale of Honours. Lord Selborne described the weary and thankless life of a Whip, how the Party machinery is becoming more elaborate and more costly, how he finds that he must have funds at all costs, how loyal he is to his chiefs and "tells them everything about the Party except about the Party Funds, and his loyalty there is shown by telling them as little as possible." Here we have the secret. In order to keep up this deception, it is necessary that the Prime Minister, who advises the Crown about the distribution of honours, should be able to place his hand on his heart and use some form of words calculated to reassure people who ask inconvenient questions. He cannot do that unless he avoids the knowledge of good and evil. Thus he is deliberately kept in the dark so that he may deny, by the card, what he knows perfectly well to be true. It is no wonder that Lord Selborne should describe the position as perfectly intolerable and the Party System as a curse.

We have by no means exhausted the treasures of this

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debate. As already observed the retired Chief Whips who now adorn the House of Lords maintained unbroken silence. Not so their junior colleagues. They lifted a corner of the veil with evident relish. Lord Willoughby de Broke vouched his own experience. His Party wanted a large sum of money for a patriotic purpose of some kind (particulars not disclosed), but unhappily were in the cold shade of Opposition. In these trying circumstances Lord Willoughby approached a wealthy supporter and dangled before him the prospect of a Baronetcy at a price which was not excessive. "That is all very well, Willoughby," remarked the opulent friend, "but when are you going to deliver the goods?" Alas! that could not be before the Unionists should return to office. The wary lieutenant obviously could not prophesy when that might happen; so he was very politely shown the door. This naïve story from a Conservative found an echo from Lord Ribblesdale. A fox-hunting acquaintance of his, whose information was evidently not up-to-date, came to him under the impression that he still remained one of the Liberal Whips, and bluntly asked for a title to be bestowed upon one of his friends. "I think he would give a good deal of money," said the fox-hunter. "What sort of figure?" enquired Lord Ribblesdale, and when a figure was named, observed, "I don't know about that." Whereupon the hunting man, after walking about the room a good deal, tapped him on the shoulder and observed, "I think he would go a bit better." Asked about the aspirant's political views, he replied that he did not know much about that, but he "thought it would be all right." So he went away. We are not informed as to the sequel. Has the new Baronet been added to the roll?

We must be grateful to Lord Ribblesdale for the little peep he has given us into the ways of the shop, still more grateful for the complete absence of cant with which he pointed the moral as it presented itself to his own mind. These things must be, said he, they do not very much matter, they have always gone on and are likely to go on

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and if they do not go on in one form they will go on in another. Upon the other hand, is it not a pious and a slightly pharisaical view to maintain the contrary? Are not plutocrats after all "a very nice body of men?" The more money there is the better the Party Government will be. Such is the creed of modern Liberalism when it is not crying out in the Market Place. We must beware of indulging in feelings which verge on those we associate with Mr Pecksniff.

All debates end in official pronouncements and this time it was Lord Crewe who spoke for Ministers with excellent discretion. To deny the practice was quite impossible for a man of honour. To say nothing was hardly less difficult. But the resources of Parliamentary reserve are inexhaustible. Lord Crewe dwelt a little upon the distressing corruption of our grandfathers, how heavy a price Lord North was obliged to pay one hundred and thirty years ago, not for peerages but for rotten boroughs, how Mr Pitt had flooded the House of Lords with new creations, while the Whigs had always been the enemies of vice and the friends of virtue. Then he instituted a comparison between ourselves and our ancestors, with a gratifying conclusion that we are far better than they ever were. The noble Marquess proceeded with much gusto to give a categorical assurance on behalf of the Prime Minister "that a contribution to the "Party Funds has not been a consideration to him when "recommending names to His Majesty for Honours." Warming to his subject Lord Crewe took upon himself to give "precisely the same assurance" on behalf of the two other men still living who have been Prime Ministers, Lord Rosebery and Mr Balfour, while at the same time declaring that he had no authority to speak for either of them. Yet he declared that he would have no hesitation in saying the same for them also. This little artifice certainly misled no one in his audience. It is a part of the business to keep the Prime Minister uninformed on purpose to enable him to say what he said upon this occasion. Of course he knows as well as every one else how the Party Funds are

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replenished and he knows who are pressed upon him by the Whips for titular distinctions; but he is not permitted to know anything about their contribution to the Fund. So primitive are the devices by which dust is thrown in the eyes of a confiding public.

It may seem to some minds that it really does not much signify whether or not titles of honour are sold, since there are plenty of people foolish and vulgar enough to pay high prices for them. Apart from the objection to humbug and imposture in general perhaps no special harm is done by indulging a silly ambition. The real evil is the way in which the money is spent.

It is spent upon maintaining the Party organizations all over the country, and the central organizations (for there are more than one), which subsist very largely, indeed almost entirely, upon money thus procured. People ought to realize how much harm of the worst kind these Party organizations have been doing of late, not in the open and avowed work of propagandism, but in their more secret operations.

Co-operation and organization for common political ends are most wholesome things in a self-governing state. Indeed, they are indispensable. Their legitimate purpose is to rally public opinion in each constituency to the choice and support of members in the House of Commons, who shall honestly give effect to the opinions which they share in general with those who sent them there, and shall act fearlessly according to the best of their judgment. We are a busy people and send up our members to Westminster, or are supposed to send them, in order that men whose general principles we know, and in whose good sense we trust, may act for us upon any question that may arise. We organize in each constituency so as to procure the selection of a trustworthy man, and to carry his election and support him while he is doing his duty. The essence of it

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is that each organization should be local in its character, naturally representing the views of the community where it exists, and that its relations to the member should be undisturbed by any interference from outside. This is what happened for many years and nothing used to be more hotly resented than any attempt at such interference. But now, though open intrusion is avoided, a system has been gradually established which most gravely affects the relations of a member to his constituents and impairs his independence in the House of Commons.

Politics are becoming a profession more and more every year and in every way. That is not necessarily a bad thing. Army, Navy, Church and Bar, Literature, Journalism, Medicine and Science are all of them professions. So are other vocations. Some of them are under strict discipline, others under no discipline at all. But in no case is an extraneous and secret body allowed to interpose either in the admission of men into the ranks of the profession or in their exclusion, or in the regulation of their conduct while there. Professional men have to obey the rules, if any, under which they accept service, to submit to lawfully constituted authorities, and approve themselves to their employers, whether they be employed by individuals or by the public at large. In other respects they are free men using their own judgment and open to public criticism. They could not discharge their duties efficiently or with self-respect if they were to be under undisclosed restraint. It is precisely this undisclosed restraint which is doing so much harm in politics to-day.

In nearly all constituencies there are now paid agents, but a single paid agent could not do very much harm by himself. He is in touch with the central agency in London, and with others in his neighbourhood. He is often an ardent party man and mixes with all sorts and conditions of men on his own side. A little knot is formed round him in which he by no means necessarily remains the principal figure. We all know how the eager spirits gather together and in a

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little time learn to confer and act together. It is a dull life for us all unless it is enlivened by some interests beyond those of home. Politics are the most engrossing of all pursuits. And so clubs spring up on Party lines for debating and discussion, with or without bowls, billiards and occasional concerts or balls. Many Members learn to their cost that these institutions are by no means self-supporting! But they are all on Party lines. They crystallize the differences between Liberal and Unionist and harden opinions into dogma. Then comes in the natural combativeness of mankind, just as in the decadence of the Roman Empire the whole Empire was convulsed by feuds which had no other origin than the colours of the favours worn by the populace at the gladiatorial show. It is true enough that the mass of the electors stand aside in quiet times, having to look after their wives and families and work hard to maintain them. At election times they are sought out and worried, as Lord Selborne described, to go to the poll for one side or the other whether they like it or not, and the bands of workers who worry them to the last man consist of the little army of enthusiasts or self-seekers which has by its energy taken possession of the local Unionist or Liberal Association. A few trained troops properly drilled and commanded will always get the better of an unorganized multitude.

These are local organizations but they are closely connected with a central Directory under the supposed, and sometimes very real, guidance of the Chief Whip. It may happen, when the Whip is a weak man and the paid staff of the Caucus at Westminster includes strong men, that the influence of the Chief Whip is overborne by wholly unknown and irresponsible persons. For there are constant communications between London and the Provinces. London provides money and directs the secret correspondents in the country. The country correspondents, not always the paid agents but the few who have made themselves prominent, supply information and carry the word of command. There is a good deal that the Central Caucus can

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do for its provincial friends, when they are approved friends, besides supplying money. It can influence the grant of Knighthoods and Baronetcies and even Peerages, but then it expects to be the recipient, not the dispenser, of cash. It can press claims for a seat on the Bench of Magistrates, but there also money is often paid, to the local, not the central, fund. It can help an aspirant to a good seat in the House of Commons and often expects a handsome contribution in return. It can encourage or discountenance any spirit of revolt against a member or candidate if he takes a line of his own or fails to spend handsomely in proportion to his means.

The best way of realizing the degree of danger to which we are exposed by this entire system is simply to look at things as they are to-day.

We have the Irish question in an acute form before us. Nearly thirty years ago Mr Gladstone brought this question into the front rank. If he had given it a little time, proceeded by Resolution instead of a crude Bill, and allowed the country a little leisure for reflection on what was a new problem (for them at all events), there would have been, a quarter of a century ago, a quiet settlement on lines of devolution all round to relieve the congestion of Parliamentary business. But he was in a hurry and he controlled the Party machine. Accordingly an instantaneous conversion to his method was announced all over the country, which carried two-thirds of the Liberal party off its legs and committed it to an immediate settlement on unscientific lines of one among the most difficult problems imaginable. Ever since then the Liberal Party has adhered to those lines and only of late has it recognized that the Irish difficulty must be settled as a part of the larger difficulty which threatens the entire United Kingdom with legislative impotence. On the other hand the Unionist Party, which as early as 1885 acknowledged the need of constitutional change in Ireland, could not resist the temptation of a popular cry and has, till very

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recent days, opposed any form of Home Rule. All this is due simply to the fact that nearly every member of Parliament has been like clay in the hands of the potter. If he dared to depart from the cabalistic words prescribed for him by the immovable, metallic, mechanical caucus on either side, he simply ceased to be a Member of Parliament.

Lest anyone think this description exaggerated we will fortify ourselves with two short quotations. On 19th March, 1914, Mr Bonar Law, speaking on the Irish question in the House of Commons, said:

“After the first interview which I had with the Prime Minister four months ago, in giving an account of that interview to Lord Lansdowne, I wrote to him that in my belief, unless a way of peace were found before Parliament met, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find it afterwards. I had that fear, because it seemed to me that when the opposing parties were brought face to face in this House they would be so strongly animated by *party spirit—the essence of which is to secure victory over our opponents at the moment without much regard to the consequences*—that there would be very great difficulty in “getting a suitable atmosphere for a peaceful solution.” *

So according to this high authority the party spirit cares for nothing except victory over its opponents. What a confession! And it is true. A few days later Mr Birrell in an address to the young Liberals, said: “I advise you not to “sell your souls too quickly to the Party Whips.”

Yes, we have sold our souls to the Party Whips, and the hideous system will ruin us unless we shake ourselves free.

The other great question which is producing danger is Tariff Reform. We need not dwell upon it. It, too, was heralded into being by a miraculous conversion. The word went forth, the Machine was set in motion, and in a few months this impossible and absurd creed became the first constructive plank of the Unionist Party, simply because Mr Chamberlain, the author and the favourite of the Caucus, had hurriedly so determined. Among those expelled from

* Parliamentary Debates Official Reports, Thursday, 19th March, 1914, p. 2251.

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the ranks of the orthodox at that time were such men as the late Duke of Devonshire, Lord James of Hereford, Sir M. Hicks Beach, and, at a later date, after a series of dialectical tergiversations which remind us of Pascal's *Provincial Letters*, the great Mr Balfour himself. Yet there is hardly one of the present leaders of the Unionist Party, and there are few of the rank and file, who in their hearts fail to recognize that the thing is impracticable. Scores of Unionist members have nevertheless been permanently excluded from public life because they had the courage to say so.

All this is the work of the undisclosed restraint to which public men are subject. Politics may be largely a profession. It is something more, a common interest of us all. It has been so shackled by the presence in our midst of unseen and enormously wealthy organizations that, instead of Parliament implying independence, the natural development of opinion and the search for wise courses by manly effort to get at the truth and find wisdom, the leader of a great Party dreads the very meeting of Parliament because Party spirit will make it so difficult to do what is right.

Co-operation there must be and always will be for all public purposes. It will come willingly and naturally in a free country, provided that the wholesome instinct be not repressed by an attempt at cast iron discipline. That is the deadly danger of what we call Democracy. It is a danger which is growing more and more formidable among us every day. The money obtained in enormous sums by the sale of Honours is spent in aggravating this danger, nay, in creating it. Without the cash procured by the grant or promise or hope of a title the Party organizations could exist only on a quite modest scale, large enough to do honest work for honest men, but wholly insufficient to maintain the corrupt methods of to-day.

Look at what is actually going on. A huge spider's web has been woven by both of the great parties all over England. In every district, or in nearly every district, are

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to be found correspondents or agents who devote their time to watching the registers, so that every man shall be enrolled if he is expected to vote with them, and every man struck off, by any legal chicanery that comes to hand, if he is expected to vote against them. These agents are in communication with the spiders at the centre, whom they supply with information as to popular feeling (interpreted by themselves), and to whom they look for pecuniary help or for promotion to some better paying district, or some auxiliary employment in one of the numberless special "leagues" or "associations" for such purposes as Land Reform, or Property Protection, or Liquor Reform, or Trade Defence—it is needless to specify. These auxiliary organizations are growing up like mushrooms and their chief purpose is to find a job for the horde which clusters round any movement that promises a chance of employment. In the centre are the spiders themselves. If anyone wishes to become a Member of Parliament without any strong local position, his best chance is to get himself adopted as a carpet-bag candidate by the spiders. If any one wishes to remain a Member of Parliament he must vote straight or encounter their hostility. If anyone wishes to obtain popular support as a Minister he contrives to identify himself with the "Machine" and its attendant Press. There are many honourable men within all ministries and within all political associations and, no doubt, within the redoubtable Caucus itself; but they are kept unaware of what is going on, as far as possible, and the underground work of priming the Press and finding seats for pliant candidates and blowing the bellows to "fire out" those who show signs of independence is left to others.

Why is it that the House of Commons, in which is now concentrated all the effective power of Government, has lost public respect? It is a very serious feature of the day that, looked upon as a whole, and notwithstanding the presence in it of many men who are individually deserving of the highest respect, the House of Commons is generally

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held in little esteem. It is not merely the disgraceful language used there, language which would not be tolerated in any parish vestry. We have become accustomed to reading of one honourable member calling another honourable member a cad or a rat or a calculating liar or a traitor. That of course is mere vulgarity on the part of individuals. It is not merely the waste of time in personalities or the essential unfairness of each side towards the other in misconstruing motives, in refusing to acknowledge error on their own part (though we are all liable to error) or to admit a true point, whether of fact or of argument, when it comes from an adversary. These are not the things which have brought the House of Commons to humiliation, though they are discreditable enough. What has for the time ruined the House in general esteem is the belief that the overwhelming majority of its members give their votes simply and solely according to the Party ticket, regardless of the actual merits of the question before them.

When the Marconi Committee of the House of Commons was sitting, there were numerous divisions, and there were some divisions in the House itself. Almost without exception Ministerialists voted in favour of the incriminated Ministers and Unionists voted against them. When the thing was over, Ministerialists maintained that the charges were inspired by pure spite, and Unionists maintained that their adversaries were animated by mere dishonesty. The same thing occurs systematically. People outside think that all this is quite disgraceful. Are they far wrong? But the disgrace is due more to the system than to the individuals. Both Parties are dominated by a misplaced and enforced loyalty. They have taken the shilling in a figurative sense and have come under discipline. If they vote wrong, or even speak otherwise than as docile supporters, their seats are put in peril, their prospects of advancement are blighted, their action is immediately assailed in the Press, and they incur the relentless animosity of the "Machine." For the "Machine"

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exists to get votes and lives upon its success. If the Party loses office supplies are cut off. There are no more titles to sell. The garrison is reduced to starvation rations, or to live on I.O.U.'s promising a title in the future at a heavy discount.

How to end all this? That is the most pressing question of modern times. It will not be done simply by breaking up parties. They will naturally again coalesce and reform their ranks. Real improvement can come only from the constituencies themselves. Suppose some constituency were to awaken a little from its slumbers and to ask from both candidates a solemn pledge that, if returned, they would honestly vote according to their consciences on the particular question before them. No doubt an apology is due for making so audacious, one might almost say so impertinent, a suggestion. If an even more revolutionary idea may be entrusted to print, suppose candidates plucked up a little courage and, when addressing the electors, would say what they really thought about public affairs, not glossing over difficulties with ambiguous phrases or escaping from them by rhetorical professions of confidence in their respective "great leaders," but fairly and squarely meeting them like men. Of course it would soon appear that a great many Liberals did not agree with all the items on the "programme" and a great many Unionists the same. It would be a mistake to suppose that the public at large would fail to respond. Habit is very powerful. At first there might be repugnance or indifference, owing to the novelty of such a candidature; but before long people in general would swing round to the honest view.

All rests upon the constituencies in the long run. To warn them, to inform them, to expose before their eyes the degradation of parties and politicians under their hide-bound organizations, to liberate candidates or encourage them to liberate themselves is a means to that end. But the first step is to do what has always been done in every struggle for freedom in our history—to stop the

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supplies of the enemy. The Caucus lives upon the secret sale of Honours. Money foully gained will be foully spent. Let us insist upon this disgraceful corruption being brought to an end, and the former independence of Parliament will at once be restored.

A singularly good opportunity is offered at this very moment, and will continue apparently for some little time to come, of testing the accuracy of the view that Members of Parliament have in very truth already "sold their souls" to the Party Whips." *The Times* of 8th April contained an illuminating communication from its Parliamentary correspondent, headed in large type, "The Problem of "Ulster. Private Members' anxiety for settlement. Demand "for a free vote." Let us, if you please, premise that, by the admission of the Prime Minister and of nearly every other responsible person, we are in danger of something very like civil war, and already we read in the papers that foreign nations are reckoning on our being weakened by internal dissensions so as to leave a fair field for our ill-wishers abroad to do pretty well as they please. Ever since last October Ministers and Opposition leaders have been in intermittent communication with each other in favour of a settlement. They failed to agree, and Mr Asquith stated with glee in Parliament that of all the newspapers which have hazarded a guess as to the real point upon which the negotiations broke down not one had hit the true point, nor did he attempt to enlighten them. Cheers and laughter are said to have greeted this sally. The laughter was indeed strictly appropriate to the occasion. If the sages who sit upon the two front benches had come to terms, all the preliminaries might well remain secret. Even so if they did not come to terms. Secrecy furnishes the only atmosphere in which a certain kind of negotiation can be carried on. But then it is surely indispensable that, without disclosing anything that passed in private conclave, the leaders on both sides, now enlightened upon the real views of their opponents, should publicly state the terms which they are

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themselves prepared to offer, so that public opinion may play its part and the House of Commons give effect to it. This they omit to do, and it is held for a capital joke that they have succeeded in concealing what is the true stumbling block even when civil war is in the offing!

Nearly every man of common sense outside Parliament is getting sick of this perpetual game of hide-and-seek—the leaders to hide the real differences, the House of Commons to seek a solution without knowing what they are. The papers have been full of what Sir Edward Carson and Mr Redmond internally wish or fear, of what Mr Asquith and Mr Bonar Law have at the back of their minds. Worthy gentlemen all of them, no doubt. It is said, probably with only a grain of truth, that they are all tied up with secret agreements. What they are really tied up with is more likely a want of moral courage. People have been known to risk their lives with equanimity who would not risk their popularity. Well this is just the occasion when we who have returned our members expect that the House of Commons will step into the arena—will it? Dare it? Before the days of the Caucus that great historic body would have made short work of fencing leaders and their honourable obligations to each other. It would have taken the affair into its own hands.

Mark the difference to-day. Of course the House may yet wake up to its duty. It has not done so yet. The high-water mark of independence yet attained is reflected in the paragraphs of the *Times* Parliamentary correspondent to which we have referred. After telling us of the anxiety for a settlement among private members, the correspondent proceeds to say that an “appeal for a free vote” will be made if the front benches have made no progress. We are told that Sir Henry Craik (a University member by the way) has given notice to move for a Grand Committee to consider a federal scheme for the whole United Kingdom with this significant proviso, “that in the Divisions which “may take place in the Grand Committee *the Party Whips*

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“ shall be withdrawn.” Mr G. Stewart has another motion for the “ suggestion ” stage, that in order to settle an area in Ulster for exclusion and to secure the withdrawal of the time limit, for the avoidance of civil strife, the Party Whips shall be taken off and the House of Commons allowed a free vote on the matter. Is it not quite astonishing that we should actually have members petitioning for a gracious permission to do their duty and vote according to their consciences? The only possible difference between putting on and taking off the Party Whips is that taking them off means that you may vote according to what you believe right without incurring the vengeance of your leaders and of the Caucus. It is quite common nowadays for piteous appeals to be heard in the House of Commons that the Official Whips shall not tell in a Division. We shall see whether it will be done in regard to the Irish Bill; but, whatever may be done, nothing can more conclusively show the degradation of Parliament or the means by which it has been accomplished.

RATHER THAN THIS

COME the eleventh Plague, rather than this should be;
Come, sink us rather in the Sea.
Come rather Pestilence and reap us down;
Come God's sword rather than our own.
Let rather Roman come again,
Or Saxon, Norman, or the Dane.
In all the bonds we ever bore,
We griev'd, we sigh'd, we wept; we never blusht before.

(Abraham Cowley, *A Discourse by
Way of Vision, concerning the Govern-
ment of Oliver Cromwell.*)

OUR PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY

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THAT Policy governs armaments is a commonplace of current journalism, falsified every day by political events. That Policy should govern armaments is an altogether different matter. In point of fact Armaments largely govern Policy. This is obvious to every one who watches the movements of diplomatists and of the Chancelleries of Europe.

Here in England, we oscillate between the two axioms, and our Foreign Office appears to think in terms sometimes of the one, sometimes of the other.

Prince von Bülow, in a work recently published, credits England with a traditional policy. He sees definite aims handed down from century to century, independent of changes of party government, winning magnificent successes in international politics. It is curious that others should so often see us in a garb which to ourselves is quite unrecognizable.

England steadfastly pursuing an "alpha" and "omega" of policy—in the eighteenth century, supporting Prussia at one moment, abandoning Frederick the Great at another, in the nineteenth century allied with France against Russia, and then with Russia against France, and in the twentieth seeking the friendship of Japan and subsequently of France, yet throughout never swerving from a set purpose, maintaining certain ideals of supremacy and of arbitration in European affairs—this is a picture about as far from the truth as anything that can be well imagined.

Whatever may be the fact about other States it is abun-

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dantly plain to every student of our history and its framers that England has never thought much about Foreign affairs, has drifted along in an opportunist miasma from year to year, and is still pursuing her wayward track.

Could, for example, the temperament and outlook of two men differ more widely than those of a Palmerston and a Granville? Could any conceivable orbit of diplomacy comfortably contain Disraeli and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman? With all his great gifts Prince von Bülow, like most foreigners, has never understood the English nation.

The English, the most self-governing people in the world historically and actually, have never directed with consistency their foreign policy. Foreign affairs have been managed for them by a succession of practically autocratic ministers, who have followed their own inclinations, and been blamed or praised according to results. In this respect we differ very little from other nations. The people, millions of them, in every state rarely conclude upon any political proposition. They are swayed and induced to believe that they conclude by the artifice of a man or a group. By such means Italy was unified under Mazzini and Cavour. By such means Germany became a nation under the tutelage of Bismarck.

Richelieu, considered, superficially enough, to have profoundly delved into the future potentialities of France, was himself under no illusions. In his political testament he enjoined prudence; and thus he leaves his experience on record: "The wisdom and sight of man, having bounds beyond which they can see nothing, God only being able to see the ultimate end of things; it suffices to know that the projects we form are Just and Possible, and to undertake them with Reason."

This, however, may be said, that the wise statesman adjusts, if he can, the means to his end; and if he cannot, he adjusts his end to his means.

Let us apply this test to the Foreign Policy of England to-day.

First let us examine the objective of British statesman-

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ship at the present hour, and the means that Sir Edward Grey possesses, should he find himself obliged to make appeal to force, which is, after all, the ultimate sanction of diplomatic effort and enterprise. Then let us endeavour to ascertain what "public opinion" expects of him, and what price the English people are ready to pay in order to effect their purpose, when they have one.

Foreign Policy is directed nominally by a Parliamentary figure, sometimes negative enough, but occasionally commanding. Behind the personality of the Minister stands a bureaucracy recruited from a special class, trained from youth to think as well as to work upon traditional lines, reflecting ideas mainly anachronistic, using stereotyped methods, and accustomed from force of habit to look upon human activities as they would desire them to be, and not as they are.

Our Foreign Office, indeed all Foreign Offices, can best be visualized by Burne Jones's figure of the Creation, in which the diminutive figures of Adam and Eve are seen within the contracted dimensions of a transparent globe, held in the hands of the Angel of God. Occasionally the glass cracks and the rarefied atmosphere quivers with a gust of popular sentiment. Such a climax occurred in the late 'seventies when Europe rocked under the eloquence of Mr Gladstone. The effect was transitory enough, and soon the Chancelleries were back once more in their congenial sphere.

Lord Clarendon was hardly fair in calling Lord Hammond, the much-respected head of the Foreign Office, a "self-sufficient coxcomb and donkey," but that this eminent official should have struck so acute an observer in that light is a curious commentary upon the characteristics that go towards the making of highly-placed bureaucrats.

Part of the machinery, then, at Sir Edward Grey's disposal is the Diplomatic Service, at the present time saturated with fear and suspicion of Germany, just as twenty years ago it was convulsed with alarm whenever a Russian frontier officer inadvertently or intentionally sneezed.

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Germany is assumed, by every member of Sir Edward Grey's staff, probably without exception, to be the fountain and origin of every political or commercial move that can be twisted or distorted into an appearance hostile to Great Britain. Natural phenomena, the result of an expanding population, of growing manufactures, of legitimate commercial activities, are put down to malevolence and far-sighted political schemes of European or world-wide hegemony. Germany can do no right and Russia can do no wrong is the *mot d'ordre* to-day. Twenty years ago every rising diplomatist thought the exact reverse. Through this unfocused glass Sir Edward Grey is asked to read the political situation. Fortunately he is a sportsman and a naturalist. He is accustomed to observe for himself.

Graver difficulties lurk behind. If a Foreign Secretary stands with one foot upon his office blotting-pad, the other must necessarily rest upon the convex shield of his country's armed forces.

The British fleet is the most powerful naval war machine in the world at the present time, but it is not so relatively strong as in 1805 or as in the winter of 1899. The rule of the waves is not to-day undisputed. Unquestionably, however, England remains at sea "a First Class Power." This defensive, offensive, and admonitory weapon Sir Edward Grey possesses. It is the real source of his strength, much as the sentimentalists may dislike the notion. In the controversies, and the combined action of the "Great Powers" during the past twelve months, Sir Edward Grey's transparently honest personality and his disinterestedness counted heavily; but behind these lay always the shadow of the British fleet.

Under certain conditions, and in certain eventualities, the sanction of British diplomacy, measured by the capacity of Fleet action, is effective and powerful.

Here the military activities of the State begin and end.

Sir Edward Grey probably is aware that he possesses nothing in the shape of an army that can influence the

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policy of any one of the Great Powers. The English nation has never been able to understand that the world has moved on since Waterloo, and that an eighteenth century Army is a negligible quantity in the twentieth. Nothing but the fatal test of continental war is likely to disperse the comforting fog which obscures the vision of our people. It is, however, a curious psychological factor in foreign politics, that the foremost advocates of interference in the primary concerns of other nations are invariably radical sentimentalists and opportunist "Liberals"; who nevertheless are for ever clamouring for the reduction of expenditure upon our already inadequate Army, and denouncing the plan upon which continental armies are based.

The Foreign Secretary is generally engaged in trying to disentangle himself from the meshes of these people, without lowering the prestige of the country in the opinion of foreign statesmen. It is a thankless and difficult task.

For the past seven years Sir Edward Grey has been balancing himself on the tight rope of the "*ententes*" with France and Russia. This is the main objective of British policy, and, combined with the Japanese Alliance, this policy has admittedly contributed to the peace of Europe and of the world. So much has been stated in plain terms by high authorities in Germany and may readily be conceded. To its furtherance every other consideration has been subordinated. But a policy of *ententes* demands sacrifices and while Russia has had her way in Persia, obtaining a hold there which is viewed with deep mistrust by Anglo-Indians of an older school, no demand, not even a light wish, has been refused to France.

No one with knowledge of the inner working of British diplomacy, can have any doubt as to the comparative risks and advantages of an *entente* and an Alliance. If we are to assume that the Palmerstonian methods are no longer practical and that this country, for reasons that have been explained by Sir Edward Grey, is unable to stand

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isolated from European combinations (having due regard to the peace of Europe and our national safety) a prudent and far-seeing statesman would ponder deeply before rejecting the advantages of an alliance, clearly defined, in preference to the hazy understanding that is called an *entente*.

It is generally assumed, however, that the obligations of an *entente* are less onerous, and—what is of still greater importance—more elastic.

In our relations with France and Japan we have exemplified the two methods, and their respective workings.

The alliance with Japan has never caused this country or its statesmen uneasiness. It stood the test, quite simply, of the Russo-Japanese war; and the still more difficult strain of the racial jealousy between the Japanese and the workers of our Great Dominions, Australia and Canada.

Confident in the written conditions of the alliance, the people of both countries leave its obligations to be borne by their Governments. Not a momentary doubt or suspicion of one party to the alliance has crossed the mind of the other.

The Entente with France tells a very different story. It is unnecessary to probe into the origin of Lord Lansdowne's policy, or to endeavour to elucidate his complete intention. What occurred, everybody knows. In 1905 Sir Edward Grey took over the Foreign Office and therewith the policy of his predecessor. The Entente with France made thenceforward long strides.

Although perfunctory denials have been forthcoming on several occasions in the House of Commons, we have, by implication, gradually found ourselves bound in fact by an informal military convention. The General Staffs of the two countries first got into touch, then proceeded to discuss hypothetical plans, and finally settled actualities to their mutual satisfaction. All this was supposed to be "without prejudice" and merely on paper. But every soldier knows that you cannot discuss such matters without prejudice, and should the French General Staff have confided their secret plans of defence to British Officers, it was because

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they honestly believed that those officers, at a pinch, would be ready with a British force to help them.

And then came the month of August, 1911. It would be indiscreet and useless to discuss the events of that danger period. The secret history of what occurred will be more safely told hereafter. A thoroughly false situation, created by ridiculous unrealities, fostered by irresponsible writers in the Press of three countries, brought this country to the verge of war. Fortunately prudent counsels prevailed. No one doubted then, and no one doubts now, that if war had broken out between France and Germany over Morocco, we should have been obliged—whether the Government liked it or not—to fulfil our ill-defined but binding engagements, and to dispatch our expeditionary force to the Valley of the Meuse; a miserable commitment in a quarrel that in no way concerned this country. This is the predicament in which a policy of *ententes* has landed us.

It may be true, as Sir Edward Grey has said, that under modern European conditions the Palmerstonian attitude of splendid isolation is an anachronism. It may be true that an attempt on our part to resume our old position in Europe of taking allies only when we wanted them and where we found them—as find them we always did—would endanger peace. But it does not follow that a policy which imposes upon Great Britain a binding obligation to assist France by arms, without defining the circumstances under which that assistance becomes obligatory, is necessary in the interests of European peace, or the most statesman-like and prudent course open to those who preside over the foreign relations of this land. It is useless for Ministers, or their apologists, to deny our obligations, and to reiterate that no “document” exists. Obligations are not always, between men of honour, recorded on parchment. They are often expressed in words, more vague and therefore more dangerous than documents—words sanctioned and corroborated by acts of confidence and friendship.

Still more often is this the case between communities and

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States. The history of our country, notably under William of Orange and under Mr Pitt, affords ample illustration of what an *entente* may mean and entail. The danger of our Ententes with France and Russia is that they may, at any time, bring about either a war in which as an Empire we have no vital concern, or such a misunderstanding as may be fatal to the maintenance hereafter of a good feeling between Great Britain and these two great nations; and, what is worse, may prove derogatory to our good name. It is assumed, and Sir Edward Grey asserts it as a truism, that the day has gone by when Great Britain can stand isolated, and free to hold the balance between contending and rival European nations. If this is a fact, there would seem to be no safe alternative but a closer definition of the conditions under which our assistance may be claimed, and of the precise military obligation we might in the early days of a war find ourselves obliged to fulfil.

Compared with any period selected since Sir Edward Grey received the seals of the Foreign Office, the present time is peaceful and the sky fairly free from clouds.

Turkish finance and the islands of the Ægean constitute the main obstacles to the subsidence of Near Eastern troubles. When Sir Ernest Cassel became the protagonist of higher financial standards at Constantinople and when he sent Sir H. Babington Smith as his representative to Turkey, great expectations were naturally formed; but events have falsified the hopes of those who imagined a Turkey as prosperous as Egypt and as well governed. Sir Edward Grey repudiates the idea of a financial "boycott," but the fact remains, that Turkey looks to Germany rather than to England, and that in spite of a change of British ambassadors at Constantinople, our influence with the Turkish Government stands lower to-day than at any period since 1854.

When it was settled that the islands of Mitylene and Chios were to be Greek, and Tenedos was to revert to Turkey, when Italy had to abandon her island conquests, and Greece to give up a large slice of Epirus to Albania, every one realized that the settlement was based upon no principle other than

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the expediency of the moment; that once more the outcome of the war had proved to be abortive and without permanent advantage to the combatants, and that the wretched provinces and principalities sandwiched between the ambitions of the growing and decaying races of the East of Europe would before long become once again the theatre of strife.

Then suddenly and quite unexpectedly there broke out in the German Press a Bismarckian campaign against that Russian Empire to which Bismarck always looked with a friendly eye, and upon the ultimate support of which he always relied—rarely in vain. No convincing explanation of that outburst is forthcoming. The ramifications of the “Armament firms” throughout Europe are as hard to detect as those of “Marconi” in English politics, or of Mr Churchill in Cabinet manœuvres.

In Vienna, the Foreign Office believed, for a short moment, that the German Government meant to provoke and anticipate a war in defiance of the Bismarckian aphorism deprecating that precise form of political activity.

In three years' time, so the representatives of Foreign Powers were told by nervous Austrian officials, the peace establishment of the Russian Army would amount to 1,300,000 men; the Russian fleet was growing so fast that the Baltic would cease before long to be a German Lake; Germany had practically developed her maximum armed strength; and Austria herself, faced with the growing power of the Slavs both within and without her frontiers, was on the down grade. Great Britain at this moment was weakened by internecine political strife. Eighteen milliards lent by France to Russia might well be jeopardized if a blow delivered before Russia was ready could be made sufficiently swift and deadly.

Suddenly, however, the storm died down, Austria recovered her nerve, and diplomatists were left groping still to find the ramifications of the “Armament firms.” Some day they will be dragged to light.

That the Slav girdle closing every day to the south and east occupies the attention of Austrian statesmen, is demon-

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strated by the continued references in the inspired press to the menacing *rapprochements* between Servia and Montenegro, and the importance to Austria of the land approaches to the Bocche di Cattaro. If the attention recently observable in Italy to the strengthening of Maddalena in Sardinia indicates an understanding as to respective spheres of naval action in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, it is Montenegro that will be expected to pay the price, and Lortchen—the sacred mountain—with the assent of Italy, may before long pass into Austro-Hungarian hands.

Unquestionably the uncertain naval factors in the Near East strengthen the case made by Mr Churchill for an adequate British force in the Mediterranean. The naval arrangements between this country and France, based on “conversations” believed to have been held at the Admiralty some time ago between French and British naval officers (by which the spheres of potential naval action of the two Powers were defined) allotted, it is said, the Mediterranean to the French fleet. It has since become evident that in the event of war the French fleet would be mainly occupied in safeguarding the transit of a French *corps d’armée* from North Africa to France and could not be relied upon to cope single-handed against the activities of the combined Fleets of Austria and Italy.

If their ministers can secure to Austria the Bocche di Cattaro and to Italy the port of Maddalena, made into strong naval bases, the case for a further increase of British naval strength in the Mediterranean becomes at once overwhelmingly strong.

NEW TREATY WITH GERMANY

MEANWHILE the relations between Great Britain and Germany have sensibly improved and are improving. The negotiations for rectifications of frontiers, some territorial exchanges, and newly defined spheres of national influence in Africa, commenced by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, have been continued under his amiable suc-

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cessor. An agreement having been reached, and initials affixed to the contracting documents, it was generally believed here and in Germany that some announcement would be made to the Reichstag and to the British Parliament. A profound silence has, however, so far been maintained. Old treaties with Portugal have suddenly assumed a significance that can only be construed into a shrinking on the part of Herr Bethmann von Hollweg from the criticism which the new arrangements are certain to call forth from the German Chauvinist Press. He has no need to be alarmed. Our Press is sure to follow suit. Just as Germany will be said, by General von Bernhardi, to have made unworthy concessions, so the British Foreign and Colonial Offices will be said, by English journalists, *plus royalistes que le roi*, to have given away priceless advantages for the sake of a friendly interlude in the relations between two peoples whose friendliness is a sham.

Every sane man knows the real value of vapourings; and the highest compliment that can be paid to the reasonableness of a compromise, is the abuse of it by the "diehards" on both sides. It is to be hoped, therefore, that British and German statesmen will pluck up their courage, take their countrymen into confidence, and publish their protocols of agreement.

That the Entente with France will not thereby suffer is realized by all those who are aware that during the negotiations the French Government have been kept fully informed of their progress.

Whatever the practical ultimate outcome of these friendly discussions may be, there can be no doubt that the relations between England and Germany have materially improved. The atmosphere of suspicion has cleared, and a spirit of forbearance and friendliness engendered wholly different from the distrust so characteristic of past years. The Emperor William in January, 1906, said that our Entente with France, to which he did not object, in no way precluded us from having a good understanding with Germany; and he instanced Russia, a Great Power with which Germany

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was on the very best of terms in spite of the Russo-French Alliance.

Recent changes in the relative military strength of Russia and Germany, to which allusion has already been made, unquestionably point to a shifting of the centre of political gravity in Europe. It is difficult, however, to foresee the effect of the enormous growth of Russian armaments upon the grouping of the Great Powers, but that this growth will tend to bring about a more friendly feeling between ourselves and Germany seems more than probable, and a similar effect may not impossibly be produced even upon the relations between Germany and France.

A survey of the political outlook oversea shows then an appreciable improvement in the prospects of peace. So far as this country is concerned with the affairs of Europe, Sir Edward Grey has reason to be satisfied. He has succeeded, to use his own words, in so shaping the foreign policy of England, that we are not likely to have against us at any given moment in the immediate future, a combination of Powers with which our Navy would be powerless to deal. He has, as he admits, based his policy upon our naval strength; and no one is likely to quarrel with him for having done so.

He has strengthened the understandings or *ententes* with France and Russia, and although in his view "we should depend for things that are vital upon ourselves," he holds that a "sane and progressive foreign policy" does not close the door against any *entente* or alliance, unless it tempts us to "lower our strength."

These principles undoubtedly appeal to the average citizen; and if the English people will realize that, while strong upon her element, the sea, England possesses nothing in the shape of an Army fit to give battle on the Continent of Europe, Sir Edward Grey may be left to conduct the affairs of the Foreign Office upon his chosen lines, which have given him and this country a position in Europe both influential and dignified.

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IT is many years since a British Foreign Minister enjoyed the reputation which Sir Edward Grey has won, both at home and abroad, by his handling of the situation arising out of the Balkan War. Foreign statesmen and foreign newspapers have joined in hymning the sagacity, the moderation, and the disinterestedness of British Policy; and we in England have gratefully accepted the homage offered to our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as a tribute to ourselves. Indeed, we feel, no less strongly than is felt in Europe, that it is due more to Sir Edward Grey than to anyone else that the break-up of Turkey in Europe did not lead to the great European conflict which, until the event, was always regarded as its inevitable sequel; and such a conflict would have been so great a disaster, to us as to others, that we are profoundly grateful to him. Yet the crisis which has brought so much prestige to our Foreign Minister has not passed over without causing very grave searchings of heart among the few people in this country who take a really serious interest in foreign affairs. It has helped to strengthen the misgivings with which, for some years past, they have regarded the present tendency of British foreign policy.

For once the foreign Press and those who inspire it have recognized and applauded the "disinterestedness" of British policy. It is this very disinterestedness that occasions misgivings. For the prime duty of Foreign Ministers, and the whole function of our Foreign Office is the protection

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and promotion of British interests. *Ententes* and alliances, the cultivation of friendly relations with other Powers, the maintenance of the balance of power, even the preservation of peace, are only means to that end, and the complaint justly made against our foreign policy is that it has been so engrossed in the means that it has tended to lose sight of the end; that it becomes so absorbed in the game of European politics—in which we only take a hand to safeguard our own interests—that, for the sake of that game, it neglects, sometimes directly sacrifices, British interests in all parts of the world. The criticism is not new; but it has taken a new form. It used to be complained of Lord Salisbury that, out of fear of Russia, he was always ready to sacrifice British interests to Germany; it is now complained of his successors that, out of fear of Germany, they are always ready to sacrifice British interests to Russia and to France. We have ceased to be the vassals of the Triple Alliance only to become the vassals of the Dual Alliance, whose interests in many parts of the world are by no means identical with ours and this subservience to France and Russia is only part of a general slackness in defending specifically British interests where they conflict with those of other Powers.

At first sight it seems strange that this criticism, so far as it concerns our relations with France and Russia, should have become more insistent during and after the Balkan crisis. The British Government was far from being so uncompromising or so indiscriminate in its support of the French or Russian view on the Albanian, Ægean and other questions that arose out of the war, as it had been in its support of the Russian view during the Bosnian crisis, or of the French view during the three Moroccan crises. It maintained a certain reserve and a certain impartiality, and used its influence to moderate the ardour of its friends and to reconcile divergent views. Previous experiences had shown the need for prudence. In supporting the Servian case against Austria in 1908-9 we had gone all lengths with Russia, until

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we were finally made to look ridiculous by the sudden and abject climb down of Russia at the orders of Austria's "friend in shining armour." After Agadir our experience had been even more humiliating. On behalf of France we resisted the German claims with extraordinary vigour, and were quite prepared to go to war about them—only to discover afterwards that we had been more French than the French themselves and that, while we were going to these lengths, the French Prime Minister, behind the back of our Government, and, indeed, behind the back of his own Foreign Office, had been quietly negotiating a settlement recognizing the justice of the German claim for compensation. With these two fiascos fresh in its memory it was natural that, when the Balkan crisis came, our Foreign Office should have decided to be more careful, in backing our friends, not to push in front of them. This more cautious attitude was welcomed by candid critics whose misgivings had been aroused, and was approved by the bulk of public opinion. It was of course unpopular among the influential section of Russian and French politicians and journalists, who wished to use the crisis to bring about another trial of strength between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, and who were prepared to run the risk of war in order, as they hoped, to humiliate Germany and get a revenge for the discomfiture of Russia over the Bosnian affair. It was even denounced as disloyalty to the Entente by a number of people in England who look upon international politics as a kind of game between two opposing teams in which our object ought to be, regardless of British interests or of the merits of the case, to score as many points as possible for the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance. This impressionist notion of foreign policy with its simple rule—always and everywhere work against Germany and support France and Russia—is very widespread, especially among the class which twenty years ago was as much obsessed by anti-Russian and anti-French feeling as it now is by anti-German. That it is not quite so prevalent

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as it was is due to the same causes that, during the past eighteen months, have strengthened the misgivings of those who deplore the general tendency of our Foreign Office to subordinate to other considerations its primary duty of defending British interests. Among most Englishmen who followed closely the long and intricate developments of the crisis, one result has been considerably to weaken the confidence felt in our *ententes*. The extraordinary vacillation of Russian policy, which scarcely remained constant for a week at a time, at one moment conciliatory and at another bellicose, according as one influence or another gained the upper hand in the Tsar's counsels, the irritating delays which Russian indecision constantly put in the way of the settlement of even minor questions, the indiscipline of the Russian diplomatic service, with M. Izvolsky apparently pursuing a policy of his own in Paris and M. Hartwig working his hardest in Belgrade to undo the work of Count Benckendorff in London, the interminable series of "indiscretions" committed by the French Press with the obvious connivance of French diplomatists: all these things, though they have passed almost unobserved in the British Press, have been noticed and taken to heart by those who make it their business to know what is going on. They have strengthened the position of those who contend that the *ententes* with France and Russia, though valuable and perhaps necessary, cannot be allowed to remain the end-all and be-all of our policy.

The complaint is not that we have understandings with France and with Russia and try to act whenever possible in co-operation with them. The strength of Germany's position, and her tendency to bully any other Power which does not accept her hegemony, necessitates some combination strong enough to face the Triple Alliance in case of need. Nor is it complained that, in order to make the combination and keep it together, Great Britain should make some sacrifice of her interests when they stand in the way of greater interests of her partners. But such sacrifices

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should be mutual, there should be give and take in political as in other partnerships, and in both our *ententes*, as they have been practised, all the give has been on our side and all the take on the side of France and Russia. That it has been so has been due, not to any inherent fault in the *entente* policy, but to the neglect of our Foreign Office to stand up for British interests. Both France and Russia take care of their own interests, it is not their business to consider ours. The understanding with us is as valuable to them as it is to us, and they would doubtless treat us with some approach to reciprocity if we insisted strongly enough upon it. If we are too slack to do that the fault is our own.

It cannot be denied that there is a good deal in this criticism, and that in practically all the cases where our British interests have been opposed to French or Russian interests ours have been allowed to go to the wall. The specific agreements with France, and later with Russia, which laid the foundation of the Triple Entente have been much criticized. Lord Rosebery protested against the Anglo-French arrangement at the time as a very bad bargain from our point of view. Lord Curzon, whose views are shared by practically all the authorities on Middle Eastern questions with the exception of Sir Valentine Chirol, has repeatedly denounced the extent to which British interests were sacrificed in the Anglo-Russian Convention. There is no need here to examine these arrangements in detail, especially as it is not so much the actual terms of the agreements which are now being criticized, as the lack of reciprocity in the closer relations for which they paved the way. To Lord Curzon's criticism of the surrender of British interests in Persia, there has been no effective reply. The attitude of the Foreign Office towards Russia was described by an important Anglo-Indian official at the time of the negotiations as that of a woman in love. Practically nobody now defends the way in which, while the whole of Northern Persia, including Isfahan, was recognized as in the Russian sphere, the greater part of Southern Persia, including Shiraz and the eastern

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shores of the Persian Gulf, was made into a neutral zone. Lord Rosebery did not make out an equally good case against the arrangement with France. The interests we sacrificed in Morocco were valuable, but it was worth while paying a good price to put an end to the irritating campaign of pin-pricks by which France had endeavoured to make our position in Egypt intolerable. If the agreement had been followed, as was expected, by relations of really mutual helpfulness between us and France, there would be little ground for complaint. That has, however, scarcely been the case.

Using the Anglo-French Agreement as a base, France has gone ahead in Morocco until it is now a French Protectorate; and she has compelled Spain to give up to her a considerable portion of those districts which, by an agreement to which we were parties, she had recognized as within the Spanish sphere. At each successive stage in her advance she received the ungrudging support of Great Britain. We backed up the cause of France as if it had been our own. Indeed, it may be doubted whether we should have shown ourselves as ready to risk a European war to consolidate our position in Egypt as, on three successive occasions, we showed ourselves to assist France in consolidating her position in Morocco. In the face of German opposition the French advance would have been impossible had there been any shrinking or lukewarmness in our support. We even helped to "persuade" Spain to compensate France for the price she had paid to secure German consent to developments which were not only not desired by Spain but were actually distasteful to her. Although we were in no way bound to put ourselves so completely at the service of France, and although on the third occasion the upshot made us look a little ridiculous, we were perhaps right in interpreting in this generous fashion our obligations under the Entente. Germany had, it is now generally admitted, a better case than we recognized at the time, but she put herself so completely in the wrong by the clumsy and blustering way in

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which she endeavoured to enforce her views that she could not resent our conduct. Had France shown, except in words, any appreciation of our attitude there would be no cause whatever to regret it. She has shown none. In Morocco itself she has shown not only indifference but even hostility to such British interests as we still preserved by the Agreement. Her political influence, which we worked so hard to make supreme, has been used to discourage British trade and British industrial enterprise. It is said that, from time to time, especially with regard to contracts in Tangier, our Foreign Office has protested against this tendency, but, if so, the protests have been singularly ineffective. Perhaps that was to have been expected. Financial and business interests dominate the French Government and the French Press, and among no people is the business view more narrow and more rigidly protectionist. No one who knows the French tradition in such matters but knows that, wherever French influence prevails, every effort will be made to establish a close preserve for French industry and French trade. The French attitude over the future status of Tangier was not so much a matter of course. Our position at Gibraltar makes it important for us that Tangier should not come into the hands of any foreign Power, and our commercial interests in Tangier itself make it important that no foreign Power should acquire a predominant influence in that port. That was made perfectly clear from the beginning, and it was agreed that an international administration should be set up for the town and district. The negotiations to settle the composition and authority of this administration have met with hitch after hitch. To judge from the French and Spanish newspapers—our own Press has either been very ill-informed on the subject or has been extraordinarily reticent—the difficulties have been caused by the persistent endeavour of France to make French influence supreme in the administration, which would then be international only in name. Some authoritative French newspapers have openly spoken of the internationalization of Tangier as a

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merely temporary arrangement to tide over the interval until that town can be brought as completely under French control as the rest of Morocco. A French Tangier would be an infinitely more serious menace to our naval position than a German Agadir, the mere idea of which, a couple of years ago, provoked so much hysterical writing from our amateur strategists. They, of course, would resent the comparison of the two cases, for they assume now that it is out of the question that we should ever be on bad terms with France, just as they used to assume, fifteen or twenty years ago, that we could never be on good terms with her. There is an old and safe rule in international politics, always to remember that the friend of to-day may be the adversary of to-morrow, and the adversary the friend. Should our Foreign Office show any toleration to the idea of a French Tangier it will justify all the hard things that have been said of its subservience to France.

This lack of reciprocity has not been confined to Morocco. Perhaps the worst case is that of Muscat, where for years the French made it impossible for us to prevent the traffic in arms for the Indian frontier. We owe it to France if the situation on the frontier has been made more serious than ever before owing to the fact that the tribesmen are now armed with modern weapons. All the time we were putting our hands in the fire for the French cause in Morocco the French Government refused to make the least concession about the Muscat traffic, although we were willing to compensate the French firms affected, except in return for territorial concessions elsewhere. Blackmail of this kind could, of course, not be paid. When we induced the Sultan to regulate the traffic and establish a system of bonded depots and sale by licence, the French Government immediately protested against the regulations as violating their treaty of commerce with him, and actually despatched a warship to enforce their arguments. The ship never actually reached Muscat as the outbreak of the Balkan war caused it to be recalled, and since then the French Government has reluctantly agreed

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to tolerate the regulations. But the whole story shows clearly the French interpretation of the Entente.

As regards our relations with Russia the case is better in some respects, but worse in others. The Russian character is essentially different from the French, and the difference comes out strongly in politics. Frenchmen at one time were accustomed to scoff at us as a nation of shopkeepers. Yet with them, far more than with us, politics, international as well as domestic, are treated in the spirit of the petty tradesman or the small peasant proprietor. The grasping disposition, the eagerness to exploit to the full every advantage, the reluctance to consider anybody's interests but his own, the narrow qualities, which are the defects of the French peasant's sterling virtues, are defects that too often cling to the French statesman. The Russian is rightly proud of his *shirokaya natura*—his broad, generous, free-and-easy disposition. In dealing with friends he is not apt to try to get the better of them, or to insist to their detriment upon the letter of his legal rights. He is as ready to give as to take. The difficulty with Russia arises out of the inveterate disorganization of the Russian administration, which is one of the results of this very *shirokaya natura*. In few Russian services, and certainly not in the foreign department, is there any real discipline. No matter what policy the people temporarily at the head may adopt, no matter even what engagements they may enter into in the name of the Government, there are always half a dozen people, ambassadors or ministers or even consuls, who have policies of their own which they attempt to carry out in spite of instructions, relying upon influential backing at Court, and trusting to be able to force the hands of their superiors by the creation of some *fait accompli*. In no diplomatic service is the man on the spot so independent of control as in the Russian. The result, though often advantageous to Russia, is seldom edifying to her friends. This applies perhaps especially to us, for in the parts of the world where British and Russian interests have needed adjust-

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ment many Russian officials have pursued their traditional courses as if they had never heard of any Anglo-Russian understanding, and, in so doing, have generally been able, with Court and other unofficial support, to hold their own against their official superiors in St Petersburg.

The most flagrant instance of this kind of thing was furnished by M. Hartwig, who, while in Persia, ignored the assurances of his Government and, with the whole weight of Russian influence, supported the ex-Shah in getting rid of his Mejliis and making himself an absolute monarch free from all control except that of the Russian Minister whose puppet he was ready to become. When M. Hartwig was at length promoted to Belgrade, where he has continued to display the same independence, his policy was pursued by the Russian consuls whom he had imbued with his spirit. His successor, M. Poklevsky-Koziell, whose loyalty to the understanding with England is above suspicion, was quite unable to keep them in order. The Consul-General in Teheran succeeded in getting rid of Mr Shuster, the American Treasurer-General, who, although guilty of some tactlessness in his relations with Russian officialdom, had made astonishing progress in putting the finances of Persia into order, and even a beginning in the creation of a tolerable administration. While Russia had agreed with us to respect the independence and integrity of Persia, and professed to desire with us the stability and prosperity of that country, the men on the spot have been able to thwart every attempt at reform—especially when it seemed likely to strengthen the authority of the Teheran Government in the North—to foster a state of anarchy which keeps the Government too weak to be anything but properly submissive to Russia, and, incidentally, to displace the authority of the Persian Government by that of Russian Consuls in the important frontier province of Azarbaijan. There is no need to dwell on the harm that this has done to British trade and British influence in Persia, and the menace which may easily result to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf if these conditions continue.

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It is not only in the diplomatic service that indiscipline obtains. The same sort of conditions prevail in St Petersburg, where half a dozen different influences contend for the mastery, and where the Foreign Minister, or even the Prime Minister, may at any moment have measures imposed upon him for which he has to take the official responsibility, but of which he does not approve, and which may be in direct contradiction to his policy. Some of these influences are strongly Anglophobe, and others, without being directly hostile to Great Britain, are in favour of a "forward" policy in the Far and Middle East, and care nothing for the understanding with us if it stands in the way. To these influences must be ascribed the opposition, in co-operation with Japan, to British enterprise in Manchuria, the practical annexation of Mongolia and the recently renewed endeavour to gain a foothold in Tibet through the notorious Dorjief. During the Premiership of M. Kokovtsoff another and scarcely less dangerous influence acquired considerable power, that of a financial group closely connected with French and Belgian banking firms. Its policy was to use Russian political influence to get concessions for railways in China, Persia, and elsewhere out of which huge sums could be made in the shape of flotation profits and orders for material. It is this group which seems to have pushed, if it did not initiate, the egregious Trans-Persian Railway scheme, with regard to which our Foreign Office, while professing to keep an open mind, appears to have compromised itself pretty deeply. The burden which the railway, if constructed, would throw upon our Indian army and the damage it would do to our whole position in the Middle East have been convincingly set forth by the military correspondent of the *Times*. The hollowness of the pretence that it would serve any useful commercial purpose that would not be better served by other less costly and less dangerous schemes was made clear in the debate on the subject in the House of Lords. The strong support given by Russia to the project, and the apparent readiness of our Government

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to acquiesce in it, would alone have amply justified some misgiving as to the practical effects of the understanding. Coming on top of a long series of unpleasant developments in Persia it shows that our Foreign Office has been inclined to treat our friendship with Russia, not as a means of protecting British interests, but as an end in itself, to attain which British interests may well be sacrificed. The story of the Potsdam agreement, by which Russia, without much consideration for our interests, came to an arrangement on Middle Eastern questions with Germany, is evidence enough that in Russia a very different view is taken of the understanding.

The criticism that, in the management of our foreign affairs, the defence of British interests is subordinated to other considerations which ought really to be subordinate to it—to the cultivation of particular relations with particular Powers, the avoidance of international friction and other purposes which, laudable in themselves, ought not to be the primary object of British statesmanship—this criticism is not based solely on the unsatisfactory nature of our dealings with our two partners in the Triple Entente. There is good reason to fear that, when the comprehensive international agreement with regard to Asiatic Turkey comes to be published, it will be found that British interests have been jettisoned wholesale in order to make a settlement easier. The only satisfactory features about the agreement, to judge from the various inspired statements that have been published in the press, are that Turkey, in exchange for British consent to an increase in the Customs Duty, recognizes our position in the Persian Gulf, which is defined in a number of separate Conventions, and that both Turkey and Germany agree to a modification of the Baghdad Railway concession which makes that project less menacing to British interests; and we appear to have received some concessions in Mesopotamia. These are important gains, and no candid critic will contest their value. If the Persian Gulf and Baghdad Railway agreements are as

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satisfactory as people who know the details assert them to be, it may be worth while paying a good price for them to Turkey and to Germany. We, however, appear to have paid all round, for, unless both our own and foreign newspapers are all on a false scent, we have allowed the door to be shut on British enterprise throughout practically the whole of Asiatic Turkey. France is apparently to be given a monopoly in Syria, Italy in the Adalia region, Russia in the Black Sea basin, and Germany in the rest of Asia Minor with considerable rights in Mesopotamia. In view of the preponderance of British trade throughout Asiatic Turkey and the influence we have always enjoyed in all these regions, the economic sacrifice seems a very heavy one. What is, perhaps, even more serious is the political risk that it involves. Economic spheres of influence in a country like Turkey almost inevitably become political spheres, and generally end by falling into the hands of the European Power which exercises the influence. Our Government, and indeed other Governments as well, have professed their anxiety to protect the integrity and to promote the prosperity of the Turkish Empire in Asia; and to us the partition of Asiatic Turkey among the Powers would be little short of a disaster. The danger is not an imaginary one. There is no secret about French political aspirations in Syria. They have been proclaimed without much reserve in the French Press, and have been obvious enough in recent speeches of M. Poincaré and of the present Prime Minister. That the Russian "forward" school, if not the actual Russian Government, hope ultimately to acquire the Armenian provinces of Turkey is equally plain. Apart from the weighty general reasons why we should seek to stave off, and, if we can, to prevent the break-up of what is left of Turkey, it is clear that such a break-up would gravely affect our position both in Egypt and in the Persian Gulf. Egypt would have a French Syria on its eastern frontier in addition to an Italian Cyrenaica on the western. Our predominance in the Gulf—always proclaimed to be one of our most vital interests—would be

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exposed to danger from Germany on the north-west and from Russia, already supreme in Northern Persia, from the north and north-east. By recognizing the division of Turkey into spheres of interest we are bringing these dangers appreciably nearer.

From the Far East and from the two Americas come more complaints of the neglect of British interests, both economic and political. We certainly cut a sorry figure in Mexico where, after recognizing President Huerta as the only man likely to restore order, we acquiesce in, and even give our moral support to, the opposite policy of the United States. The rebels, who are enabled to maintain themselves by the official favour of America, murder British subjects and destroy British property. We are not only unable to exact reparation ourselves, but do not even venture to inform President Wilson that it is his duty to exercise some kind of restraint over the bandits whom he patronizes for reasons of American policy. During the administration of Mr Taft there was a remarkable extension of the Monroe Doctrine, and a development of "dollar diplomacy" which, adopted as they are by his successor, are turning the smaller and weaker Latin American states into what for all practical purposes are protectorates of the United States. In a recent speech which provoked very bitter comments in South America, President Wilson even went so far as to claim a moral dictatorship over the whole American continent and the right to decide how hitherto independent countries should manage their internal affairs. In the United States the official hostility to financial interests is no more regarded as an article of export than is anti-clericalism in France, and throughout South America the diplomacy of the United States is used to the full to promote American industrial and commercial enterprise and to exclude European, and especially British, competition. In the weaker countries, such as Colombia and Ecuador, this interference takes a very arrogant form and purely economic concessions granted to British firms, on terms very advantageous to the countries granting the

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concessions, have been directly vetoed by the United States.

These developments cannot be agreeable to the British Government, but we seem to acquiesce in them. In fact, our general attitude towards the United States is one of amiable acquiescence. Important as is the cultivation of Anglo-American friendship, it may well be doubted whether we do not go too far in this direction, and whether we should not be more respected in the United States if we occasionally showed a little more backbone in defending our own interests. The problem is a delicate one, for the amazing American ignorance of international affairs and the sensationalism and chauvinism of a large section of the American Press make any controversy with Washington both difficult and dangerous. There can, however, be no need for us to toady to the United States, and that word is scarcely too strong to describe the eagerness which we show to conclude general Arbitration Treaties with a country which has so little respect for treaties, especially when we have learned by experience that the Senate will either emasculate them or throw them out altogether.

If we cross the Pacific to the Far East we find British interests, both political and economic, menaced on all sides, and the predominant, almost exclusive, position which we once held gradually slipping away from us. The open door for British enterprise, on behalf of which we were once, it seemed, prepared to go to war, has been closed by Japan in Korea, South Manchuria and Fu-kien, and by Russia in North Manchuria and Mongolia; Germany has been allowed to earmark Shan-tung as her own preserve, and France to assert exclusive claims in Yun-nan; in the Yangtze basin, where we used to be supreme, we have now to face competition with the very nations which exclude us from their so-called spheres, and to share with them what were originally obtained as British concessions. What is especially galling is that much of the damage done to British interests has been made possible by the use of British money. The

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capital of the railway which has made South Manchuria Japanese has been mainly raised in England, and Japan has received from the London market the money required for her own national, municipal and industrial needs, and has thus been able to set aside huge sums to subsidize steamship and other enterprises to compete with us in China, especially on the Yangtze, and to establish claims by loans to viceroys and other officials. To travel in the Far East is to be deluged with complaints of the British Government's neglect of British interests. Many of the complaints are exaggerated and some are altogether unreasonable, but for others there is a good deal to be said. There is evidently something wrong when we see British policy chop and change in the way in which it has chopped and changed in China. The Chinese aggression in Tibet has been treated with a vacillation that has enormously increased the difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory settlement. We have oscillated between devotion to the principle of the open door and a desire to gratify other Powers by allowing them to mark out preserves for themselves. Our official attitude with regard to loans—perhaps the most delicate problem of all—has undergone startling transformations and does not seem, even yet, to be finally settled. In fairness to our Foreign Office it must be admitted that the whole question bristles with difficulties. The concentration of our fleet in home waters, imposed upon us by the growth of the German navy, has diminished our visible power and with it our prestige in the Far East. Russia and Japan, whose interests in China are very great and very different from ours, are adjacent Powers capable at any moment of exercising overwhelming pressure upon the Chinese Government. The only checks upon them are their jealousy of one another, and our understanding with the one and alliance with the other. An even greater source of weakness is that the struggle is largely one of finance and concessions, and that, in comparison with our rivals, we lack the organization which would enable us to use our financial and industrial resources to

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promote British interests. These considerations may explain to some extent how we come to fare so badly in the Far East; they do not get rid of the fact that we have no thought-out Far Eastern policy, and that our interests have suffered for want of one.

To some of the criticisms set forth in this summary review of the position a Foreign Office apologist might be able to make a plausible reply; but, if candid, he would be compelled to admit that there is justification for considerable misgiving. There is no reason to push the case too hard. We have no right to expect either omniscience or infallibility in the conduct of our foreign affairs any more than in any other field of human activity. The management of British foreign policy is an enormously complicated and difficult business. We have interests in every corner of the world; our trade and our traders penetrate everywhere; we have colonies scattered all over the globe; the great dependency of India and our self-governing Dominions have interests and views of their own which are not always easy to reconcile among themselves or with the general interests of the Empire. The Dominions, for instance, insist on the right to exclude Asiatic immigration, and their insistence is very unpalatable to Japan, our alliance with whom is, and is likely to remain for many years, one of the main pivots of our policy. The vital interests of India in the Middle East are in conflict with those of Russia; Australia resents with increasing bitterness the conduct of French settlers and officials in the New Hebrides, while the general European situation compels us to cultivate the friendship of both France and Russia. Any settlement of colonial questions in Africa, to bring us into those better relations with Germany which are in themselves desirable, is almost certain to cause and create difficulties with the Union of South Africa. To pick out the best course in this labyrinth must be puzzling enough; the choice must often be between decisions both of which involve some sacrifices and some risks, and whichever decision is made is bound to dissatisfy

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someone. Another standing difficulty is that in our foreign policy we are on the defensive. We are, what Bismarck used to maintain Germany was, a satiated Power. We desire no new territories, no more place in the sun than we already possess. On the contrary we already feel that the burden we have assumed is almost more than we can carry, and we are downright afraid of incurring any fresh responsibilities. We are everywhere in the position of having to try to maintain the *status quo* against the efforts of Powers which are not satiated, who are striving after opportunities of expansion and are quite ready to shoulder new responsibilities. To be on the defensive is, in politics as in war, to be at a disadvantage; it is a penalty for our past success which is a constant handicap to us. In Persia, for instance, the best and simplest reply to the Russian advance in the north would be for us to advance in the south; but that would mean a heavy increase in our administrative and military responsibilities which we wish to avoid even at the cost of considerable sacrifices.

We suffer too from the growing use of finance as a political instrument. The struggle for political influence is now largely an affair of loans and concessions. Great as are our financial resources and unequalled as is our industrial capacity, we are frequently beaten in this field by countries in which finance and industry are in closer co-operation with one another and with the Government, and in which they can be used to secure political objects abroad, receiving in return a more thorough-going diplomatic support than is usual with us. There are many who advocate that in this respect we should imitate our neighbours, and the advisability of doing so seems plain enough when we see their more organized forces invading fields, in almost every part of the world, in which we used to be supreme, and everywhere creating interests in conflict with ours. There is, however, very much to be said on the other side. The position in England is very different from what it is on the Continent. With us financial, commercial and industrial interests are the

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creation of private enterprise and, rightly and wisely, are very jealous of official control or official interference. Abroad such interests largely owe their beginnings to official initiative and their prosperity to the fostering care of Government, and they accept the control and guidance of the State as a matter of course. It is a question whether it would be practicable to establish a similar condition of things here; it is still more a question whether, if practicable, it would be to the ultimate benefit of the country. It would certainly tend to discourage private initiative; and the closer association of Government with private money-making concerns would open the door to all manner of unpleasant developments. The Marconi affair and the honours scandal are warnings that we cannot rely as implicitly as we used to believe we could on the sound instincts of our politicians to preserve, amid any temptations, the highest standards of our public life. Even in Germany where the standard is very high, the co-operation of the Government with big business interests, especially with armament firms, has given rise to many unpleasant rumours and considerable murmuring. In France the influence which financial houses exercise over the Government has led the foreign policy of France into some very devious paths, and is one of the stock complaints of Socialists and others against the present *régime*. Apart from all question of the possibility of undue influence and even of downright corruption, public opinion in this country would very soon grow restive if our ambassadors were employed to the same extent as some of their colleagues, as commercial agents for big private firms or groups of capitalists. A distinguished French Ambassador was popularly known, in the capital in which he was accredited, as "Son Excellence Monsieur Dix-huit pour Cent." Few of us would wish to adopt a system which would render that conceivable in the case of a British diplomatist.

For these, and many other difficulties, allowance must be made, but, even when every allowance is made, there remains ample ground for criticism and ample room for misgiving.

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There can be little doubt that our world-wide interests have not always received all the support they might have had. Our Foreign Office, like our Admiralty, has been obsessed with the German menace—against which both were justified in taking ample precautions. Lord Fisher carried his policy of concentration in the North Sea to such an extreme that we have had scarcely any ships to spare for the Pacific and the Atlantic, or even for the Mediterranean, with, at times, unfortunate results; and our diplomatic strength has, in a similar way, been too exclusively directed to the single object of securing cover against a possible German attack. There has been a failure in the all-round vigilance which is required to safeguard our interests in all quarters of the globe.

For this failure it is not so much the Government and the Foreign Office who are to blame as Parliament, the Press, and, above all, the Public. To depreciate the Foreign Minister would be flagrantly unjust. Sir Edward Grey is not the ideal Foreign Minister. No single person possesses, or ever will possess, all the qualifications; Sir Edward Grey possesses a good number of them, and, if he has some obvious weaknesses, he has also what many other people have not—the qualities of his defects. He is not a travelled nor a deeply read man; he has a tendency to concentrate his mind on the solution of immediate problems to such an extent as to ignore the future difficulties to which the solutions may give rise; he is apt to assume somewhat too readily that the other party to an agreement or an understanding will interpret it with the same loyalty and generosity as himself; he is sentimental enough to accept almost at its face value the current American bombast about “ideals” and “national righteousness” and the “love of humanity.” On the other hand he possesses considerable strength of character, which comes out especially whenever an attempt is made to drive him into a corner, a great fund of common sense, a serene temperament and calm judgment, and, most important of all, an absolute straightforwardness and sincerity of character

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which, now universally recognized abroad, may fairly be described as a national asset. His subordinates are devoted to him, he is admired and respected abroad, and enjoys to an unprecedented extent the confidence, the respect and, one may even say, the affection of the whole diplomatic body in London. When he leaves office we shall be lucky if we find a successor to equal him. Our Foreign Minister is hampered in his work by the fact that he is at the same time a party politician, and, in addition to conducting the Foreign Affairs of the British Empire, has to take a leading part in political struggles at home and to make speeches on Home Rule, Woman Suffrage, and a hundred other questions that have nothing to do with international politics. That drawback is, however, inseparable from our British system of Government. It has its compensating advantages, and observation of the work of bureaucratic foreign ministers abroad does not make us anxious to change our system.

If it would be unjust to depreciate Sir Edward Grey it would be almost equally unjust to join in the more widespread depreciation of our Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service. There are slackers and incompetents to be found in them, of course—there are in every large body of men however carefully selected; but, taken as a whole, our diplomatists compare favourably in keenness and intelligence with those of almost any other country. A certain amount of red tape, a certain tendency to resent outside criticism and to forget that they are the servants of the country, these are not faults peculiar to diplomatists and Foreign Office clerks, but are common to all large organizations. Even private firms which depend on the public for a living are not exempt from them, and one of our greatest steamship lines is notorious for these very defects throughout the world. The chief defect of both branches of the service is that they are understaffed and underpaid. The pay is so poor that men are not infrequently tempted away by business firms, which find it worth while to give them many times as much as they receive from the Government, and the understaffing

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and consequent overwork, especially at critical times, is the real cause of much apparent negligence. A department like the Foreign Office, immersed in a flood of details, and confronted almost every day with situations requiring immediate attention, is apt to fall into routine ways, to confine its attention to the problem of the day and to overlook facts and considerations which are not brought to its notice. It requires to be stimulated, to be shaken up occasionally and to be made to reconsider its policy from time to time in the light of fresh developments. Comparatively efficient as the Foreign Office may be, it needs bracing by the fresh air of intelligent outside criticism. Such a bracing breeze can only come from a vigilant and well-informed public opinion, and, unfortunately, on foreign affairs our public opinion is neither well-informed nor vigilant. In that respect we are worse off than we used to be. For some years past the country has been taking less and less real interest in international politics. It likes to read of any picturesque incident, and at a time of crisis it gets excited, but it relapses into its usual indifference as soon as it is assured that nothing dramatic is going to happen.

To discuss the causes of this decline of interest—some of which are obvious enough—would lead too far afield. Evidence of it meets the observer everywhere. In Parliament it is so marked, and so disastrous, as almost to make one regret that foreign policy is no longer regarded as a party question. When Governments could come into, or be driven out of, office on a point of foreign policy, ambitious members took care to study international affairs, for a man capable of making an effective speech in a foreign debate was a valuable asset to his party. Now that there is no such incentive, scarcely any members take any continued interest in foreign questions at all, and those that do are generally faddists whose sole concern is in some minor issue—the lot of the Eastern Christians or Congo atrocities, or the treatment of Portuguese prisoners. Seldom or never

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is there heard any real criticism of Foreign Office policy in its larger aspects, and, indeed, there are scarcely half-a-dozen members who could say anything worth hearing on the subject. It has been suggested as a remedy that a standing committee should be constituted with access to confidential information. The suggestion seems worth considering. Service on such a committee might educate the members, and it would be a salutary experience for the Foreign Office to have to explain and justify its policy in detail. The difficulty would be in getting able men to take part in the work and to give sufficient time and attention to it. The post of Parliamentary Under-Secretary, which used to be considered a prize, is now so little sought after that it is given to men of small calibre and of no special qualifications.

Perhaps the most convincing evidence of national indifference is to be found in the Press. At one time the *Times* gave us day by day, in telegrams from all over the world, all the information that mattered on foreign affairs. It has recently very greatly restricted the supply, and now devotes a large proportion of its foreign news to lighter, non-political topics. This tendency was evident even before the price was reduced to a penny; it is not likely to become less marked now that the paper is catering to a wider and presumably less educated and less serious public. Two newspapers, the *Standard* and the *Daily News*, which used almost to rival the *Times* in the fullness and the accuracy of their foreign political news, long ago ceased to count from that point of view. The *Daily Telegraph* and the *Morning Post* still publish numerous foreign telegrams and letters, but neither in the one nor in the other is the quality of the service to be compared to that of the old *Times*, *Standard*, and *Daily News*. To the few of us who still wish to know and to understand what is going on abroad it is becoming a more and more difficult problem where to get independent and authoritative information. The astute business men who control the London Press, and whose business it is

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to know what does and what does not interest the general public, have decided that authoritative foreign political news is not a marketable commodity. If they are right the outlook is very serious. No country, and especially no country with a parliamentary government, is likely to be well served in any branch of its national business in which it does not take a real and continuous interest.

DIPLOMACY

LORD LYONS

THE old Diplomacy is as dead as Queen Anne, but unlike Queen Anne, without any hope of resurrection. Like many other old institutions it has been killed by the nineteenth century and its inventions. The position of an Ambassador is still one of great dignity, and he can help largely to keep up the prestige and authority of the nation which he represents. He is consulted and, if the Government are wise, listened to, but in the determination of policy his initiative has been strangled. He is so far as that is concerned little more than a clerk at one end of a telegraph wire whose duty it is to carry out the instructions of Downing Street with as much exercise of power of conciliation as may be. It is hardly possible to conceive a situation so sudden, so unforeseen, that it would not be the duty of the Ambassador to abstain from any move without having first consulted the Secretary of State and the Home Government. Whether this is altogether an advantage is open to grave doubt. In the warp and woof of complicated and delicate negotiations, there are often intricacies and slight shades of which it is difficult, if not impossible, to communicate the full importance in writing, or by telegraphy, but which the "man on the spot," if he be worth his salt, can turn to account. In the interchange of views between negotiators "*c'est le ton qui fait la musique*," and it is precisely the fine subtleties of the gamut the reality of which it is so difficult to convey by correspondence. It not seldom happens that the man at the other

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end of the wire, though he may be thoroughly acquainted with the brutal facts under discussion, may, for lack of knowledge of the temper of a Minister and of the peculiar pressure which at a given moment is being brought to bear upon him by the internal politics of the country which he represents, be inclined to some move which the astute agent, wary and watchful, would easily avoid, by smoothing difficulties and counterchecking dangerous arguments.

It is difficult in these days to realize the initiative power exercised by some of the older diplomatists. A Russianized Pozzo di Borgo forces on an alliance between Austria and the country which employs him for the annihilation of a brother Corsican. A Stratford de Redcliffe, in the execution of a policy of which his own government hardly concealed its hatred, plunges five great nations in war. Such masterful agents as these are unthinkable to-day. Not much more astonished would the world be by the dispatches of Ministers accredited to the long since defunct small German and Italian Grand Ducal Courts—proud records of august handshakes prolonged beyond those accorded to rival plenipotentiaries, chronicles of snarlings and bickerings over some vital question of precedence at a court supper or dinner. These were subjects upon which the lesser men expatiated in deadly earnest, deeply penetrated with a sense of their importance—and yet they were not altogether without their value, for we owe them some measure of grateful respect, since the judicious handling of such twaddle occasionally brought to light the talents of a man fitted for the nice conduct of real affairs. Indeed it was such a case that first gave the Foreign Office an inkling of the worth of a man who in the story of later years was destined to play a dominant part, the importance of which not even his excessive modesty and self-effacement could keep altogether in the background.

There is little need to call Dr Johnson into court to prove that “nobody can write the life of a man, but those who “have eat (*sic*) and drunk and lived in social intercourse

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“with him.” Boswell’s life of the Doctor himself, the life of Macaulay by Sir George Trevelyan, the life of Gladstone by Lord Morley, and the life of Lord Randolph Churchill by his brilliant son, are witnesses to the truth of his saying. Certain other recent biographies, on the other hand, where the writers had no personal knowledge of their heroes, reach no higher than the dignity of painstaking compilations, lacking that Promethean spark which alone gives life to history. Lord Lyons has been lucky in having such a biographer as Lord Newton, who not only had daily social intercourse with him, “eating and drinking with him” for some years, but being moreover a man of his own profession and his intimate subordinate, though at the time when they were together only a brilliant youngster, had something more than the ordinary opportunities of estimating his chief’s public value. Lord Newton is, as the House of Lords well knows, a master of subtle humour and delicate irony: he writes excellent English—terse, bright and to the point: and with these qualifications it is no wonder that he has produced a book which, seeing the momentously important events in which Lord Lyons took a leading part, must be largely consulted in all attempts to write the history of the latter half of the nineteenth century. We use the words “leading part” advisedly; for Lord Lyons was essentially a leader, guide and instructor upon whose wisdom those who had the ultimate decision of affairs were able to lean with confidence. For the relation of intricate negotiations Lord Newton has been happily documented with material that is entirely new and unpublished. The word “intricate” need scare no reader, for he has marshalled his facts so skilfully that much which might have been obscure is crystal-clear.

The great Lord Lyons—for he was great—was born in 1817, the son of that famous old sea-dog and diplomatist, Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, afterwards the first Lord Lyons. Like his younger brother he was sent to sea when he was little more than a child—only ten years old. But he was quite

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unfitted for a sailor's life: he was a martyr to sea-sickness, which he never got over, and so, as Lord Newton says, "it was probably with no slight satisfaction that the navy "was exchanged for Winchester." But it is a coincidence worthy of note that the two diplomatic achievements which chiefly brought him into note were, as we shall presently see, both of them connected with the sea and shipping and maritime law.

One would have liked to have had some knowledge of his early days, for the childhood that was to father a man of so marked a personality could not have been without interest but upon this point his biographer is silent: indeed a bare page and a half is all that is devoted to transferring him from Winchester to Christchurch, where he took his degree in 1838, and to the thirteen years during which he was eating out his heart as an attaché at Athens (where his father, the Admiral, was minister), despairing of promotion and half-minded to leave a profession in which he was destined to be so distinguished a figure.

In 1853 we find him at Rome, a post of some importance, though, as England had no diplomatic relations with the Vatican, it was always filled by an official of no higher rank than one of the Secretaries of Legation at Florence, and afterwards at the Italian Court when it was at Turin, and later transferred to Florence. It was a post which needed no little skill and tact, and was later occupied with conspicuous ability by Lord Odo Russell (Lord Ampthill). Lord Lyons's experience showed, as he himself wrote, that "in spite of my peculiar position, notwithstanding a very "strong opinion to the contrary, at Rome, as at most other "places, one succeeds best by transacting one's business "in the most plain and straightforward manner, and through "the most direct channels. By acting on this principle and "by being very quiet and unobtrusive, I think I have in part "allayed the suspicions which are felt towards us always "more or less at Rome, and I am certainly on a better footing "with Cardinal Antonelli than I had at all expected to be."

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This saying of his—uttered at the very beginning of his first experience of an independent post—is worth quoting, for it gives us the keynote of his whole diplomatic career, and reveals the secret of the success which he achieved when he was afterwards placed in positions as difficult and as delicate as any that a diplomatist was ever called upon to face.

Four years later Lord Lyons was called upon to settle “one of those trivial questions which so deeply exercised the diplomacy of a former generation”—a question, indeed, which it is nowadays difficult to imagine occurring outside of the Court of the Grand Duchess of Gerolstein. Lord Normanby, K.G., Ex-Viceroy of Ireland, was British Minister at Florence, and had gone on leave, furious, in circumstances which were grave indeed. The Pope having visited Florence, a banquet in his honour had been given by the Grand Duke, and the diplomatic body were invited; but to their great indignation they were not seated at the *Tavola di Stato*, the sovereign table. Lord Normanby demanded an apology, and the *chers collègues* having agreed to support him, backed out at the last moment: so Lord Normanby went off fuming and fussing, and “uttering dark threats that he would not return unless the apology was forthcoming.” Mr Lyons was summoned from Rome to act as *Chargé d'affaires*, and upon him fell the task of making the Tuscan Government apologize. For three weary months a correspondence at which so essentially practical a man as Lyons, with his subtle sense of humour, must have laughed in his sleeve, used up reams of paper, until at last, after “a severe rebuke” from Lord Clarendon, the Tuscan Government ate some infinitesimal particle of dirt, “the injured Lord Normanby returned to his post, and Lyons resumed his duties at Rome.” For the full enjoyment of Lord Newton’s account of the episode it is almost necessary to have known the two men—the Turveydrop-like pomposity of the one, and the simple sober dignity of the other, gifted with the most delicate feeling for proportion.

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It was in March, 1858, that Lord Lyons had his first great opportunity. Diplomatic relations with Naples having been broken off for some years, Mr Lyons received orders from Lord Malmesbury to proceed to Naples to inquire into the case of the "Cagliari." It was a difficult matter and created a great excitement at the time.

The "Cagliari" was a mail steamer plying between Genoa, Sardinia and Turin, and on 25th June, 1857, "a number of "Mazzinians who had taken passage in her, seized the "master and crew, altered the course of the vessel, landed "at the Island of Ponza in Neapolitan territory, where they "liberated three hundred political prisoners, and subsequently proceeded to Sapri, in the neighbourhood of "Salerno. Here they again disembarked, expecting the "inhabitants to rise in their favour, but encountered a "superior force of Neapolitan troops, who killed or captured "the whole party, while the 'Cagliari' was seized by Neapolitan warships as she was making her way ostensibly to "Naples. Some weeks later it was ascertained that among the "prisoners in Naples were two English engineers, Watt and "Park by name, and it was stated that these two men "were entirely ignorant of the conspiracy, and had been "forced by the conspirators to work the engines under "threats of being summarily shot if they refused." Naturally the British Government demanded that these men should at least have fair trial, and Lord Clarendon, then Foreign Minister, there being no Legation at Naples, wrote personally to Signor Carafa, the Neapolitan Foreign Minister, on their behalf; but the Neapolitan Government shuffled and delayed, and in March, 1858, the two men were still in prison, where owing to cruel treatment, after the manner of the Naples of those days, "the health of both was completely broken "down, and Watt had become partially insane." It was in these circumstances that, Lord Malmesbury having succeeded Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office, Mr Lyons was ordered to proceed to Naples to investigate the case. He was successful. The two Englishmen were released and

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after further negotiations, an indemnity of £3,000 was paid to Watt and Park, and finally the "Cagliari" was placed at Mr Lyons's disposal. The question had been complicated by our relations with Sardinia, and Lyons had been ordered to use threats of our making common cause with that Power against Naples should his demands be refused: but as Lord Newton points out it was an additional satisfaction for Lyons to be able to say "Far from threatening, I did not even go so far as my instructions warranted, for I did not say that His Majesty's Government proposed that the mediator should retire at the end of three months, nor did I tell Signor Carafa that I was myself ordered to go back to Rome if the mediation should be refused at the expiration of ten days."

The same methods of suave and gentle persuasion which answered so well in this case were to be the secret of his success a few years later in another hemisphere and in far more critical circumstances. The conduct of the "Cagliari" case resulted in his being appointed Minister at Florence, and in the following November (1858) "came the offer of the Washington Legation, an offer which, with characteristic modesty, he accepted with considerable misgivings as to his competence." It was a good thing for England that any such scruples that he may have entertained were overcome. His mission to Washington was big with fate. In the same month his father died and he succeeded to the peerage.

In February, 1859, Lord Lyons sailed for Washington in H.M.S. "Curaçao." In these times of huge liners and rapid passages, with the possibility already in view of still swifter crossings of the Atlantic in airships, it is startling to read of a voyage which occupied forty-two days, "a period which must have been singularly disagreeable to a man who, in spite of some years' naval service, always suffered from sea-sickness." It was no doubt something of a relief to Lord Lyons to meet with a most courteous reception when he presented his credentials to Mr Buchanan,

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the then President of the United States, for he might well have anticipated that, at any rate at first, the Legation at Washington would not be a bed of roses. He had to take up the succession of Sir John Crampton, a diplomatist who, though, first as Secretary of Legation and afterwards as Minister, he had served for a good many years at Washington, had never succeeded in making himself popular with the United States authorities. There had been much ill feeling between the two countries on account of enlistments for foreign legions at the time of the Crimean war: Crampton, who did not realize the susceptibilities of the Americans, had been very active in this recruiting scheme, and matters had reached a point of such tension that in May, 1856, President Pierce broke off relations with Crampton, who had to return home. Things had more or less quieted down in the meantime, but in December, 1858, a Presidential message containing "some rather ominous passages with regard to the relations between England and the United States," was delivered. There were at the time not a few signs of underground forces at work which might at any moment break out into open eruption. Lord Lyons would have been superhuman if he had not felt some emotion at entering upon duties which must manifestly be fraught with unusual difficulties: still, "the sentiments now expressed were friendly in character and showed a disposition to settle pending difficulties in an amicable spirit." Statesmen so minded, and animated by this conciliatory feeling, might reckon upon being wholeheartedly seconded by the new Minister.

For a year or two Lord Lyons had no very crucial question to face. The San Juan "difficulty," in which the United States Government showed the most conciliatory temper, and the question of the possible absorption of Mexico by the United States, in which Great Britain had no more than a philanthropic concern inspired by the feeling that it would have threatened the extension of slavery, could hardly be reckoned as coming under such a category. In

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the meantime in such negotiations as he had to conduct, his conciliatory and unobtrusive policy, his great discretion, had won for him golden opinions and great respect among all classes of American politicians; that, together with the popularity which the Prince of Wales never failed to gain and which was a conspicuous result of His Royal Highness's visit to Canada and the United States, happily placed the relations between the two countries on such a footing as had probably never existed since the separation. The value of this was felt when the great strain came. In 1861, Mr Buchanan had faded into that Stygian darkness in which ex-presidents of the United States flit as phantoms of a past dignity.

Abraham Lincoln ruled in his stead—Abraham Lincoln, tree-feller, rail-splitter, village postman, and one of the greatest men that ever made history.

This tall, gaunt, raw-boned, lantern-jawed man, fresh caught from Illinois, with none of the graces which the gods have given, save that supreme grace of truth and pellucid honesty which sweetens all intercourse, would have been an easy man for a Minister like Lord Lyons, himself the very incarnation of transparent sincerity, to deal with. His Secretary of State, Mr H. Seward, was a man of another kidney. Mr Seward was a New York lawyer, a rough, coarse, unconciliatory nature, one of those impossible people who mistake bluster for courage, and braggadocio for strength—so unmannerly was he that on one occasion when he was a guest at a dinner party at the British Legation, he talked so offensively to certain of the diplomatists present that Lord Lyons, a past-master in the art of turning a sharp corner, broke up the conversation by saying that as host it was now his duty to go and talk to the ladies. It needed all the tact, patience and self-control of Lord Lyons to treat with such a man. That he succeeded in taming him into something approaching to the amenities—we had almost written the decencies—of diplomatic intercourse, was one of Lord Lyons's most notable achievements.

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In 1860, the United States were on the brink of a volcano. The secession of the Southern States was imminent, and on the 10th December Lord Lyons wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: "It is difficult to believe that I am in the same country which appeared so prosperous, so contented, and one may say so calm when we travelled through it. . . . Our friends are apparently going ahead on the road to ruin with their characteristic speed and energy. The President (Buchanan), is harassed beyond measure."

Lincoln was inaugurated as President in March, 1861, and in the following April the dogs of war were let loose with a vengeance, "and the capture of Fort Sumter (by the Confederates) signalized the fact that a population of little over five millions of white men had had the audacity to challenge over twenty-two millions of their fellow-countrymen." The blockade of the southern ports became all important for England. Lord Lyons, writing to Lord John Russell, said, "If the United States are to be permitted to seize any ship of ours wherever they can find her under their jurisdiction on the plea that by going to a southern port she has violated the U.S. Customs Laws, our commerce will be exposed to vexations beyond bearing, and all kinds of new and doubtful questions will be raised. In fact, this it seems to me, would be a paper blockade of the worst kind. It would certainly justify Great Britain and France in recognizing the Southern Confederacy, and sending their fleets to force the U.S. to treat British and French vessels as neutrals in conformity with the law of nations." Mr Seward was apparently convinced of the reality of this danger, but when he saw how violent the President and his colleagues were, veered round and became "the fiercest of the lot." Lord Lyons went on to say, "I am in constant apprehension of some foolish and violent proceeding of the Government with regard to Foreign Powers. Neither the President nor any man in the Cabinet has a knowledge of foreign affairs; they have consequently

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“all the overwhelming confidence in their own strength which popular oratory has made common in this country.” The position of the British Minister at Washington was one of supreme difficulty. The Government had wisely made common cause with France, but no clear instructions as to procedure had been issued to Lord Lyons—Lord John Russell contenting himself with saying that he relied upon “the wisdom, patience and prudence of the British Minister to steer safely through the danger of the crisis.” The Law officers of the Crown gave it as their opinion “that we must consider the civil war in America as regular war—*justum bellum*—and must apply to it all the rules respecting blockade and letters of marque, which belong “to neutrals during a war.” They went on to express a pious wish that both parties should agree to the Declaration of Paris regarding the flag covering the goods and the prohibition of privateers. Pious wishes do not always bear fruit, and seeing the vital importance to England, and especially to Lancashire, of trade with the Southern States, it was evident that blockade running would soon become a common practice, and, seeing how ineffectual that blockade was, would be resorted to with the result that considerable fortunes would be amassed by it.

Matters were not made easier by the negotiations which were taking place at home between Lord John and Mr Adams, the new American Minister, who had succeeded Mr Dakas. Mr Adams said that the language held by Lord John to his predecessor had given umbrage in the United States, and might even lead to the termination of his own mission unless the unfavourable impression should be corrected. He complained moreover of the recognition of the South as a belligerent. Lord Newton very justly points out that Lord John Russell was honest in his endeavours to show that England as a whole was in sympathy with the North—popular feeling was naturally all on the side of the abolition of slavery. The ovation which Mrs Beecher Stow received in London was not yet forgotten, and *Uncle Tom's*

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Cabin, now a forgotten book, was still selling by thousands. But Lord John Russell as a negotiator was neither conciliatory nor tactful, and it was certainly remarkable that while on the other side of the Atlantic Lord Lyons was using all his tact, all his discretion, both natural and trained, to soften the asperities of Mr Seward, Mr Adams on this side was confronted with the querulous acrimony of the English Foreign Minister. There was moreover another British statesman whose clumsy activities and hardly concealed partiality were peculiarly exasperating to the men of the North. Mr Gladstone never quite shared the indignation and horror with which slavery was regarded by the bulk of his fellow-countrymen, and when, later in the conflict, the cotton famine and the attacks of the American Press had alienated many Englishmen from the North, there were "demonstrations of pleasure" in the House of Commons at McClellan's defeat, and Mr Gladstone declared that "Jefferson Davis and the leaders of the "South have made an army; they are making, it appears, "a navy; and they have made, what is more than either, "they have made a nation." Language such as this, held at the moment when the fortunes of the Federals were at their blackest, could not but arouse the bitterest feeling. Mr Gladstone was apt to be anything but happy when he dealt with the susceptibilities of foreign nations. A passage in a speech of his delivered on the 17th March, 1880, during the famous Midlothian campaign, is unforgettable. That was the oration in which he bitterly attacked Austria and defied any man to put his finger upon any part of the map of Europe, and say "There Austria did good." That was a speech which cost him a humiliating apology when a little later he met the Austrian Ambassador, Count Károlyi, at a party given by Lord Granville. His utterances in regard to the War of Secession in America were even more dangerous than this. Austria might be offended by his insults, but they would not, could not, lead to open hostilities. But there were moments during the great contest across the Atlantic

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which were crucial, and no responsible statesman should have hampered friendly negotiations the object of which was to avoid a fratricidal war between two peoples of the Anglo-Saxon race. It is necessary in order to understand the difficulties with which Lord Lyons had to deal to show what were the elements of conflict, working on both sides of the Atlantic, which he had to meet and overcome. That he succeeded, that when he went home on leave to consult with the Cabinet he was able to write to Lord Russell, "I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this morning," was one of those triumphs of peace of which the laurels are greener and more fragrant than any that ever hid the baldness of a Cæsar.

The course of the great War of Secession is followed with conspicuous ability in Lord Newton's life. It is impossible to say more about it here than that throughout those terrible years, years in which gifts of the most consummate tact and judgment were put to the test, Lord Lyons continued to work with patriotic patience and with such great restraint that one is almost tempted to say silently: indeed in one letter to Lord Russell he himself talks of "my language or rather silence." One only goal was ever before his eyes, and that goal the prevention of any cause or excuse that might lead to an outbreak of hostilities between the two countries. We can go into no details here, but there were two episodes in which his moderating influence curbed the hot heads of both nations.

The first was the famous case of the "Trent." On the 8th November, 1861, "the English mail steamer 'Trent,' " one day out from Havannah, was met by the American "warship 'San Jacinto' and stopped by a shell fired across her bows. She was then boarded by a party of marines, and the officer in command of the party demanded a list of the passengers. The production of the list having been refused, the officer stated that he knew the Confederate delegates to Europe, Messrs Mason and Slidell, to be on board, and insisted upon their surrender. While the dis-

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“cussion was in progress, Mr Slidell made his appearance
“and disclosed his identity. Thereupon, in defiance of the
“protests of the captain of the ‘Trent,’ and of the Govern-
“ment mail agent, Mr Slidell and Mr Mason, together
“with their secretaries, were seized and carried off by force
“to the ‘San Jacinto,’ and taken as prisoners to New
“York.”

When the news arrived in England the excitement and indignation were such that no one who witnessed them will ever forget that fever of wrathful resentment. On the other side the less thoughtful portion of the American public worked itself up into a perfect delirium of patriotic enthusiasm. Captain Wilkes, the commander of the “San Jacinto,” was raised to the dignity of a national hero—banquets were held in his honour and the Governor of Boston made a speech in which he said “that there may be
“nothing left to crown this exaltation, Commodore Wilkes
“fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the
“British lion at its head.” Promotion to the rank of Admiral was the heroic captain’s reward.

Peaceful and conciliatory as Lord Lyons was, and deeply concerned as he had shown himself in the avoidance of giving, or of unnecessarily accepting, any cause of offence, he was as convinced as the home government that in this procedure of Captain Wilkes, the limit at which patience was possible had been reached; and it must have been a relief to him to receive the dispatch in which “the United
“States Government were informed that International
“Law and the rights of Great Britain had been violated,
“that His Majesty’s Government trusted that the act would
“be disavowed, the prisoners set free and restored to
“British protection. Should this demand be refused, Lord
“Lyons was instructed to leave Washington.”

Before the dispatch was sent off, on the 30th November, it was sent for approval to the Queen. Her Majesty was constantly in the habit of amending Lord Russell’s dispatches, always rather slipshod affairs, and often couched in offensive

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language. She never did so with greater effect than upon this occasion when, acting upon the suggestions of that most sagacious adviser, the Prince Consort, written at a moment when, as he himself said, he was so ill that "he could hardly hold the pen," she so toned down such expressions as might have wounded the sensitive feelings of the United States, that the dispatch when it was received by Mr Seward raised no dissatisfaction, and that he "handsomely acknowledged" the great consideration which had been shown by Lord Lyons in his conduct of the negotiations." In their deep sorrow it must have been a happy memory for the Queen, the Prince of Wales, and his brothers and sisters to feel that the last official act of the husband and father whom they loved and venerated, on the eve of his entering into that peace which passeth all understanding,* should have been largely the means of preventing what would have been a tragedy indeed. It was a peace which was "a victory no less renowned than war."

Mr Seward's answer to the British dispatch was a note "of the most portentous length abounding in exuberant dialectics, but the gist of which was contained in the two following short paragraphs."

"The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort Warren, in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated."

"Your Lordship will please indicate a time and place for receiving them."

The rest of the Note might as well have been left unwritten.

Messrs Mason and Slidell were accordingly conveyed in an American ship from Fort Warren to Province Town, and there embarked on a British warship for Halifax, it having been expressly stipulated that the transfer should not take place at night. From Halifax they proceeded to Europe.

The affair ended better even than Lord Lyons had hoped. On the 19th December he wrote: "I don't think it likely

* The Prince Consort died on the 14th December.

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“ they will give in, but I do not think it impossible that they “ may do so ”; and to the very end he was preparing for the worst. All the greater must have been the relief when, on the 27th, Mr Seward’s answer came. “ The Americans,” he writes on 31st December, “ are putting the best face they “ can upon the surrender of Slidell and Mason, and as far “ as depended upon me I have done everything to make the “ pill as easy to swallow as possible. But I cannot disguise “ from myself that the real cause of the yielding was nothing “ more nor less than the military preparations made in “ England.” Coming from him, these words sound like a warning, profitable, if we would but listen, even in these days.

There are very few great events in history the credit for which it would be just to ascribe to any one man, and so perhaps Lord Newton is right when he says that “ it would “ be an exaggeration to attribute solely to Lord Lyons the “ credit of having successfully prevented the calamity of a “ war between England and the United States.” Energetic action of the Home Government, the wise moderation of the Queen and the Prince Consort, the loyal moral support of the French Government, and the good sense of the Americans, each and all of them played a restraining part. But when all is said and done, it was to the extraordinary patience and delicacy of touch of Lord Lyons, who never once made a mistake—never under the most goading provocation lost his head—that the ultimate success of the negotiations was due.

“ In after years,” Lord Newton writes, “ Lord Lyons frequently expressed the opinion that if there had then been “ telegraphic communication across the Atlantic it would “ have been impossible to avert war, and it is more than “ likely that he was correct, although it is improbable that “ many people realized it at the time.” It was a notable case of a victory gained by the man on the spot.

If a difficulty of the most threatening character had been conjured away there were soon others to which a war such

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as that which was raging was bound to give birth. Enlistment, desertion and other pretexts drove scores of men to seek protection of the Consuls both in the North and in the South, on the ground of being British subjects. An article from a Southern newspaper is worth quoting: "We can conceive nothing more disgraceful than the conduct of Irishmen, for example, who have been cursing the British Government ever since they could talk, who have emigrated from their country to escape the British yoke, but who now run to an English Consul and profess themselves subjects of Queen Victoria in order to evade their duties in the land of their adoption." That of course alludes to the South, but Lord Lyons himself on 11th May, 1863, writes no less bitterly: "I have been unwell for more than a month, and am beset by a quantity of small vexatious business concerning the wrongs of the British subjects who have suddenly proclaimed their unswerving loyalty to the British Crown and demand my protection." Also there was the Alabama case—a very real stone of offence—and the bitter Anglophobia of Admiral Wilkes—all matters in which the United States Government behaved generously and even magnanimously. The work, however, which devolved upon Lord Lyons was stupendous—in November, 1863, he recorded that he had already received nine hundred notes from Mr Seward in that year. But there was one episode so comic that it is difficult to repress a smile in alluding to it. Is there not a comedy in every tragedy? Is there not a grave-digger in Hamlet?

A great change had during the last year or two come over the terrible Mr Seward. Tamed by the British Minister, he was now roaring as gently as any sucking dove, and would come to feed out of the hand of Lord Lyons or M. Mercier, the French Minister, with all the caressing softness of a pet lamb. In August, 1863, in a confidential conversation with Lord Lyons, he expatiated upon the necessity of reviving a better feeling between Great Britain and the United States, and of making some demonstration in return for

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the visit of the Prince of Wales before the war, which had been productive of the happiest results. Now it was the turn of the United States to make a corresponding display of good will, but it was difficult to devise the means of doing so, as the President could not travel and America possessed no Princes. Would Lord Lyons think the matter over? Lord Lyons could not see the necessity for such a step: but Mr Seward returned to the charge, and Lord Lyons, who was not slow in seeing his object, wrote: "The only conjecture I can make is that he thinks of going to England himself. He may possibly want to be absent for some reasons connected with the Presidential contest. If he thinks that he has himself any chance of being taken as a candidate by either party he is the only man who thinks so at this moment. It is, however, generally considered to be an advantage to a candidate to be out of the country during the canvass." (In view of recent Presidential Elections these last words are amazing. Times have changed since 1863.) To think of a visit by Mr Seward, of all men, as an adequate compliment in exchange for the Prince of Wales's visit! Needless to say, that demonstration did not take place.

However conciliatory Mr Seward might have become, mainly owing to the correct attitude of the British Government in detaining Confederate ironclads in England, public feeling in America, and even in certain members of the Government, was bitterly hostile. Mr Welles, who was Naval Minister, and Mr Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, were cases in point. The latter knew well that he was harping upon a popular string when on an electioneering tour he talked of "taking old Mother England by the hair and giving her a good shaking." Mr Sumner, another distinguished politician, outdid him in rancour.

Lord Lyons' difficulties and trials were never destined to cease so long as he remained at Washington. For the details of these we must refer the reader to Lord Newton's masterly narrative. In a mere appreciation such as this,

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it is impossible to do more than hint, even where the subject tempts the writer to expatiate. To add to his troubles, the long years of grinding work and harassing anxieties had begun to tell upon the health of the Minister. A trip to Canada to escape for a while from the great heat of Washington could not restore a man who was evidently suffering from nervous prostration. Lord Lyons felt at the end of 1864 that he could hold out no longer. It was not surprising. During the year 1864, no less than 8,326 dispatches and letters were sent out by him—mostly drafted by himself, but in any case revised and corrected by him. His attachés and secretaries were at work from nine in the morning until seven, without an interval for luncheon—and often they had to return after dinner and write into the small hours. That is the sort of life that is led in times of stress by those members of the diplomatic service whom the public is apt to look upon as mere dancing dogs! The Legation at Washington during the war was not the only theatre of such work.

Lord Lyons went home and took up his abode with his sister, the Duchess of Norfolk, and on 16th March, 1865, he wrote to Mr Stuart, the *Chargé d'affaires* at Washington: "You will have seen that I have gone out of the service altogether and have become a gentleman at large without pay or pension. My health did not admit of my fixing a time for going back, and the Cabinet became nervous about leaving Washington without a Minister in these critical times."

Lack of space forbids us to reproduce the very handsome expressions of regret at Lord Lyons' departure which he received both from Mr Seward and from Lord Russell. He had, indeed, served both countries well, and as Lord Newton says in regard to the letter of the former, "It is satisfactory to realize that these two men between whom so many encounters had taken place, parted on terms of friendship and mutual esteem." They appreciated one another's good qualities and that Lord Lyons retained in

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his heart a soft corner for the rugged New York lawyer, is shown by the fact that “in subsequent communications “with his own Government Lord Lyons frequently expressed the hope that Mr Seward would continue to be “responsible for the foreign policy of the American Government.”

Sir Frederick Bruce was appointed to succeed him, and surely no wiser choice could have been made. Sir Frederick was a younger brother of Lord Elgin, with whom he went out to China, and who was at the termination of the special Embassy made Minister at Peking, where the influence which he acquired both with Chinese officials and with his foreign colleagues has never been approached. Unfortunately he died in 1867, at the early age of fifty-three, mourned by America as much as by England. He was a handsome giant, of most attractive manners—one of those happy mortals who carry sunshine with them wherever they go. To know him was to love him.

* * * * *

Rest and the society of his relations—the best of all restoratives to a man of Lord Lyons’s affectionate nature—in contrast to the strenuous labours of those four exhausting years soon effected a cure. He was out of the service, but such a man could hardly be spared, and in the month of July, 1865, he was appointed to the Embassy at Constantinople, in succession to Sir Henry Bulwer (Lord Dalling). It would have been difficult to find two men more different than Bulwer and Lord Lyons. Bulwer was a clever curiosity and a born intriguer: on leaving Cambridge he had been successively a Greek patriot, a cornet in the Life Guards, an ensign in the 58th Foot, had retired upon half-pay, had achieved success as a gambler and dandy (not quite of the first water), and finally entered the diplomatic service. In appearance, in his old days, he was a small shadow of a man, as wizened as Tithonus, with an insane desire to show the frame of an athlete. To this end he used to encase him-

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self in numberless great-coats, from which, when he came to the Foreign Office and the heat became intolerable, he would pray some kindly clerk to set him free, and the poor old mummy was unrolled. As Ambassador at Constantinople he had ample opportunities for the exercise of his peculiar talents—he was often in hot water, but, like a famous bishop, always contrived to come out with his hands clean. His methods were not those of Lord Lyons, they were far more nearly in accord with those of the Russian Ambassador, General Ignatieff, whom the Turks called “the father of lies.” Lord Lyons’s transparent honesty must have been an astonishment to Constantinople, which was used to being a hotbed of underhand machinations, plots and counterplots, and where no diplomatist trusted anybody else, least of all the colleagues with whom he was supposed to live in brotherly love. However, it was a time of comparative calm, and Lord Lyons, accompanied by his two trusty henchmen, Malet and Sheffield, whom, with his usual affection for his friends, he had insisted upon taking with him, was able to enjoy all the charm of that most captivating city in a peace of mind to which he had long been a stranger. The Danubian principalities were a worry, as they always had been, and as, now that they have been exalted into Kingdoms with a rich importation of ready-made monarchs from abroad, they continue to be. Crete was another difficulty, as it always has been since the days of the three evil Kappas. Still these were troubles which, after the years of perpetual pin-pricks and imminent international dangers on the other side of the Atlantic, must have been looked upon by Lord Lyons as no more than enough to keep his armour from growing rusty.

In 1867 Lord Cowley resigned the Embassy at Paris and the post was offered by Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons. Lord Cowley was a model diplomatist of the old school, self-restrained, undemonstrative, absolutely ignorant of those arts of advertisement which form too large a portion of the equipment of the statesmen of to-day. He had been

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brought up in the strictest sect of diplomacy, and only six years, during which the Embassy at Paris had been held by Lord Normanby, separated him from the time when his father held the same post. The first Lord Cowley was one of those three famous brothers, the other two being the great Duke of Wellington and the Marquess of Wellesley, of whom it would be idle and out of place to say aught here. The second Lord Cowley, afterwards created an earl, had gained an influence at the court of the Tuileries which on more than one occasion saved a difficult situation. Never was this more conspicuously shown than when, in 1860, Mr Cobden was sent to Paris on his famous mission in connexion with the treaty of commerce. The negotiations, so long as Mr Cobden insisted on conducting them by himself, were none too prosperous. Indeed, there came a day when, after a protracted conference, Mr Cobden came back to the British Embassy ready to throw up the sponge. Lord Cowley comforted him and said, "Let me see what I can do." He saved the situation and the treaty was signed. But Cobden claimed and received all the glory.

It was in the footsteps of this great diplomatist and statesman, whose quiet dignity, no less than his political sagacity, had made him a very real factor in all international affairs, that Lord Lyons was to follow. He felt that it was a difficult succession; he wrote to him: "When I first heard that 'you were likely to give up Paris, I felt, as I think I said 'in my letter to you, alarmed at the prospect of the Embassy's falling into other hands. I should have been indeed alarmed had I then known into whose hands it was 'likely to fall.' This was characteristic modesty, but Lord Lyons need have been under no alarm. Lord Cowley might feel that his successor would be worthy of him, and it is hardly too much to surmise that his advice was sought by Lord Stanley before the appointment was made. Lord Cowley was acquainted as no other man could be with all the forces at work in France from the Emperor downwards: he knew the whole intricate network of French politics,

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and he was in a position to take the measure of all the men who might be "in the running" for the Embassy. It is hardly thinkable that so judicious a statesman as Lord Stanley should not have consulted him. Be that as it may, the wisdom of the choice was fully justified.

Lord Lyons had now reached the highest reward which his profession had to offer. The Embassy at Paris must always be, in importance as in dignity, superior to any other diplomatic post. In the days of which we are writing it was, and probably still is, more or less an annexe of the Foreign Office in Downing Street. There are few international questions in which the interests of England and France are not almost equally concerned, whether they be acting in opposition to one another or in concert. Every dispatch which reached the Foreign Office, no matter whence it came, was copied for Paris. The labour which it entailed upon the Ambassador was Herculean: indeed, since the day after all consists only of twenty-four hours it may be doubted whether even such indefatigable workers as Lord Cowley and Lord Lyons could have found time to read and digest all the matter which was sent to them. There were certain excellent and worthy ministers whose verbosity experience must have taught them to put on one side. Still, even the absolutely necessary work of reading was exhausting.

It really seemed as if in some sense Lord Lyons was destined to be the stormy petrel of diplomacy. He was sent to Florence and the Grand Ducal reign collapsed. He went to America and the War of Secession broke out. He was promoted to Paris and there came the great catastrophe. So shrewd an observer as Lord Lyons could not fail to see that the throne of Louis Napoleon was tottering. The poor Emperor was surrounded by difficulties with which he seemed quite unable to cope. Abroad there were many troubles, not the least of which was the question of the occupation of Rome, which meant the bolstering up of the Papal Government. Then there was the growing power of Russia and such matters as the Annexation of the Grand

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Duchy of Baden to the North German Confederation. Greek affairs, the perennial question of ceding Crete and other portions of the Ottoman dominions to Greece, was another source of disquietude. In France there was a great feeling of discontent owing, as Lord Lyons said, "mainly, I imagine, to the inconstancy of men and Frenchmen in particular. In fact he has reigned eighteen years, and they are getting tired of so much of the same thing and want novelty." The glitter of the Empire had ceased to dazzle, and even the brilliant *cent gardes* no longer captivated the women and aroused the enthusiasm, tempered by jealousy, of the men. In his own family the Emperor had, as everybody knew, to deal with a wife who was taking more and more part in public business, in spite of her declaration that she meant to abandon politics for works of charity. Lord Lyons's account of an interview with Her Majesty is very instructive on that point. Then there was Prince Napoleon to be reckoned with, a very astute politician with something of the prophet's eye, but, like many another prophet of old, but little of a comfort to the ruling power. With him also, for he was a frequent visitor to the Embassy, Lord Lyons had much talk, during which—notably upon the subject of the Roman question—it is strange to be told that the Prince expressed his views in the hope that they would thus be brought before the Emperor—the English Ambassador to be the intermediary between Prince Napoleon and his cousin! This Prince, who in many ways was a deplorable person, was able to impress Lord Lyons by his ability and shrewd common sense. "He spoke with great animation and remarkably well." In the spring of 1868, Prince Napoleon made a tour in Germany. He returned fully impressed with the danger of a war with Prussia, with the folly of attempting to annex the Rhenish provinces, and with the vanity of talking of disarmament (how history repeats itself!) seeing that Prussia alone had 200,000 men under arms. Though opposed to war, if war there must be, it should be made at

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once—the consolidation of Germany was proceeding surely and rapidly; the adhesion of Southern Germany would soon follow, and “hereafter war would have to be waged with a Germany thoroughly united and perfectly organized. . . . He considered that an unsuccessful war would overthrow the Emperor and his Dynasty and send the whole Bonaparte family to the right about: a war only partially successful would rather weaken than strengthen the Emperor at home while a thoroughly successful war would simply give His Majesty a fresh lease of Cæsarism, and adjourn indefinitely the liberal institutions which he (Prince Napoleon) considered essential to the durability of the dynasty. The Prince is not without apprehension as to war being made this season (1868). He fears weak men, and he looks upon the Emperor as a weak man. He fears the people who surround His Majesty, the Generals, the Chamberlains, the ladies of the Palace.”

These views of Prince Napoleon, which are among the many new contributions to history contained in Lord Newton’s book, seemed well worth giving *in extenso*. The Prince was not the only man who looked upon the relations with Germany in a spirit of grave anxiety. What the intimate views of the Emperor may have been upon this subject it would be hard to say. When, in 1863, he sulked in his tent, his abstention from interference in the invasion of Denmark contributed not a little to the aggrandisement of Prussia: it was his fate to be continually hatching broods of homing chickens.

In the meantime the Emperor was trying to bring about a conference of the Powers to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for him in regard to the Roman question. A conference was his panacea for all diplomatic ailments. In this he was warmly seconded by the Empress who, in a long conversation with Lord Lyons, in which “she spoke with much grace both of manner, and, I think, with very great ability,” urged the importance and propriety of non-Catholic, as well as Catholic, Powers taking part in it. Lord

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Stanley's comment upon this letter was characteristic. He said that the Empress's "frank and sensible conversation" furnished the best reason he had received yet for keeping out of the affair altogether. Why should we be asked to bear for the Emperor the responsibility which he had assumed? Prince Napoleon shared Lord Stanley's views. He thought that the best service England could render the Emperor would be to advise him to give up the idea of a conference and settle the matter with Italy by satisfying at least in a certain measure, Italian aspirations. "He declares," writes Lord Lyons, "that Italy will never be quiet, and that the unity of Italy will never be assured until she gets Rome for her capital. He believes that the Emperor's support of the Pope is very unpopular with the great majority of the French people, and that it will, if persevered in, be a serious danger to the dynasty." . . . He wishes England to advise the Emperor that "he will not be able to hold his own, unless he abandons the system of personal government and gives a large increase of liberty."

Grumbling and growling everywhere! The Emperor at his wits' ends and talking of "moral influence," that last poor refuge of a desperate statesman! In spite of political troubles, and the manifest lack of sympathy on the part of England, Louis Napoleon was not slow in discovering the charm and sterling merits of Lord Lyons, whose tact could not fail to ingratiate him wherever he went. "The Emperor talked to me a long time and related to me interesting anecdotes, some very amusing, of the conduct of various persons towards him in past times." But unfortunately Lord Lyons was no gossip and so these "very amusing" stories have been lost.

How entertaining it would have been to be carried like Cleofas by Asmodeus, "le Diable Boiteux," through the roof, and allowed to listen unseen to the talk between the two. To the world at large Louis Napoleon in the Tuileries was a mystery as silent as the Sphinx in the desert, for so the newspapers described him. Few men suspected that in

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the grey volutes of the brain which lay behind that wooden mask, there was a sense of rather sardonic humour, which, when he chose to give it play, made him the best of company. We may be sure that the Ambassador, no less gifted in that respect, would not be slow to throw back the ball in these encounters of wits. Like the Emperor, Lord Lyons had a quite irresistible trick of giving a whimsical expression to a commonplace subject. He, too, was in his quiet way a humorist. The personal relations between him and the Emperor were always pleasant and sometimes, perhaps, cordial. Lord Lyons liked His Majesty though, as in one of those rare outbursts of confidence in which he revealed his thoughts, he confessed to Lord Newton that he had formed no very high opinion of his abilities.

The attempt to arouse interest in England in the Roman question was fruitless, but he never quite gave up the hope of inducing the English Government to act as pacificators between France and Germany. But he had lost confidence, he was out of spirits, and when Lord Cowley, in August, 1868, paid him a visit at Fontainebleau, he told Lord Lyons on his return that he found him much depressed and aged—a disappointed man, who would willingly, had it been possible, have retired into private life. The glamour of the early glories of his reign had faded into mist, and he was weary. A little later in the same year Lord Clarendon, whose influence with him and with the Empress, whom he had known from her childhood when he was minister at Madrid, was a matter of common knowledge, dined with His Majesty at St Cloud, and, having just returned from Berlin, was able to repeat to him the pacific language which he had heard from the King and Queen of Prussia and General Moltke. This was good hearing, but the Emperor was at no pains to conceal his anxiety lest anything should occur that might arouse the feeling of the army and the nation, and he expressed his earnest wish that “England should “step in to enable France and Prussia to withdraw with “honour from their present antagonistic attitude.”

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Lord Clarendon, with that nobility which characterized all his dealings, communicated to Lord Lyons all that he had learnt both at Berlin and at St Cloud, although he knew that it would be for the benefit of his political opponents. But by the end of the year there was a change of Government in England, and to the Emperor's great joy Lord Clarendon, the friend whom he loved, was once more at the Foreign Office.

A visit of the Crown Prince of Prussia to England enabled Lord Clarendon to tell Lord Lyons that His Royal Highness was to the full as peacefully inclined as his father, and indeed that he went a step further, for while he personally was willing to see the army placed upon a peace footing, the King would not hear of it. But how strange it seemed at a moment when we in England have been proposing naval holidays to read talk of the same nature earnestly exercising the minds of men nearly half a century ago.

In spite of all pacific assurances the witches' cauldron was beginning to seethe and bubble. War was imminent: Prince Napoleon went so far as to express the opinion that it would break out in the spring: he was wrong by some eighteen months. Much was to happen before what was an anxiety should be crystallized into a storm ending in a tragedy such as the world has seldom or never seen.

There was a Cretan conference, a whole web of intrigue about the Luxemburg railway and the Belgian question threatening the peace of Europe, a proposal for a conference on international postage, until Lavalette told Lord Lyons that the country was sick of the very name of the thing, and in spite of conferences and pacific talk, trouble was brewing in every direction.

Meanwhile Lord Lyons was subjected to an annoyance personal to himself, but none the less real. In the month of June, 1869, Lord Lyons was requested by Lord Clarendon to return to England to vote on the Irish Church Bill. He strongly objected to doing so on the very proper ground that an ambassador ought to abstain from taking a hand in

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party politics. Lord Clarendon, however, urged by Mr Gladstone, returned to the charge and in such urgent terms that he could not refuse. How sorely it went against the grain with him is plain from a letter which two years later he addressed to Lord Granville, when the latter begged him to come once more and vote on the Army Purchase Bill. That Lord Lyons was right in maintaining that it was inexpedient for an ambassador to vote on party questions must be manifest. Diplomats, like other permanent civil servants, are bound to serve ministers of whatever party may be in office. If they assume the attitude of party men it is not in human nature that they should command that intimate confidence which is essential to their relations with the members of the Government which they have helped to oppose. It is a wise and cardinal rule of the English public service that its members are neutral. The higher the position the greater the obligation in this sense. Lord Lyons was deeply penetrated with the importance of a principle which it is a matter of surprise to find two such large-minded statesmen as Lord Clarendon and Lord Granville eager to set aside for party purposes. It seems worth while to call attention to these two incidents because they show what was the opinion of one of the most sagacious and prudent of men. Mr Gladstone's idea that the Government had a right to call upon an ambassador for his vote needs no refuting.

In the course of the correspondence that took place at the end of 1869, it was clear that Lord Clarendon had lost all faith, if ever he had any, in his friend Louis Napoleon: in one letter he went so far as to say, "If the Emperor attaches value to the English alliance, he ought not to sacrifice it by a sneaking attempt to incorporate Belgium, by means of a railway company and its employés. If he wants war it is a bad pretext for doing that which all mankind will blame him for." Later, on 31st August, he writes with prophetic instinct: "The prospect of affairs in France gives cause sufficient for anxiety, and I have an

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“instinct that they will drift into a republic before another “year is over.” Indeed the Fates were busy with the thread of the Empire’s life. The new liberal and quasi-constitutional Government under Emile Ollivier seemed for the moment to be running smoothly enough when on the 10th January, 1870, Fonvielle and Victor Noir, editors of Rochefort’s republican newspaper, the *Marseillaise*, presented themselves in the study of the Prince Pierre Bonaparte at Auteuil, and called him to account for an article which had appeared in a Corsican newspaper. The Prince, taken by surprise, pulled out a pistol and shot Victor Noir, while Fonvielle made his escape. It is easy to imagine the cry that would be raised among the republicans by the death of Victor Noir at the hands of a member of the hated family. It is not so easy to describe the concentrated rage with which Rochefort, that master of vituperation, lashed the Emperor and the Government. The Empress told Lord Lyons that matters would have been worse “under the old *régime*”; that, however, is hard to believe. What is strange is that what so profoundly stirred all France, what was so pregnant with results, should be so little noticed by the publicists of to-day. Pierre Bonaparte was acquitted and left France, but he had sown the seed of an ineradicable canker.

Abroad the attempts to induce Prussia to disarm pursued their gentle but ineffectual course as before. Lord Clarendon did more than even his best to try and persuade Bismarck. The man of iron and blood was polite but unmoved. The Duc de Gramont, known in his salad days as “le bel Agénor,” had become Minister of Foreign Affairs, and when the thunderbolt of the Hohenzollern candidature (for the throne of Spain) fell in the early days of July the ex-dandy Duc de Gramont lost no time in intimating to the British Ambassador that France would go to war with both Spain and Prussia rather than allow a Hohenzollern to reign at Madrid. . . . “The election of Montpensier “might be looked upon as a *mauvais procédé* towards the

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“Emperor and the dynasty, but the putting forward a “Prussian was an insult and an injury to all France.” At the same time the warlike Duke gave Lord Lyons to understand that he would be grateful to England if she would use her influence with Prussia in order to bring about a solution of the difficulty. To the unspeakable sorrow of all England, and we might say of Europe, Lord Clarendon had died on the 27th June. It now fell to the lot of Lord Granville to deal with foreign affairs—at the end of his dispatch of 6th July, he paid a generous tribute to his predecessor when he said, “It is very sad that I should be writing to you in the place “of one who would have had so much personal power in “such a matter as this.”

The immediate causes of the war—the meetings of the King of Prussia with Benedetti at Ems—the editing of the famous telegram—Gramont’s aggressive speech—the wild excitement of the Paris mob shouting “*A Berlin!*” and a few months later “*Nous sommes trahis*”—all these are wisely avoided by Lord Newton. They are matters for history, not for biography, the province of which is to furnish history with materials, not to supplant it, and they have been amply recorded by other writers, themselves eye witnesses. For ourselves, though we have only skimmed the first volume of this great book, we have almost exhausted our space. No more than Lord Newton could we hope to deal with the lightning-swift tragedy of the war or the horrors of the Commune. Our theme is diplomacy, and in Lord Newton’s two bulky volumes there is matter galore for us. Indeed, in surveying the twenty years during which Lord Lyons was Ambassador in Paris, the reviewer is fairly bewildered by the mass and the magnitude of the questions with which he had to deal. The Presidency of Thiers—his fall—the election of Maréchal Macmahon—Franco-German relations, always a threatening subject—the purchase of the Suez Canal shares—the Treaty of San Stefano—the proposal that Lord Lyons should go as English plenipotentiary to the Congress of Berlin, which to his great relief was settled

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by Lord Beaconsfield going himself with Lord Salisbury—the election of President Grévy—the Eastern question—the concert of Europe, always playing out of tune—Tunis and Tripoli—the rebellion of Arabi—England abandoned by France in Egypt—the pranks of the mountebank General Boulanger, the Napoléon de Café Concert, an Agamemnon with Paulus, the comic singer, as *vates sacer*, and “*en r’venant de la revue*” as his anthem—changes of Government without end: these are but stray items in the work with which that silent, self-contained, prudent man, gifted with the true wisdom of statesmanship, had to wrestle. That he did so without ever making a mistake accounts for the esteem in which he was held by so many successive secretaries of state. Their confidence was shown by the numberless cases in which he was left to act upon his own discretion. He never gave greater proof of wisdom than when he declined Lord Salisbury’s offer to him in July, 1886, that he should take over the seals of the Foreign Office. He was then sixty-nine years of age. He was in failing health, worn out by the long exercise of almost superhuman industry; indeed, he was nearer to his end than he himself imagined. In a singularly graceful letter Lord Rosebery praised his decision. He continued his work at Paris for another year, but on the 1st November he resigned and was created an Earl. On the 28th of the same month he had a stroke of paralysis and in a week he was dead.

It would be difficult to improve upon the portrait which Lord Newton draws of his former chief. The impression left upon the mind of the reader must be recognized as true by all those who had the good fortune to know him. As a public man he was absolutely devoid of all petty ambition: he never thought of advertising himself, on the contrary he pushed modesty almost to a fault: himself a most indefatigable worker, he expected something of the same quality in his subordinates, who loved him for his just, honest and generous nature. In his private life he was simple and unostentatious, yet always dignified. For the

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amusements in which men of his caste are wont to find relief from the cares of business, he had no liking. In no form did sport attract him. He was content to go dowagering for an afternoon drive with Sheffield, the "Hare," so called from his large, almost flapping ears, and Dog Toby. The party were a familiar sight to Parisians, who would watch the strange trio with some amazement. We are told that women had so little attraction for him that there never was even the suspicion of a flirtation in his life. For his family, on the other hand, for his father, his brother and his sisters and their children he entertained the most devoted love, and his friends, especially Sir Edward Malet and Mr Sheffield, were held by him in an affection which they on their side returned with interest. They became inseparable.

"It was Lord Lyons's fate," writes Lord Newton, "to represent this country at most critical periods during wars in the course of which England, while desiring to observe the strictest neutrality, aroused the bitterest hostility on the part of the belligerents."* These words contain no exaggeration.

His prudence, patience, and self-restraint steered the ship through many hidden dangers. There is an old saw which runs, "Blessed is the minister who does not make history." It is given to few men to make history, it is given to still fewer to prevent others from making it. These are the greatest of all, and it is among them that Lord Lyons takes an honoured place.

* *The Life of Lord Lyons*, by Lord Newton. 2 vols. Edward Arnold, 1913.

THE SEA, A MONARCHY

TO be master of the sea is an abridgment of a monarchy. . . . But this much is certain—that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will. Whereas those that be strongest by land are many times, nevertheless, in great straits. Surely, at this day, with us of Europe, the vantage of strength at sea, which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great Britain is great; both because most of the kingdoms of Europe are not merely inland, but girt with the sea most part of their compass, and because the wealth of both Indies seems in great part but an accessory to the command of the seas.

(*The Works of Francis Bacon*. London, 1803, vol. II, Essay on "True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," p. 329.)

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A FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FOR ENGLAND?

WHEN the time comes for the fulfilment of the intention expressed in the preamble of the Parliament Act, when, that is, it becomes impossible any longer to postpone the reconstitution of the House of Lords, it is probable that much will be heard of the Senate of the United States of America; not however that so strong a second chamber would commend itself to the extreme Radicals whose one object appears to be to thwart the creation of a second chamber of any kind. The American Senate is a great institution; it has been not inaptly described as the masterpiece of the constitution makers. Doubtless it has been “both extravagantly praised and “unreasonably disparaged, according to the predisposition “and temper of its various critics”; but during the century and a quarter of its existence it has attracted the best men in American political life, and, on the whole, justified the favourable judgments of its foreign critics.

The Senate, but for the somewhat dubious exception of the German Bundesrath, would be unique among second chambers in that its functions are threefold—legislative, judicial, and executive. It is with the last mentioned that we are now concerned, as exemplified in the control of foreign affairs. But it may not be amiss to consider for a moment the origin of the Senate and its actual place in the world of American politics.

When the delegates of the thirteen states met at

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Philadelphia a hundred and twenty-seven years ago to draw up a scheme of federal government, they found themselves confronted by a task of no ordinary difficulty. The Confederation had proved a *fiasco* and it was clear that the projected union must of necessity be closer than would be altogether agreeable to the smaller states. These, being fearful of political annihilation, insisted upon the state being taken as the unit: Rhode Island must in every respect be the equal of Massachusetts, Connecticut, or Virginia. The large states, on the other hand, wanted a central government in which the representation of the various states should be based on population; by which they would have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The states were so nearly balanced on this primary question that a union based on equality of representation in both branches of the legislature was as hopeless of realization as one based on representation in the ratio of population. It was obvious that compromise was inevitable. Eventually the delegates of the smaller states agreed that representation in the House of Representatives should be based on population, and that the election of the President should be by a process which was a combination of both forms—an arrangement which failed in practice. But in regard to the Senate they were immovable: they insisted on equality of representation and would not give way. On this point the negotiations all but failed; but at length it was agreed that each state should be represented by two senators elected by its legislature; that the senators should hold office for six years; and that one-third of the whole number should retire at the end of every second year. This provision secured that the Senate, unlike the House of Representatives, should have a continuous life; and that the Vice-President of the United States should be the president of the Senate, with, however, only a casting vote. On the Senate, thus constituted, were conferred judicial and executive powers in addition to those which it enjoyed as a branch of the legislature.

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There have been seventeen amendments of the Constitution; but only one of these, the seventeenth, has affected the Senate. In virtue however of that seventeenth, which became effective a year or so ago, the senators will for the future be chosen not by the legislature but directly by the electorate of each state, as is done in the Commonwealth of Australia. This change will profoundly modify the character of the Senate. Till now, it has been common enough for a senator to be re-elected again and again; some have held their post for twenty or maybe thirty years. The legislators, that is, have been able to appreciate the value of experience in statecraft—a business which has to be learnt like every other business. But it would be vain to expect similar intelligence and discrimination in a popular electorate. The late Mr Gladstone was quite alive to this. On one occasion he went so far as to say to the late Cardinal Manning, like himself a Liberal, that in his opinion the Reform Act of 1832 had been the ruin of the House of Commons. When asked for an explanation he went on to say that before 1832 the House of Commons was composed of men of leisure, who made politics and statesmanship their business; but that after the passing of the Reform Bill this was no longer the case and one saw successful City men, well advanced in middle life, entering Parliament and fondly deluding themselves that they were competent to deal with the most complicated matters, foreign affairs included.*

The judicial functions of the Senate require only a passing word. It has the sole right to try impeachments; and the only change made in its composition when acting as a court of justice is when, as has happened once, the accused is President of the United States. In that event the Chief Justice of the federal Supreme Court takes the place of the Vice-President of the United States as President of the Senate.

* This statement was repeated by Cardinal Manning at his table in the Autumn of 1879.

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In regard to legislation, the powers of the Senate differ but little from those of the House of Representatives. Bills for raising revenue, it is true, must be introduced in the popular House, but they may be rejected or amended by the other; it has happened that the Senate has rejected all save the preamble, and substituted a bill of its own which the other House has accepted. There is nothing in the Constitution regarding appropriation bills; but, by unbroken custom, they have been treated in the same manner as bills of supply. This limitation only applies to general appropriations, for bills dealing with a single item may be introduced in either House. In all other matters, the two houses are, so far as legislation goes, on an equality, and thousands of bills are annually introduced in either house; in a recent Congress the total number of bills and joint resolutions was well over thirty-eight thousand, of which more than nine thousand six hundred were introduced by the ninety-six senators.

Obviously no legislative assembly could deal with such a mass of work; and the difficulty could only be surmounted by the American system of legislating by committee. In the House of Representatives a bill is read as a matter of course a first and a second time—that is, one of the clerks reads its title—and then it is referred to a standing committee whose business it is to deal with matters of its class, the committees themselves and their chairmen being selected by the Speaker at the beginning of every Congress. The reference to the committee is in the majority of cases the last that is heard of a bill. But should its merits, or the efforts of its supporters, secure its consideration the committee eventually reports to the House, advising either its adoption or its rejection; and (exception being made for the proposals of the committees of Ways and Means and Appropriations which are always debated) the report is practically final. Mr Woodrow Wilson, now President of the United States, says, that in reality the committees dictate the course to be taken, the House does not sit

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for serious discussion but to sanction the conclusions of its committees as rapidly as possible.* Much the same system prevails in the Senate. But the committees are nominally chosen by ballot; practically, however, Lord Bryce points out, "they are selected by caucuses of the majority "and minority meeting in secret conclave and then carried "wholesale by the vote of the Senate." And the Senate differs from the popular house in another respect—as a rule it thoroughly discusses the matters brought before it.

Through its committees, Congress has, to quote Mr Wilson again, "entered more and more into the details "of administration, until it has virtually taken into its own "hands all the substantial powers of government. It does "not domineer over the President but it makes the secretaries its humble servants . . . [and] the secretaries are the "executive in fact." Not that Congress can control the executive officials; "its only whip is investigation, semi-judicial examination into corners suspected to be dirty " by setting its committees to cross-examine scared "subordinates and sulky ministers."†

Of these committees undoubtedly the most important is the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, which derives its importance from the executive rights and duties assigned to that body by the Constitution.

By the second article of the Constitution the President of the United States has authority to make treaties; but only by and with the consent of the Senate, the agreement of two-thirds of the senators present being requisite for ratification. By the same article the President is empowered to *nominate* ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, judges of the Supreme Court and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for; but he may only *appoint* them with a like approval of the Senate, the consent of two-thirds of those present being required as in the case of treaties.

* See *Congressional Government*, pp. 78, 79.

† *Congressional Government*, pp. 45 and 278.

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The requirement of a two-thirds majority may, as will be readily appreciated, be a very serious difficulty. A striking instance of this was the refusal in 1869 to approve the appointment, made by President Grant, of a Mr Smythe as Minister to Russia. Smythe had been collector of the port of New York and in that capacity "had gained influence" enough with the Senate to be able to say in so many words that if the Senate did not confirm him it should confirm no one else and he did in fact succeed in stopping confirmations. Public business was kept at a standstill in order that a ring . . . might force Mr Smythe into a position for which he was unfit.* In that same year the Senate rejected the Reverdy-Johnson treaty which had been negotiated for the reference of the "Alabama" claims to arbitration, and so deferred for a couple of years the much wished for settlement of those claims. And, what was even more marked, a few months later it tore up the treaty for the purchase of the islands of St Thomas and St John. The suggestion for the cession of the West Indian possessions of Denmark came from the United States, during the presidency of Mr Lincoln. Denmark at first refused but eventually consented to negotiate. America offered five million dollars for the four islands; Denmark asked fifteen. The States then offered seven and a half millions; Denmark refused, but expressed its willingness to accept that amount for the two islands of St Thomas and St John. America agreed and the treaty was signed in October, 1867. The King of Denmark announced the transfer to the islanders and took a vote on the annexation: the inhabitants were in favour of the transfer. The islands were then formally transferred to an agent of the United States Government. The treaty was sent to the Senate for ratification in December, 1867, and was shelved. The time fixed for ratification was passed; Denmark extended it and later sent an agent (who had been Minister and a *persona grata* at Washington), to insist that

* *North American Review* cviiij. (1869), p. 625.

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action should be taken. But it was only in March, 1870, nearly two and a half years after the signature of the treaty, that the Senate condescended to deal with the matter; and then it refused its consent! The islands reverted to Denmark and remain Danish to this day.

When the Senate was first constituted its members were only twenty-six in number; it was very much in the position of a privy council or the old executive council of the colonial governors. The constitution makers could hardly have anticipated a time when, instead of thirteen states, there would be forty-eight, and as a consequence twice that number of senators. Could they have foreseen the possibility of there being ninety-six senators, it is hardly credible that they would have required a two-thirds majority in such a matter as the ratification of the treaty with Denmark.

To its Committee on Foreign Relations the Senate refers: (a) all presidential messages relating to the ratification of treaties, diplomatic nominations, petitions from persons thinking themselves aggrieved by the action of some foreign power, or other matters relating to intercourse with foreign countries; (b) bills in the Senate relating to like topics; (c) petitions to the Senate of aggrieved persons claiming against some foreign government. These matters all go to the committee as a matter of course. In addition the Senate may *motu proprio* direct its committee to inquire into some specified matter. For instance, in 1886 the committee were instructed by the Senate to inquire into the rights of American fishing vessels in British North American waters and as to any violation of such rights, with a direction to report on the steps which should be taken for the vindication of the rights of American citizens. And four years later it was instructed to inquire into the steps which had been taken under an act of Congress of the previous year to incorporate the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua, and into the conditions and prospects of that enterprise, and then to report what, in its opinion, the interests of the United States required in respect of the proposed canal.

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It would seem that nothing of importance could possibly escape the committee. Nevertheless some subject may yet suggest itself as being proper for its investigation which has not been brought within its purview by presidential message, bill, petition, or instruction of the Senate. The course then adopted is very simple. Some member of the committee may introduce a bill in the Senate dealing with the matter they desire to investigate; and this bill is then, as a matter of course, referred to the committee, which, having thus become seized of the business, is free to investigate and report.

A glance at the published reports of the Foreign Relations Committee will show how extensive is its field of operations. These reports deal with: (1) diplomatic relations with foreign countries; (2) boundary disputes; (3) fishery disputes; (4) trade and commerce with foreign countries; (5) tariff restrictions; (6) maritime canals; (7) Pacific cables; (8) international exhibitions; (9) international conferences; (10) claims of American subjects against foreign governments; (11) claims of foreigners against the United States; (12) treaties and legislation respecting them; (13) nominations to the diplomatic and consular services; (14) questions regarding the re-organization of those services; (15) claims of diplomatic and consular officers for increase of salary or re-imbursement of moneys paid; and (16) applications made by such officers to accept decorations from foreign governments. In short, the committee's range of operations is co-extensive with that of the foreign department of the executive.

The committee has access to and examines the papers dealing with the subject in hand and if need be takes oral evidence; and that it does its work with care is quite evident from its reports. In one case the report, with the papers and evidence, extended to a thousand printed octavo pages and more. And as a general rule the business is carried through without reference to party politics. This fact was placed on record on an occasion which was an exception to

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the general rule, two reports being presented to the Senate; in that of the majority we find it stated that the committee "had hoped, as has been the case generally hitherto, that "no influences or divisions of a nature coincident with the "lines of political parties would enter into a matter of "this character"—which was a treaty for the settlement of fishery disputes with England, to which further reference will be made.

That its committee may be at no disadvantage, the Senate is accustomed to demand for its use copies of all documents in the department of state having any reference to the subject under discussion. In the ordinary course papers asked for are given, but they may be granted with a request for secrecy; this was the case when, in 1868, the Senate called for the papers relating to the cession of the Danish West Indian islands. The Secretary of State wrote to the chairman of the committee suggesting that if the Senate should order the documents to be printed, the documents so printed should, on account of references therein to individuals, be made use of only in what is known as executive session, a session that is when the Senate exercises its executive functions, which theoretically is private.* It is obviously to the President's interest to do nothing to annoy the committee. But it has happened that papers have been refused. This was the case in 1888 in regard to the treaty signed at Washington for the settlement of the fishery disputes between England and the United States. When the treaty went to the Senate all papers were asked

* Mr Moore says in *The American Congress* (p. 514), that "Although the "executive sessions are supposed to be confidential, the newspaper correspondents find very little trouble in obtaining from the senators a full "account of what has taken place in them. If the matter under discussion "is of importance to the Republicans, they generally want to have it known "to the public and so of the Democrats. It has been found impossible to "keep the proceedings of the executive sessions secret and very little "attempt is made to do so now." The chief characteristic of an executive session seems to be that so soon as the senators are relieved from the observation of the public, "they light their cigars and make themselves comfortable in various ways."

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for and refused. The Executive urged that the negotiation of vexed questions could not be hopefully entered upon without a guarantee of mutual and implicit confidence between the agents; it urged too that in this particular case every point submitted in conference was covered by papers already in possession of the Senate, excepting the question of damages sustained by American fishermen which had been met by a counter-claim for damages to British vessels in the Behring Sea. The committee was divided on the question, five being in favour of ratification and four against; and two reports were issued.* In the majority report the claim of the committee in regard to the delivery of papers was set out in perfectly unambiguous terms.

The committee thinks it due to the Senate to state that contrary (as it believes) to the universal previous practice of the Executive in connection with the consideration of treaties, when the Senate has asked for all the papers in detail concerning the progress of the negotiations, the Executive has not thought it for the "public interest" in this instance, to communicate all such papers and detailed information to the Senate, although the Senate requested it; and it was stated in reply to the resolution of request that the deliberations of the plenipotentiaries were in confidence and "that only results should be announced and such other matters as the joint protocolists should sign under the directions of the plenipotentiaries." . . . It thus appears to be claimed by the Executive that the Senate, without whose advice and consent no treaty can be concluded, has no right to be informed, confidentially, of the course of negotiations and discussions and the various propositions and arguments *pro* and *con* arising in the negotiation of a treaty. The committee feels it their duty to protest against any such assumption. It believes that such a claim is contrary to the essential nature of the constitutional relations between the President and the Senate on such subjects, and that it is the reverse of the continuous practice in such matters from the commencement of the government to this time.

The fact seems to be that the President is under no con-

* The Senate refused to ratify the treaty, the voting being on strict party lines—thirty Republicans against twenty-seven Democrats.

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stitutional or conventional obligation to communicate papers either during the progress of negotiations or when he proposes a treaty for ratification. In refusing he is within his rights. But the papers are obviously needed if the Senate is to be enabled to form a fair judgment; and, whatever his rights may be, prudence no less obviously dictates that the President, if he wishes his treaty to be ratified, should keep in close touch with the Foreign Relations Committee during the negotiations and afterwards give every facility in his power to the Senate to enable it to grasp all the facts of the case. Otherwise he courts disaster.

Enough has been said to indicate the importance in American politics of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the chairman of which may be very truly regarded as a second minister of foreign affairs. The Senate's prerogatives and its committee must at times be not a little galling to the Executive; but it must undoubtedly have the effect of making those responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs very careful and circumspect.*

Is there anything for us to learn?

Do not we also need a Foreign Relations Committee?

Before answering this question it will not be amiss to set out the reasons for the control of the President by the Senate, given by Alexander Hamilton.†

It has been remarked . . . and the remark is unquestionably just, that an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his people, has personally too much stake in the government to be in any material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers. But a man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of chief magistrate, possessed of a moderate or slender fortune and looking forward to a

* As would be expected, the present President is fully alive to the necessity of having the committee on his side. According to the Washington correspondent of *The Morning Post*, some three months ago he invited its members to the White House where they spent an evening in the discussion of the Panama Tolls Bill and some arbitration treaties.

† *The Federalist*, No. LXXV., and adopted verbatim by Story in his *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States*.

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period not very remote when he may probably be obliged to return to the station from which he was taken, might sometimes be under temptation to sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it would require superlative virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the interests of the State to the acquisition of wealth. An ambitious man might make his own aggrandisement by the aid of a foreign power the price of his treachery to his constituents. The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which could make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a president of the United States.

At first sight this seems to have no application for us who have an hereditary monarch. But, in days when the theory of the nullity of the Kingship is openly proclaimed, is this the case? The real person to be considered is not the King but the Secretary of State for foreign affairs. He it is who makes and ratifies treaties; unless the proposed treaty requires some alteration in the law of England or involves recourse to the public purse, the Secretary of State is master of the situation. And the quality of our rulers is changing apace. During the last six or eight years we have become accustomed to a Cabinet of which some of the most notorious members seem bent upon earning a reputation as noisy Cleons, who “burst into the Council House, “and storm, and blow, and bluster”—politicians, not statesmen, who could only be adequately described by an Aristophanes.

So far the Foreign Office has escaped. But for how long? The time is probably near at hand when it too will follow the Exchequer and the Admiralty into the hands of men of the new stamp. When that disaster comes upon us, it will indeed be a bad day for England if some check has not been devised which will make it impossible for the safety of the country to be bargained away to keep some discredited ministry in office.

A Foreign Relations Committee for England?

But, even as things now are, some check on the autocracy of the Foreign Secretary is eminently desirable. The Declaration of London and the consequent Naval Prize Bill are proof of this. The Foreign Secretary's instructions to the British plenipotentiary at the Congress which resulted in the Declaration of London have been very truly said "to cause a surrender of almost everything that came into question. . . they were a volunteered unprovoked surrender lightly adopted and wantonly volunteered before even so much as a summons had been made." As a matter of fact everything of importance to England in a maritime war was abandoned; and, "so far as the sole executive action of a single minister of the Crown can bind," Great Britain was "bound by all that is contained in this Declaration of London." As the late Lord Chief Justice of England said in the House of Lords, having built up the prize law of the world we were giving it away. Fortunately the new code involved the alteration of English law, and so the concurrence of Parliament. A subservient House of Commons truckled to the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues, but the House of Lords threw out the bill, which another distinguished lawyer, Lord Halsbury, characterized as the most mischievous and reckless proposal ever put before the House.

Desirable as it would be to deprive the Foreign Secretary of his sole right to make and ratify treaties, it might for the moment not be easy of accomplishment: but the establishment of a non-party committee of one or other House of Parliament, or perhaps a joint committee of the two houses, with the right of access to *all* papers (unedited of course) and the correlative duty of reporting thereon to Parliament, would go far toward the prevention of an improper use of the secretary's power.

The country's welfare, or rather its very life, should not be in the discretion of any individual—even if the dangers suggested by Hamilton and Story be non-existent. It is incredible that, if we had had a committee of the kind suggested, Sir Edward Grey would have been allowed to

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give away England's rights and England's safety. Nor can it be believed that under such conditions the late King would have made those visits to foreign courts, alone or attended only by a foreign office clerk, which have left this country in the awkward predicament of being unable to deny or evade allegations by foreign Powers of engagements by royal promise; made in conversations of which the sole and only record would be in the archives of some foreign ministry of foreign affairs. Had such a check as we have suggested been in existence, King Edward would undoubtedly have been accompanied by the Secretary of State for foreign affairs; and had this been done it is highly probable that the actions of Germany during the past ten years would have differed considerably from what they have actually been.

It will perhaps be suggested that a model of the kind of committee required is ready at hand in the Council of India. But this is emphatically not the case. The members of the Council of India are appointed by the Secretary of State for India; they may not sit in Parliament; and they are not responsible to Parliament. What is wanted for the control of the foreign office is a body absolutely independent of the Secretary of State and responsible to Parliament and to Parliament only.

Something analogous to what is wanted does however already exist in the committee of Public Accounts. This is composed of fifteen members of the House of Commons—eight nominated by the Government and seven by the Opposition whip, with a chairman appointed by itself. Its office is to see that money voted by Parliament has been used as Parliament directed; and it is a noteworthy fact that its divisions have never yet been on party lines. No better illustration of the worth of this committee could be quoted than its action in 1905 in regard to the army vote. In the first quarter of 1904, it will be remembered, the War Office reconstitution committee issued three reports, claiming, amongst other "reforms,"

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complete immunity from civil control in the expenditure of the greater portion of the money voted by Parliament for the military services: but in the following August these financial proposals were rejected by an order in Council. Five months later, in January 1905 that is, the army council issued an army order, the real effect of which would have been to establish the state of affairs rejected by the order in council of the previous August. The Council had, however, failed to take into its reckoning the Public Accounts committee, which, in May 1905, passed a resolution calling, in no uncertain language, the attention of the House of Commons to what was going on. Great Personages then took a hand in the game and a great functionary was moved to approach a prominent member of the committee with the demand that this resolution should be cancelled: the messenger, however, was desired to intimate to all Personages concerned that if the army order were not withdrawn there would be a "bigger row" than there had been since the time of ship money! On July 26th the report of the committee was debated in the House of Commons and adopted unanimously.* Within a week another army order was issued, modifying or rather destroying the "peccant" one and restoring things to their proper position.

There are obvious differences between this committee and the one suggested for the control of the foreign office. But in the Public Accounts committee we have an instance of what can be done effectually to check public servants, and of the harmonious way in which men of different political parties can work together for the public good when they are not talking to their constituents through the press.

No one would probably contest the abstract proposition that it is distinctly undesirable that peace or war, or the abandonment of our rights in peace or war, should be in the hands of one man; and no one certainly would contest

* Such a debate is unfortunately all too rare an occurrence.

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the abstract value of the reasoning of Hamilton and Story in regard to the folly of lodging such power in the hands of an individual, unless that individual has some greater stake at venture than that of an ephemeral politician. Will any man say that the danger foreseen by these two farsighted Americans may not, in the near future, be a very real danger for us? If so would not the danger be at any rate minimized by the establishment of such a committee as we suggest? And if the committee could have an official—corresponding in some respects to the Comptroller and Auditor-General—who could go into the Foreign Office, or even round to the various embassies and legations, playing the part of the truffle-dog, its value would doubtless be greatly enhanced. This might not have been feasible with ambassadors of the type of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The post would certainly then have had its unpleasant side; but there have been changes since the day of the Great Elchi. Nowadays ministers and even ambassadors are little more than foreign office clerks who get their instructions by telegram between breakfast and luncheon, and carry out the orders received between luncheon and dinner.

It would naturally be anticipated that every conceivable difficulty would, as a matter of course, be raised by the Foreign Office to prevent the establishment of a committee expressly designed for its control; and, after the committee had been established, it is no less likely that every possible impediment would be thrown in its way. But the antecedent difficulties would not be insuperable, and still less the others. It is not attempted to work out the details here and now; for the moment we are not concerned with them. Our object is attained if we have established the principle on which the suggestion is based. Some sort of more effectual control over the Foreign Office there soon must be, or the office will one day be found to have brought us, without any of us being previously aware of it, to war and disaster.

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FOUR CONVENTIONS AND A BILL

UNDER the degrading Standing Order which allows Bills to be "presented" to the House of Commons without any motion, question or opportunity of debate, and thus allows such Bills to be smuggled through what is "deemed" a first reading, Sir Edward Grey, supported by Mr Churchill, presented on the 6th April last a Bill entitled "The Second Peace Conference (Conventions) Bill." It is a most mischievous Bill of the same brains, blood and parentage as the Naval Prize Bill, which on 12th December, 1911, was rejected by the House of Lords, with the result that the Declaration of London, so destructive to the naval power of this country, could not be ratified, and was brought to an end.

The Naval Prize Bill, although its revival has since been annually threatened, has never yet been, and probably never will be, again brought up to face the storm of national indignation which caused its rejection. But the Bill now in question represents a desperate endeavour by the Government to rescue some of the wreckage of the other fantastic proposals made at the International Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907.

At that Congress there were adopted fourteen Conventions; some of them merely foolish and manifestly impracticable; but some of them as directly aimed as the Declaration of London at the diminution of naval power

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and the increase at its expense of military power. Out of the fourteen, His Majesty's present Government, exercising that usurped authority claimed by the Prime Minister as the sole present depositary of the prerogatives of the Crown, signed thirteen, and of the thirteen ratified nine. This was done secretly without the previous knowledge either of Parliament or of the country. And now that same Government proposes to demand of Parliament such changes in the Law as will enable it to ratify the remaining four Hague Conventions. It is earnestly to be hoped that this demand will be refused. For not only are the Conventions themselves either foolish, or to this country most mischievous, but the new powers which would be given by the Bill are such as ought not to be granted.

The four Conventions now in question are those which at the Hague were entitled Nos. 1, 5, 10 and 13.

Convention No. 1, for "the *pacific* settlement of international disputes," is, with characteristic Foreign Office incapacity of being accurate, described in the Memorandum accompanying the Bill as a Convention for the "*specific*" settlement of such disputes. It is a burlesque of either title. The contracting Powers agree "to use their best efforts to "ensure the pacific settlement" of such disputes, and "before an appeal to arms" to "have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers"; but they only agree to do this "as far as circumstances allow." And if, in fact, mediation by other Powers takes place it is not to "have the effect of interrupting, delaying, "or hindering mobilization or other measures of preparation for war," while, if it comes after the commencement of hostilities, then "the military operations in progress are "not interrupted." In addition to this, but always only "as far as circumstances allow," the contracting Powers "deem it expedient" to institute an International Commission of Inquiry, whose Report, however, "leaves to "the parties entire freedom as to the effect to be given "to the finding." Thus nobody is even expected to have

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recourse to the method of pacific settlement provided, except so far as they like; nor is any Power to be bound by it except so far as that Power deems that circumstances allow; while meantime both parties are to continue uninterrupted all their warlike preparations and all their warlike actions.

As a method of arriving at a peaceable settlement of international disputes this is a mere mockery. No international dispute that ever arose or that ever could arise could be brought one whit nearer to settlement by the hollow phrases of such a Convention. It can only be intended to amuse the excellent persons who still believe that when the blunders of diplomacy or the passions of nations have brought them to the brink of war, or even into war, they can be stopped by a mere expression of the pious wishes of a Convention carefully guarded against any possibility of actual realization.

Of this there is a very recent proof. On the 21st April of this year Vera Cruz was attacked and captured by the fleet of the United States after much fighting and loss of life. Both Mexico and the United States signed and ratified this Convention, yet neither of them has had recourse to it before making their "appeal to arms." Neither has Great Britain offered her "good offices or mediation." All the world is well aware that the Convention is mere hypocritical pretence not intended to be taken seriously or ever to be used, or capable of being used, to prevent such outbreaks of war as the capture of Vera Cruz.

Yet for the purposes of this Convention, Clause 1 of the Bill proposes to give to the Secretary of State power to enforce the attendance of witnesses before "any international tribunal . . . wherever sitting, whether within "or without His Majesty's dominions, or before any "member of any such tribunal." And as these powers are to be exercised, not alone by a Secretary of State but by Governors or Governors General in all the British Dominions beyond the Seas, this means that from the remotest

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parts of Canada, South Africa, Australia, or New Zealand, any British subject may be ordered, under severe penalties for disobeying, to proceed instantly to the Hague, or to any other place where the foreign tribunal may be sitting, and may be compelled to take with him and to produce any such documents as the Secretary of State or the Governor may require. There is no present power in our Law to require the submission of any British subject to any such order or requirement; and were this section to be enacted it would place every subject of the King at the mercy of a foreign tribunal, instituted perhaps for an excellent purpose, but deprived of any authority or power to achieve it. There is no limitation in the clause as to the witnesses whose attendance may be enforced, or as to the documents they may be ordered to produce. Whatever the witness, even should he know nothing of the facts, or whatever the documents, although they may have no bearing upon the facts, all will be subject to the arbitrary orders of a Secretary of State or a Governor. This alone, quite apart from the merits or the capacity of the tribunal, should ensure the rejection of the clause.

Convention No. 5, "respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land," amounts to the destruction of neutrality.

Article 18 declares that "the furnishing of supplies or the making of loans to one of the belligerents" shall not be considered "as acts committed in favour of one belligerent provided that the furnisher of the supplies or the lender of the loan neither lives in the territory of the other belligerent party nor in the territory occupied by it."

For a neutral to furnish supplies or money to a belligerent is manifestly an infraction of neutrality, so held to be by such jurists as Bluntschli, Phillimore and Calvo. The supply of money by a British subject to a State with which Great Britain is at war, is (as testifies Lord Clarendon), by the law of England high treason; and if such an act on the part

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of a belligerent subject has so criminal a character, it cannot be innocent on the part of a neutral subject, whose duty is to abstain from the war altogether. It is to be added that while this Convention expressly authorizes the making of a loan to a belligerent by a neutral, yet the abortive and abandoned Declaration of London would have made the proceeds of that loan capturable at sea. Article 19 authorizes the requisition by the belligerent of "railway material" coming from the territory of Neutral Powers . . . so far "as is absolutely necessary," a provision which leaves all such material at the uncontrolled mercy of the belligerent general, exercised according to his own sole notion of what is "necessary." This is to be commended to those who still believe that the Hague Conference meant to make War by Land less severe upon neutral property than War by Sea. Finally the Convention, by article 20, is not to apply "except between contracting Powers"—and then only "if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention," whence in War a pretty confusion must arise.

This Convention is sought to be buttressed by clause 2 of the Bill, which would give to His Majesty—meaning thereby the Prime Minister of the day—the power to make by Order in Council new regulations, going far beyond the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, for "preventing or prohibiting . . . the supply of fuel or stores to . . . ships belonging to any foreign State at war" with any friendly State. It further gives a new power to "authorize the arrest and detention" of the crew of any such ship, and also power to make "such incidental, consequential and supplemental provisions as may appear to His Majesty"—meaning always the Prime Minister—"to be necessary or proper."

This same clause also gives to the Government new powers in respect of two other Conventions, namely, Nos. 10 and 13.

No. 10 is the Convention "for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War."

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It is a harmless, foolish, philanthropic, impracticable Convention of no considerable importance. But new powers of arrest and detention are taken in respect of this under clause 2 of the Bill, while clause 3 (1) solemnly enacts that “a British vessel other than a hospital ship, or a boat belonging thereto, shall not be painted white outside with “a broad horizontal band of red or green” under a penalty of £100 and detention—a very new paint-pot provision entirely on a level with the intelligence that dictated the Convention itself.

This Convention (No. 10), among other things, prescribes by Article 12 that “any warship belonging to a belligerent “may demand the surrender of sick, wounded or ship-wrecked men on board” either a hospital ship, a merchant ship, a yacht or a boat; an obligation which would force every British merchantman, yacht or boat to surrender to their enemies men perhaps at the last extremity and dying of their wounds when it had rescued them from death. So monstrous an infraction of the laws of humanity and of the immunities of the British Flag cannot but arouse the indignation of every seaman. God forbid that any British seaman should ever be guilty of so base an act!

But the most poisonous of all the Conventions and the most mischievous to this Country is No. 13 “concerning “the rights and duties of neutral Powers in Naval War.” It is in order to enforce this, as well as for other purposes, that Clause 2 (1)a of the Bill, for regulating the supply of fuel or stores, and Clause 2 (1)b, authorizing the arrest of crews, are said to be needed. As already said the powers thus demanded are new and go far beyond the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870.

This, the worst and most confused of the Conventions in question, by article 6, forbids the handing over by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power in “any manner directly or indirectly, of warships, supplies, or war munitions

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“or material of any kind whatever.” Yet the very next article (7) declares that a neutral is “*not* bound to prohibit the export or transit for either belligerent of arms, munitions of war, or in general of anything which could be of use to an Army or a Fleet.” How these two incompatible articles are to be reconciled does not seem to have troubled the delegates who signed the Convention. Again article 8 declares that a neutral Power is bound to prevent “the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise or engage in hostile operations against a Power with which its Government is at peace” and also “to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any such vessel.” Nevertheless it is not bound according to the preceding article, to prohibit “the export of anything which could be of use to an Army or a Fleet.” If this means anything it means that while the neutral need not prevent the export of any vessel which *could* be of use, it must prevent it if it could *not* be of use!

Articles 19 to 23 allow the toleration by neutral Powers of the bringing in by belligerents of prizes into their neutral ports. This toleration being all in favour of the weaker naval belligerent with the fewer ports and against the stronger—such as Great Britain—with the most ports, is enlarged throughout. Great Britain and the United States resisted this article. But Germany, Russia and France, being all military Powers, joined together on this as on other occasions against Great Britain and the United States. Practically the Convention leaves it to any neutral Power to be in maritime warfare just as neutral or as little neutral—that is to say as belligerent—as it pleases, most especially in regard to Great Britain. Thus article 23 makes any neutral port a place of secure detention for any prizes taken by the weaker naval belligerent which is yet unable to secure their passage to that weaker belligerent’s own ports without fear of recapture. It is manifestly directed against Great Britain. It is a gross and especial authority

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to violate neutrality in a way exceptionally injurious to this country. To crown all, article 26 declares that the exercise of this or of the other new licences of belligerency accorded to neutrals "can under no circumstances be considered an unfriendly act." All the doctrines and rules this Convention embodies are confessedly new inventions, or to quote the words of its framers "a thing entirely new."

It is, then, for the sake of this Convention, together with the other three, and in order to fasten upon this country all the disadvantages which this Convention especially and all the other in a minor degree would bring, that "The "Second Peace Conference (Conventions) Bill" is introduced.

Those who resisted and finally defeated the Naval Prize Bill will, it is to be hoped, as successfully resist and defeat this most dangerous and mischievous measure, whereof the character and effect are by no means exhaustively described, though they are perhaps sufficiently indicated, in the account above given.

Rather than pass the Bill giving new powers to the Government, without which these four Conventions cannot be carried into effect, it would better become Parliament to consider whether the ministers should not be impeached who usurped the authority of the King in order to ratify—secretly and without the knowledge of Parliament or the country—the other nine Conventions so tamely agreed to by those sent by Sir Edward Grey to the Hague to surrender the national maritime rights which it should have been their first determination to preserve.

Vast mischief, the full extent whereof will only be fully understood when we are engaged in war, has already been done by the secret ratification of the nine Conventions already thus imposed upon us.

Had there existed here anything similar to the Com-

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mittee of Foreign Relations with which the United States have had the prudence to control the secret actions of their Foreign Office, not one of these mischievous instruments would have been ratified.

But there does exist here a Parliament without which the changes in the law, required to give effect to those four dangerous residual Conventions, cannot be made. Those changes most assuredly should not be made.

NAPOLEON ON ENGLAND

AVOID ARMIES AND CONTINENTAL WAR ON LAND

LORD Amherst, ambassadeur extraordinaire d'Angleterre en Chine, débarqua le 1^{er} Juillet 1817 à Ste Hélène—Napoléon lui dit :

“ L’Angleterre ne devrait pas viser au rôle de grande puissance militaire . . . L’Angleterre tient l’Océan ; elle y est suprême. C’est folie à elle de descendre de ses vaisseaux pour courir les aventures et combattre à terre. C’est agir comme François 1^{er} à Pavie . . . quarante-cinq pièces de canon . . . lui assuraient la victoire . . . François 1^{er}, tirant son grand sabre et voulant charger à la tête de sa gendarmerie, vint juste se placer devant cette artillerie et la réduisait au silence. . . . Ne faites donc pas de même . . . Vous ne devez pas gêner le tir en prenant position sur le continent. Aussi longtemps que vous conserverez l’empire des mers vous n’avez besoin que d’Ambassadeurs pour obtenir ce que vous voudrez. Car vous pouvez bloquer toute l’Europe ; et le blocus j’en sais les effets. . . Vous mettez un pays dans la situation d’un corps frotté d’huile, et qui ne peut plus respirer.”

Le Matin, Lundi, 12 Février, 1912.

LABOUR AND WAGES

IT would be hard to name any subject of more pressing concern at the present moment than that of the true relation between Capital and Labour. Nor can any more sorely need candid and unprejudiced inquiry. For it concerns all classes, affects all interests and in some degree occupies all minds; while it is daily becoming clearer that if mankind is to continue to fulfil its first great injunction to be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth and subdue it, some reasoned and satisfying answer must before long be given to the doubts and difficulties which have recently surrounded the whole question.

These doubts and difficulties are not confined to England; nor did they, or any one of the doctrines which flow from them, originate here. They were all invented abroad and bear evident marks of their origin.

Thrown up during the great European unrest of the early 19th century and long regarded here as frail foreign products unlikely to survive a Channel crossing, they have now arrived among us; and, though stiffly received at first and still regarded with suspicion by the vast majority of Englishmen, they have without doubt already produced in English industry results of which serious account must be taken. Of these results the most striking is the modern Labour Dispute; and this it is which, in its more recent manifestations and extensions, has compelled general attention to the whole subject. For though it seems absurd to apply military terms to the normal operations of industry, the modern extension of Labour

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Disputes has made it clear to all that, as now conducted, such disputes have, within their limits results economically indistinguishable from those of military war. Violent interference with production and the conversion of vast numbers of productive workmen into unproductive burdens on the community, such no doubt are the evils of excessive militarism and war. And these are also, within its limits, exactly the evils of the modern Labour Dispute. It is thus evident that a sufficient number of such disputes, combined with a sufficient extension of the limits of each, would in truth diminish the resources of a State as surely as any foreign war on which it could embark.

It is a commonplace to say that the industrial pre-eminence of England during the early part of the 19th century was mainly due to the fact that, while every other population in Europe was then still overshadowed by war, we alone could count on peace within our shores. So it was. By wise energy, foresight and expenditure England, amid a distracted Europe, made her own internal peace secure. Perhaps a greater glory awaits her. Perhaps, amid a Europe weakened by class-hatred and torn by labour convulsions, England may again show the world a way of social peace. It is not impossible. But this way, if it is to be found, will not be found either by glorying in present difficulties or by ignoring them. It will be found by examining each one of them frankly in order to arrive at and proclaim that underlying truth which alone can satisfy doubts. For this can never be other than an economic matter. And in economics there is at least this merit about the truth—that, once proclaimed, it is sure in the end to prevail.

II

LABOUR Unrest, at bottom, may always be regarded as springing from the labourer's desire for more money; and this fact enables superficial critics to pour contempt

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upon it as the merely base expression of a purely selfish discontent. Led away by agitators, deluded, ignorant and corrupt, the British workman is represented by such critics as the embittered enemy of industrial peace, slack and shiftless, caring nothing for the prosperity of the industry by which he lives, without interest in his country or pride in her position in the world and engrossed wholly and solely in the subject of the amount of money he can extract weekly from the pocket of his employer. With such men, we are told, it is useless to reason. They are sunk in such depths of materialism that no ray from Reason's lantern can ever hope to reach them.

That some slight ground exists for this class of criticism is undoubted. There are men to whom such a description could fairly be applied; and it must be admitted that, judged by their public utterances, it seems to be the desire of some of the more prominent among labour spokesmen rather to increase than to diminish their numbers. But selfish materialism is not the monopoly of any one class. It exists among the very rich at least as much as among the poor; and no one who really knows the English workman, whether at his work or in his home, will affirm that he is more inaccessible to reason, more idle, more naturally prone to violence or, above all, less ready to be fair, than any other class of Englishmen.

Indeed a love of fairness for its own sake is perhaps, in truth, his most prominent characteristic; and this it is upon which the labour agitator principally plays. High-flown theories of equality and sounding references to vague Utopias which easily move the Latin mind, leave the English workman cold—as every street-orator could testify if he would. Naked appeals to envy and covetousness do not succeed with him. But appeal to his sense of fairness and the case is different indeed. Point out merely that his employer is rich while he himself is poor and he remains unmoved. But tell him that his employer, whether rich or poor, is systematically cheating him, that he is being

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unscrupulously exploited, that he is not getting his fair share, that he is being tricked—persuade him of this and something has indeed been done with him. For it is not the nature of the English to fear hardship and misfortune. What they fear, and hate too with a bitter hatred, is injustice. And it is this doctrine that the workman is being tricked and cheated out of his just share in the products of his industry that is really at the bottom of all that is formidable in English labour unrest. Destroy that doctrine, convince the workman finally and for ever that it is false, and the one essential step to peace will have been taken.

It may be objected that this involves what is often thought to be the hopeless task of addressing directly to working-men the arid truths of political economy. No doubt this is so. But it is a mistake to suppose that working-men take no interest in industrial economics. It would be more nearly true to say that at this moment they take very little interest in anything else. And if the sedulous propagation of economic fallacy has already produced the striking results we see, it is impossible to suppose that a hearing could not be got for at least an equal administration of economic truth. For in economics as in everything else, truth, with a slight effort, can be made just as attractive as falsehood.

The first observation to be made upon this doctrine that the workman is being cheated out of his fair share in the products of industry is this: that the burden of proving it lies upon those who advance it. They arraign the whole existing industrial system, alleging a serious grievance. It is plainly then their business in the first place to prove that their grievance exists. Yet this is exactly what they never do. All that is ever done is to assert it. What, for instance, is the fair share of labour in the product of any specific industry? On what principle is it to be arrived at? Presumably it is never represented by the existing wage, for if so the grievance disappears. It is, then, something more than the existing wage. But how much more? And if this much more, why not more still? No answer to these

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questions is ever attempted—except indeed by the full-blooded Socialist who claims that the whole product of every industry justly belongs to the workman. But the questions raised by this claim are even more insoluble than those asked above. Is, for instance, the whole product of a particular successful factory to be divided only between the workmen in that factory or is it to be shared by all the workmen in the land? And is each workman to share equally in it irrespective of merit, or unequally? And, if unequally, on what principle and by what authority are the shares to be assessed? Such questions, though often asked, are never answered; and, until some authoritative answer to them is forthcoming, we may safely leave the pure doctrines of continental Socialism to that electoral fate to which the English workman has hitherto most steadily consigned them.

This difficulty of suggesting some principle by which the workman's fair share of profits may be known has led to the invention of certain stock phrases which are used as a kind of argumentative shelter from the too keen blasts of candid inquiry. And these phrases are now in such constant demand and use that they have come in many quarters to be regarded as expressing some clear and even axiomatic idea. The workman, for instance, is told that under present conditions he is denied "the Right to Live," that he is refused "a Fair Wage" and even "a Living Wage"—expressions which, while plainly suggesting injustice and so evoking a popular response, can hardly be said to help an honest inquirer to discover where the alleged injustice lies. For unless the "Right to Live" means the right to live without working—a right which Socialists are particularly concerned to deny—it can only mean the right to live by working or, in other words, the right to a fair remuneration for work done; and the demand for this right, like that for a Fair Wage, is thus merely a demand for some new system of remuneration without the slightest indication of what that system should be. Still less helpful, if possible, is the demand for "a Living Wage." For what, one must ask, is

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this expression intended to mean? Not surely a wage that will merely enable its recipient to live—for that he evidently already has. What then? Something more. But, again, how much more; and, if that much more, why not more still? What, in fact, is really meant by “a Living Wage”? Among all those who demand it not one can be found to answer. Language no doubt is sometimes used which seems to convey that by a Living Wage is meant a wage which will enable its recipient to lead a life founded upon some conception or other of the ideal life. But whose conception, and whose ideal? Ideals differ vastly in different men; and the ideal of one is often much more expensive and yet much lower than that of another. For happiness and influence, in truth, do not depend on gold. Certainly the greatest men have commonly been poor; and it is highly probable that the twelve Apostles had not a hundred pounds a year between them.

But these phrases, though devoid, as we have seen, of practical or constructive meaning, are not without illustrative value; for they all repose upon and foster the idea that there being some right in the workman to a higher wage than he now receives, there must also be some duty on the employer to pay him that higher wage. And here at last we come to a clear and arguable issue. Is there any such duty on the employer? Has he a duty to raise or even to preserve any particular rate of wages in the sense that he may properly be accused of cheating and unfairness if he does neither? Now it will be admitted that no man is in any way bound, as a matter of duty, to employ any other man at all. No one is bound to be an employer. If then he has in fact no duty to pay any wage at all, how can he at the same time be bound as a duty to pay some particular wage? The truth surely is that the whole attempt to find some ground in abstract justice for a claim to increased wages is mistaken. Wages are neither fair nor unfair; they are fixed either by personal benevolence or by mercantile bargain; and the employer who pays what he has agreed to pay may

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be wise or unwise but is clearly not cheating. Every right implies a correlative duty; and where there is no duty on the one side it is vain to set up rights on the other.

But let us probe a little more deeply still this allegation that the workman is being cheated. The proposition continually asserted, in effect, is this: that the Wages Bill of modern industry does not bear a sufficient or "fair" proportion to its Net Profits. What would an honest inquirer do who wished to establish the truth of this proposition? He would evidently make a careful examination of various industries in order to see what the proportion actually is between their Profits and their Wages Bill. And it is certain that any such examination would lead him at once to somewhat startling conclusions. He would find, in the first place, that the proportion between Wages and Profits varies vastly in different industries; and he would find, in the second place, that the level of Wages is on the whole highest where the Wages Bill is smallest in proportion to the Profits. In agriculture, for instance, the yearly Wages Bill of an average farm is probably many times the amount of the farmer's annual profit; while in such industries as journalism or banking, where labour is not the chief expense, it is often much less than the net yearly profit of the business. Yet the wages of the workman employed in agriculture are not on this account at a higher level than those of the machine-minder, the office-boy or the bank-messenger. On the contrary they are, on the whole, at a lower level. And if, in obedience to some false doctrine of abstract justice, a universal proportion of Wages to Profits were decreed and enforced, the only result would be to increase the higher wage and immensely to reduce or even to extinguish the lower. Nor is the difficulty lessened if each separate industry be taken by itself. For consider two cotton-mills in competition in the same town, each employing the same number of equally competent workmen at the current rate of wages and so having each the same yearly Wages Bill, but one making twice the net profit of the other.

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If, now, in obedience to the same doctrine, the prosperous mill be compelled to pay higher wages than the other, the result can only be in effect to fine the workman in the less successful mill for no fault of his, to reward the workman in the prosperous mill for no merit and to burden the successful Employer as against his competitors in trade for no other reason than that his management has been better than theirs.

The injustice of these effects is apparent and they must here suffice to show the intrinsic and fatal falsity of the idea that justice requires some proportion to be kept between Wages on the one hand and Profits on the other.

The same class of considerations supplies one answer to the complaint constantly made that the workman is being cheated because when trade is increasing he does not get his fair share of the increase. For this is merely in essence a re-statement of the original assertion that injustice is done to the workman if Wages do not move with Profits.

And before finally dismissing the argument as to the abstract justice or injustice of any particular rate of wage, this observation must be made. If justice requires that Wages and Profits should rise together it must equally require that they should fall together. For if the establishment of some new or fixed relation between the two is to be defended on the ground of Eternal Justice, on that ground it must stand whatever the Profits. Eternal Justice does not alter with the price of cotton. The truth is, then, that rates of wages are not and cannot be made into matters of justice at all; and that all attempts to persuade workmen or others to discuss them on that ground or to regard them from that point of view are of necessity mistaken and can lead to nothing but a vague and utterly fruitless unrest.

What, then, is to be said of those schemes of Profit-Sharing to which many employers are now turning and in which many economists seem to see the seeds of an enduring settlement? In these, no doubt, the workman does share both in the increase and in the decrease of the business to

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the extent of his holding; his wages to that extent do move with profits; and very striking results have hence been achieved in the way of securing that industrial stability which flows from assured peace. The experiment wherever made has been almost uniformly successful in achieving peace, and the striking thing is that it has achieved this peace without any great or even any noticeable increase in the effective wages paid. For it must be remembered that the income which the workman under such a scheme derives from his share in the Profits is necessarily a very slight part of his whole wage, and that largely owing to the liability of that share to suffer in yield during bad times, his total effective wage is no greater than that of his fellows outside. But, though thus not more highly paid than other men, the profit-sharing workman is content; and is especially content in those schemes which enable him, by electing a delegate to the Board or otherwise, to have, besides his share in the profits, some actual voice in the management.

Many conclusions have been drawn from this state of things, but one at least is clear: that the achievement of industrial peace is less a matter of raising wages than of convincing the workman that he is not being robbed.

The whole success of Profit-Sharing lies in the fact that it does convince the workman of this; and though its essential feature—the establishment of a direct relation between Wages and Profits—would appear for the reasons already given to be economically false, and although, since the workman (quite properly) will never consent to share in losses, its application is only possible to steadily successful concerns, it is nevertheless to be heartily welcomed and encouraged as a temporary educational expedient of the highest value.

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III

IF, then, Wages are not to be fixed by reference either to some shifting view of abstract justice or to Profits, how are they to be fixed? On this important question the practical answer of organized labour is clear. Wages are to be fixed by a bargain come to between all the workmen acting together on the one side and the employers, singly or together, on the other. And organized labour believes as a matter of economic theory that by thus acting all together the workmen are able to exact better wages from the employers than each would be able to get for himself if he stood alone.

This belief in the power of collective bargaining to raise wages is widely spread among many of the better classes of English workmen; and it is due to them to examine with strict fairness, and from their own point of view, the foundations on which it rests. For every one must agree that so long as private property and personal liberty remain to us—and the one can never exist without the other—the workman is absolutely entitled and even bound to discover and use fully the most really effective means at his disposal to secure the highest obtainable price for the commodity of labour which he sells. His labour is his private property; all labour, indeed, is nothing else than property in an exceptionally private form; and the workman who owns it, like any other property-owner, is clearly entitled to use every honest means at his disposal wherewith to increase its market-price. And more than this. Labour in general is sold by men quite unversed in economic theory whose lives nevertheless largely depend upon the bargain they ultimately strike. Such men, engaged in such a bargain, are entitled to be provided with at least so much of economic truth on these matters as disinterested inquiry can distil.

Regarding, then, labour as a commodity for sale, and

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assuming that the object is to obtain as high a price for it as possible, what are the conditions one would like to see prevailing in the labour-market? The first would be this; that there should be a brisk demand for labour; that as many employers as possible should be bidding for it against each other. Observe that it does not here matter whether the employers bidding are good or bad employers. Every employer in the market, whether good or bad, helps the workman to a higher price. And, indeed, the bids of the bad employer may help him most of all; for it is the bad employer whose difficulty in obtaining labour is greatest and who consequently will be forced to make the highest bid if he is to get it. A great number of competing employers, then, irrespective of quality, is the first requirement of the workman.

And the second is this: that there should be the greatest possible number of distinct transactions. For it is only in this way that the price at which at each moment the demand really balances the supply—that is the true market-price—can be determined. When transactions are few, the price is uncertain and great scope is left in each new transaction for that “cheating” on the employer’s part which the workman chiefly fears. But in a brisk and lively market, with many similar transactions being settled all around him, the employer cannot hope to underbid. He must pay at least the market-price or go without his labour.

Now if these two are the conditions of real importance to the workman, let us see how collective bargaining affects them. So far as increasing the demand for labour is concerned it is evident that collective bargaining avails nothing. No employer needs more labour because he has to go for it to a combination of workmen rather than to each workman individually. His need cannot be increased by the circumstance that workmen are combined. But is it equally certain that his readiness to supply his need may not thereby be decreased? Will an employer step as readily into a labour-market consisting of Trade-Union officials as into one

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consisting of individual workmen? Do the complex trade regulations and hard divisions which combination necessarily involves, the stupefying extension of small disputes into matter of high trade-union principle to be fought to the death at any cost, the visits and requirements of the Union secretary, and all that has followed in the train of the "solidarity of Labour"—do these things tend to attract or to repel a possible applicant for labour? It is for the workman himself to answer this question. But it is right that he should at least see and understand that if, and in so far as, these things disincline applicants to venture into the labour-market at all, to that extent they directly tend to lower his wages.

Nor, evidently, will combination help the workman in his market by multiplying the number of separate transactions in the commodity he is selling and so ensuring for it at every moment the highest and most sensitive price. Its operation is in the exactly opposite direction. By brigading all the sellers of Labour in the market into one rigid combination with whom one must deal collectively or not at all, the essential element of price is removed from each individual transaction and relegated to some agreement previously come to, possibly in quite different circumstances, between the combination and the employers.

It is evident that the only economic power left to the individual workman by this arrangement is that of accepting or rejecting the work offered at the price fixed. But what security has he that the price thus arbitrarily fixed is higher than that which, in a free market, he could obtain for himself? It may be that it is lower; in which case he is clearly being "cheated." Or, no doubt, it may be higher. But in that case he is, by hypothesis, exacting more for his labour than the demand for it will justify; and it is quite certain that this circumstance must force the employer either to restrict his production below the level at which a free labour-market would allow it to stand, and so to reduce the demand for labour, or else to recoup himself if he can by increasing

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prices. In these events the combination workman is seen either to be enjoying such advantage as he gets at the cost of his fellow-members of the combination, whose chances of employment are directly diminished by his action, or else to be in fact enjoying no advantage at all through the necessary diminution in the buying-power of his wage by increased prices. And each of these results postpones and interferes with that natural expansion of his industry which, by creating or attracting to it the further capital needed, can alone ensure an effective and permanent improvement in his wage. It is then, again, for the workman himself to consider whether advantages of this sort are really advantages at all.

The defenders of the collective bargain against the free market, however, are with difficulty brought to deal with such considerations; and it is necessary, therefore, to consider shortly their case as they themselves present it. So far as this can be gathered it reposes upon two general propositions: first, that the interest of the workman and that of his employer are always necessarily opposed, and, secondly, that the individual workman, being bound to sell his labour quickly or starve, is unable to conduct his bargain on equal terms with the employer who can always afford to wait and wear him down into the acceptance of starvation wages. From these premises the conclusion is drawn that workmen in every trade must combine if wages are ever to rise; and to this is added as a kind of corollary, that every rise in the wages of a combined trade is due to combination.

Now, in real truth, the supposed conflict of interest between workman and employer is imaginary. For, even assuming that the whole and sole interest of the employer is to increase his own profit, his first need to that end must ever be to secure and increase the productive efficiency of his workmen; and no man with a grievance is ever efficient for long. None the less it is true that the employer, as the buyer, has an interest in paying low for labour while that of the workman, as the seller, is to get as high a price

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for it as he can; and, in this sense, their interests do conflict like those of any other bargainers.

But is it certain that, in the case of labour, this conflict must always operate against the seller? What is continually overlooked is the fact that when the individual employer is left freely face to face with the individual workman, the employer's conflict is not solely with the workman but also with every other competing employer in the trade; and it is this latter and further conflict which, in a free market, automatically and continuously controls the employer in the interest of the workman and gives to the workman his economic power. It is true that the individual workman without savings must sell his labour without undue delay; but he is in no way bound on that account to sell it to the first bidder. And his strength as a bargainer depends partly on his own reputation and skill as a craftsman, but mainly on the existence of that close competition among his possible employers which will enable him to laugh at one who offers him too low a wage.

Rightly understood, therefore, the private competition of individual employers, so far from tending to injure the workman as is often suggested, is in fact his greatest security against low wages; and so far as that competition is destroyed to that extent is the workman's economic power diminished. But, if this be so, it is difficult to see how the workman's bargaining power can be improved by combination. For combination, as we have seen, involves fixing wages beforehand according to some previously-agreed scale. The employers, in consequence, are at once almost entirely relieved from each other's competition so far as the rate of wages is concerned; and the workman is thus deprived of his greatest security against extortion. The bargaining-power of a workman face to face with many employers competing for his services is evidently great. It is absurd to represent such a man as bargaining upon unequal terms or as unable to put a reserve price upon his labour. And, if the employers are not in fact competing for

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his services at the moment, it is certain that no combination of workmen can make them compete. Indeed the true danger to the workman is not from capitalist competition but from capitalist combination. For though, as we have seen, an individual employer in a free market cannot "cheat" the workman in any intelligible sense of the word, it is far otherwise with a complete and determined combination of employers. Such a combination can evidently always defeat the workmen's combination if it chooses; for its members have open to them in the last resort, what the members of the workmen's combination never have, the power of withdrawing from the industry altogether. And the mere existence of any universally complete combination of capital, whether calling itself the State, as the Socialists suggest, or by any other name, would instantly abolish the whole economic power of every workman in the country and reduce him into that dismal condition of complete equality which characterizes the slave. If then, and so far as, the combination of workmen weakens capitalist competition and increases capitalist cohesion, to that extent it diminishes the economic power and consequent freedom of the workman, without, so far as can be seen, increasing his economic strength in any direction.

But it is said that without combination the workman would be unable to use effectively the only economic weapon he possesses, namely the right to withhold his labour; and that he would thus be wholly in his employer's power both as to wages and as to every other condition of his employment. Yet it is one of the strangest of the many paradoxes of the labour movement that this great weapon of the strike can of necessity only be used where its use is least required. For it cannot be too often remembered that it is only when the wages of an industry are high enough to enable the workman in fact to make substantial savings out of them in hard cash and to invest those savings in a strike fund that a serious strike is possible. For this reason one does not hear of strikes in the submerged and sweated

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trades, but in the prosperous ones. It is not the distracted home-worker of the East-end earning a few shillings a week who strikes; it is the coal-miner or the railwayman earning several pounds. It is prosperity that strikes; adversity cannot. And a further paradox is this: that, after wages have ruled high enough for long enough, a strike is nearly inevitable; since only so can the men re-touch their money. The trade-union funds, despite all strikes, are very large. Every farthing of them represents an acquired saving out of wages. With such savings left in their own pockets it is certain that vast numbers of workmen to-day would already be well on the way to becoming property-owners themselves. And if these men have been kept in the status of workmen instead of having become capitalists, it has been largely due to their belief in the efficacy of the strike to increase wages. On labour disputes alone it is estimated by a conspicuous trade-union politician that from 1900 to 1911 the workman lavished three million pounds worth of his savings and lost £12,400,000 in wages. Yet what, according to the same authority, did he get in return for this stupendous expenditure? Of the 6,150 disputes in that period, only one-quarter ended in favour of the workmen; while wages in 1911 were no higher than in 1900 when this vast expenditure commenced. "A strike," says he, complacently, "never did "bring much substantial gain to the workers." To whom, then, does it bring gain? And why is it continued?

But if neither the collective bargain nor its weapon the strike can bring substantial gain to the workman by strengthening his power of bargaining with employers, the collective bargain has this further essential weakness: that no means exist or, so long as men are free, can be devised of enforcing it when it has been made. For here, in spite of all the theories of combination, one is always brought down to the individual workman. Is he, or is he not, to be forced, by the magistrate and the gaol, to work for wages which he himself does not approve? If so, it is slavery. If not, it is impossible in the last resort to enforce the collective bargain.

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In other words, the collective bargain involves the enslavement of the worker. And here we surely begin to see into the very heart of the matter. For if it be true, in the famous phrase, that civilization consists in the progress of individuals from status to contract, it is clear that every attempt to lead men back again from contract to status is retrograde and false. Yet what else, in truth, is the attempt to replace the free market by the collective bargain? After many long and weary vicissitudes the English law has now at last relieved the workman from every disability of status and conferred upon him the fullest rights of contract. No man now is bound to give his labour against his will; and every man, by law, is entitled to sell his labour freely as he chooses, where he chooses, and for the best price he can get. That, indeed, is the very meaning of modern liberty. This great change was made in 1834 and was not finally completed until thirty years later. It is the unanimous opinion of every competent inquirer that in the period between that date and a time some few years ago the real wage of regularly employed English workmen (that is the actual purchasing power of their labour having regard to prices), has doubled. This, at any rate, is something. But now, having got his full liberty of contract, the workman has been induced to regard it as worthless and even dangerous. The market has been opened to him, the bidders are waiting, all is ready; but he will not go in. He gives up his hardly-earned right of free recourse to the market and, placing himself blindly in the hands of some combination or other whose decrees, whatever they are, he undertakes to obey, reverts instantly and placidly to status.

This is disheartening behaviour for those who believe in liberty; and it is behaviour which, though bad for every one concerned, is unfortunately especially bad, as we have seen, for the material prosperity of the workman himself.

If direct proof be needed of the truth that, even in the most disadvantageous circumstances, the free market can do at least as much for workmen as any modern reversion to

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status, it will be found in a consideration of the two great classes of workmen who hitherto have steadily rejected the collective bargain and have been content to rely for their wages on the free market: namely, the agriculturist and the domestic servant. It is true that the wages of these trades, measured in money, are not at so high a level, for reasons which will be directly considered, as those of many other trades. But the point is that the improvement in the condition of both of these classes in England during the past fifty years has undoubtedly been at least as marked as that of any other workmen. The actual money wages of the agricultural labourer have everywhere risen in that period; and their purchasing power, like those of other classes, has doubled. And this result has been achieved in a trade from which modern industrialism has continually been withdrawing men to fill its factories and whose products have during that period been suddenly subjected, by the remission of protective duties and by the lowering of freights, to the fierce and direct competition of the whole world. If in such a trade the unimpeded action of the free market has enabled the English agricultural labourer to double the value of his labour, what could it not have done for the workman in more favoured industries? And it must be remembered in estimating the true wages of the agricultural labourer that his employment is almost invariably continuous and his necessary expenses small, while the townsman must incur a far higher necessary expense and is subject to periods of slack trade and consequent unemployment. The same considerations apply equally to the immense class of domestic servants who, without combination of any sort, have shared to the full in the general improvement of labour. In these circumstances the contention that workmen must combine if their conditions are ever to improve appears difficult to sustain; while the claim that every improvement in wages is due to combination is seen to be not only inexplicable in theory but false in fact.

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IV

IF then, as is here suggested, the combination of workmen in their own interests in fact tends to defeat those interests, it is unnecessary to examine in detail the various devices by which it seeks to make itself effective; though, certainly, if combination be a sound principle its children are strangely deformed. The manifold attempts to increase employment by restricting output; the calculated aggravation of the already grave monotony of modern labour by a rigid confinement of each man within a certain limited class of work apart altogether from his own aptitude or wishes; the crude injustices of the Minimum Wage; the hatred of apprenticeship; the belief in and determination to create caste-like monopolies in labour; these and other children of combination have, to say the least, a weakly and unwholesome look.

No reasoned defence of them on economic grounds can in truth be made; nor, indeed, is any such defence ever attempted. They are defended, if at all, without regard to economics, upon the general ground that combination, in actual working practice, cannot be made effectual without them. Here, therefore, we may leave theory and consider how the principle of workmen's combination is at present shaping itself in practice.

Whatever view be taken of the value or effects of combination as a matter of theory, it can hardly be denied that during the last few years it has, from the workman's point of view, been extremely unremunerative in practice. According to the official returns on these subjects—which, though based on admittedly incomplete data and so quite inaccurate as general statements, are nevertheless valuable as affording accurate comparisons from year to year within their expressed limits—wages in the building, mining, engineering and textile trades and in agriculture had, for

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twenty years before 1906, been rising at the yearly rate of about three-quarters of one per cent. Since 1906 these same wages have risen at the very different rate of something over one-half per cent per annum. And, what is equally important to the workman, the price of food, which in the former period had steadily declined, has in the latter advanced so rapidly as entirely to nullify even this reduced increase of wage. So far, then, as the official returns will take us, they show the workman to be getting substantially less for his labour than he got eight years ago: his real wages have declined, while unemployment has notably increased. And yet it is during these very years that combination, with its weapon the strike, has made its most prodigious efforts to better the workman's lot. In the single year 1912 over forty million working days were lost by strikes in the United Kingdom—which is many more than were lost in the whole five years from 1907 to 1911 and nearly four times the days so lost from 1902 to 1906. It is clear, therefore, that if energetic combination is a remedy for low wages it belongs to that class of remedy which considerably aggravates the disease.

This effect of more intense combination will not, as we have seen, surprise economists; for if it be true that combination weakens rather than strengthens the bargaining-power of workmen, the more combination they attempt, the worse in the end will their position be. But it has considerably surprised the workman. For until recently, no doubt, labour combination had gone hand in hand with a progressive improvement in the workman's wage; and that fact had brought many workmen to the belief that the one in some way results from the other. To-day, however, this belief is being rapidly weakened; and one result is clear. The workman is beginning to take back his fortunes into his own hand. So far from reposing in those who control his combination that steady trust which was the strength of the older-fashioned trade-union leader, the workman to-day is almost as often in conflict with his leaders as with his

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employers; and the recent history of combination has been that of a confused and confusing series of such rebellious conflicts. The belief in combination itself, indeed, appears not yet to waver; but it has suddenly become so difficult to work successfully in practice that, unless the source of this new difficulty can be quickly discovered and removed, the whole organism appears likely before long to perish in convulsions.

There can be little doubt what this strange new irritant is. For, since 1906, the trade-union world has been swiftly captured and transformed by a relatively insignificant group of continental Socialists whose object is not to improve the structure of modern civilization in the interests of the workman, but wholly to destroy it. This difference of aim, which is the essential distinction between the old and the new trade unionism, is of the highest practical importance. Before 1906 the directors of trade unionism desired merely to modify the conditions of their own trades, in the interest of their own members, by negotiation with their employers; since 1906 their desire has been to eliminate employers altogether. The older trade unionism regarded the employer as a necessary partner with Labour in industry, though a partner who, in the interests of Labour, needed careful supervision and control. The new unionism regards the employer as a natural and permanent enemy, whom, so far as possible, Labour must harry out of existence.

Under the influence of this new principle, the whole temper and spirit with which trade-unionism is directed have, in the last few years, been changed. Founded for purposes of trade alone, trade unionism has been violently diverted into politics. From self-supporting and self-governing combinations of workmen concerned solely with improving the condition of their own trade, trade-unions have been turned into mere units of an unwieldy and quasi-political host dominated by persons whose primary interest lies, not in improving the conditions of particular trades, but in procuring an early overthrow of the entire industrial fabric.

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And, since it is clear that society will never be overthrown by that patient investigation and adjustment of disputes in his own trade which was the function of the older trade-union leader, his modern successor leaves that relatively humble work to others and devotes his own energies to political propaganda.

The manœuvres by which this surprising capture of English trade unionism was effected will not be considered here—though they afford a commentary of great interest upon the whole trend of modern politics. But their practical effect has been two-fold. In the first place the corporate and trade-union sentiment of large masses of English workmen is diverted from trade and used, by a trick, to return to Parliament representatives of continental Socialism whose essential doctrines, openly preached on their merits, would certainly be, and always are, rejected by all but a very small minority of the workmen concerned; and, secondly, the daily management of the various unions is rendered halting and uncertain by the continued absence in London of the really responsible leader. And this access of violence in doctrine accompanied by this dispersion of executive power has replaced the relatively small but sometimes fruitful trade dispute of earlier days by the vast but always fruitless upheaval of the past few years.

It may be freely admitted that the presence in Parliament of members able to speak on industrial and social subjects from the workman's point of view is of value in debate. But such members must be either real workmen or at least men who really understand the workman's point of view; and most of the members of the present Labour Party in Parliament have, in truth, no first-hand knowledge of a workman's life at all. Very few of them were ever working-men themselves; and it is significant that the moving spirits of the group are almost all lecturers, journalists and ex-clerks of the regular middle-class Socialist type who have never done a day's manual labour in their lives. Such men are hardly likely to reflect with any accuracy the blunt and

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sturdy views of the English labouring man. Still less are they likely to develop and display that readiness, courage or humour in debate which mark the effective parliamentarian. Nor do they. A group of capable men as numerous as the present Labour Party could certainly in eight years have made themselves respected and feared by their parliamentary opponents. The present Labour Party, as a parliamentary force, is universally and justly despised as a mere docile appendage of the Liberal Party.

But, as might be expected, it is the working man himself who most of all despises the Labour Party; and discontent with the new alliance between pure trade-unionism and parliamentary Socialism is rapidly growing. At labour gatherings up and down the country the leaders of the new unionism are denounced, with all the authentic eloquence of the British workman, as persons who have left their own business of attending to trade disputes in order to go to London and "ape Dukes" in Parliament. The contempt in which Parliament holds the Labour Party is increasingly shared by all its supporters in the country. This, of itself, necessarily weakens that "discipline" without which trade unionism evidently falls to pieces. The rank and file were ready to trust their older leaders who had worked among them and whom they knew. They will not trust the absent bagman or the visionary clerk whom a Socialist caucus has imposed upon them and then sent to London for the high and holy purpose of destroying society. And the converse is true. If the men mistrust these new political leaders, so do the masters. For it must be remembered that whereas the men's leaders ten years ago had no politics, the delegate who now comes to negotiate with the employer is an avowed and active parliamentary enemy of all employers and of all modern industry—a fact which, to say the least, does not tend to increased geniality and reasonableness on either side. It is one thing to deal with the purely industrial agent of the workmen; it is another to deal with an embittered and doctrinaire political opponent.

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The irruption of labour leaders into politics has further weakened trade unionism by introducing among the members of each union the divisions of varying political opinion. Every union of necessity contains men of all political opinions; and every vote given by their leader at Westminster, while it pleases some, antagonizes others. It is clearly impossible that a leader in such circumstances should command the whole-hearted adherence of the whole combination. All that such a leader can hope to command is the half-hearted adherence of the workmen and the whole-hearted dislike of the employers.

Moreover, under this new political direction, trade unionism has been swept into the wildest excesses of megalomania. The unions are no longer to be voluntary associations of workmen who prefer combination to the free market; they are to include all workmen, whether willing to join them or not. Under the shelter of special statutes directed to that end, non-union men are to be pestered, insulted and harried into an unwilling membership, under pain either of giving up their employment altogether or of subjecting their industry, and, if thought necessary, the whole industry of the country, to the long-drawn and fruitless miseries of a particular or general strike. Under this compulsion vast numbers of unwilling men have joined trade unions during the last few years. In the ten months from August, 1912, to June, 1913, the membership of the South Wales Miners' Federation, which had been steadily decreasing till it embraced only about one-quarter of the workmen employed in that industry, was by these methods violently increased until it now nominally includes nearly all the workmen in the mines. And the same kind of pressure has resulted in similar increases elsewhere. But it is for the trade-union workman to consider, if he will, how far trade unionism itself is really strengthened by these immense accessions of unwilling recruits. "I send you a "hundred volunteers," wrote a South American recruiting-officer to his General, "Please return the ropes." It is

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probable that a prudent General would also have returned the volunteers.

But if, in these essential points, the solidarity and bargaining power of the unions have been impaired, their Socialist masters, abandoning the method of negotiation and bargain even in its most collective form, look to legislative action to repair these defects. Workmen's Compensation Acts, the Eight Hours Act, the Minimum Wage Act, the Old-Age Pensions and the Insurance Acts—these are the new bulwarks of working-class liberty. As was inevitable, each one of these Acts is merely a further reversion from contract to status. Under them the workman is no longer free at all. He is the docketed slave of official machinery, enjoying only such rights as are allotted to his status by the Acts and unable to claim more. And what, in the end, has he achieved by submitting to these collars? The Acts have now had time to show their results; and in the result, as we have seen, he is worse off now than he was before they were passed.

But it is not even in these respects that the new trade unionism has most gravely injured the workman; nor is it upon the workman that its effects have been greatest. Its greatest and most deplorable effects are those which it has had upon the employer. For the employer, or his manager, having been so long and so loudly informed that the natural relation between the workman and himself is one of pure covetousness on the one hand and pure avarice on the other, is dimly beginning to believe it. Already the high division of labour necessary to modern production and, above all, the advent of the impersonal joint-stock company as a large employer, had weakened those daily personal relations between employer and employed which had sweetened the older and more varied forms of labour. Yet even the older trade unionism, concerned solely with its own trade, divorced from politics and speaking by the mouth of straightforward, and often extremely capable, men in close and constant touch with every change of process and

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every turn of the workshop, had not altogether destroyed those relations or banished goodwill. Nor, perhaps, can goodwill between masters and men ever be entirely destroyed. But there can be no doubt that the modern direction of labour by Socialist politicians has made prodigious strides in that direction. And the employers, released, as we have seen, by this same direction from the necessity of competing with each other in the matter of wages and conditions of labour (for these are now settled for them by the Unions and by Acts of Parliament), and yet faced with constant harassment and abuse on the part of those through whom alone they may now approach their men, are beginning, though slowly, to come together. Thus the labour market which, under free conditions, would inevitably tend to keep up wages by fostering economic production and giving to each workman the highest price that such increased production would enable him to get, is drawing aside into two vast sullen groups called Capital and Labour, informed by hatred of each other and resolved to best each other if they can. This, no doubt, is the result aimed at by those who have contrived it. They have desired it; and, with great ability and energy, have begun to bring it about. But it should be remembered by the workman that the end of these things is not the improvement of wages but the fall of society; and that, until society does fall, he must be content, so long as he approves these courses, to go on paying for them that full price in liberty, as well as in wages, of which the last few years have shown him but a first slight instalment.

And if, at the end of it all, society does fall, he will be instantly buried in its ruins.

RICHARD CORFIELD

DISASTER OR VICTORY

FEW people knew, or even knew of, Mr Corfield, fewer were ever in Somaliland, and fewer still have heard any word of praise of him. Yet it is necessary to draw the attention of the public to a man who stands outside his age, in act and spirit and sentiment. This is an age of bombast in words, of wild violent rhetoric, of military metaphor, of sound and fury—we say we will “die in the last ditch,” or stake “the last penny and the last man,” when we really mean that we shall vote in a particular way if the weather is fine, or that we do not mind some one else being taxed. Now so far as can be seen, Mr Corfield never wrote nor talked in this way; he just did things of this kind in fact as readily as we use them as metaphors. This is an age of safe-salary hunting and responsibility shifting. Since we are mostly officials or deputies or representatives, we measure in advance the consequences of all our acts on our own fortunes. Democracy and Bureaucracy teach us double cunning; we promise redress, we wink at ill-doing, we intrigue for berths, we stifle our feelings, and in moments of crisis we refer to headquarters. We wring the dirty hands of most objectionable persons and swear we are their brothers, and we do not even inquire their names. We are meticulously precise in explaining our own personal impotence on any occasion, and we flee responsibility like the plague. Mr Corfield was out of touch with his age: he hugged responsibility as the pagan his idol, he stood by those whom he desired to defend, he took his own line.

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This is an age of military caution; no general even on manœuvres likes to be suspected of doing anything but the safe thing. To take the risks of Frederick, or Saxe, or Bonaparte, would land any ambitious soldier upon the shelf; but Mr Corfield, the civilian, was a standing denial of the spirit of his time: he took his chances, snatched his battles, and did his best.

As a consequence Mr Corfield is, to the man in the street, "Mr Corfield of the disaster in Somaliland." He flung his little dart at the giants Humbug, Cowardice and Self-Interest; and the powers that be have damned him when scarce dead, with bell, candle and blue book, and the label "Disaster" has been graven on his tomb. To understand how it is done we have to realize that when Lord Northcliffe and the two front benches agree in a matter, it is so; when they do not it is a controversy.

Lord Northcliffe and the two front benches agree that there was a disaster in Somaliland, and you, sir, or madam, who read this believe that there was a disaster; and there is indeed very little hope that, even when you have read it, you will not continue in that belief. It is official; it is public opinion; it is not denied. The disaster had to be because a minister said it was a disaster, because his opposite number did not question the fact on the spot, and so could not do so later without admitting himself wrong, and because Lord Northcliffe's papers announced it as a disaster in the first instance and could not deny their primitive accuracy. So the order of natural things demands a disaster; and there it is.

This is a pity, because, in a country rich in pushing pigmies but poor in heroes, and in a decade singularly destitute of any public acts of physical or moral courage, Mr Corfield and the action in which he met his death, if given due publicity, might serve to fan the embers of a waning moral and a decaying national spirit.

It is not a bad story; indeed, even in a blue book, it makes one's pulse beat a little faster. Had Mr Corfield been an

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eighteenth century Whig, Macaulay would have made him so famous that his name would have been known even to the readers of the Harmsworth *History of the World*. Let us see what Mr Corfield did, and what is said about it.

It is unnecessary to go over the whole of the history of our affairs in Somaliland, to say what should or should not have been done, or to criticize the varying policy of the British Government since 1904. However nothing could be more instructive than to follow the facts contained in the memorandum written by Mr Byatt in April, 1912.*

At the end of 1909 the British Government decided to arm the friendly tribes and to withdraw entirely to three towns upon the coast. Immediately upon this being done the "overmastering trait of acquisitiveness in the Somali character," led to fierce fighting between the friendlies amongst themselves, and also with the Ogaden Somalis who were Abyssinian subjects. Efforts in the direction of moral influence proved utterly and entirely delusive; the Government was unable even to prevent serious raiding in the immediate neighbourhood of the coast towns. The loyalty of the very Government servants, police interpreters and the rest, became affected; trade, except illegal traffic in arms, was checked and the revenue impoverished. The condition of anarchy spread rapidly over the country with a prospect, under the then system, of becoming permanent.

In the meantime the Mullah (no longer officially described as "mad") had settled at Damer, near Gerrowe, on the Protectorate frontier. In November, 1911, he successfully attacked one friendly tribe and in February, 1912, another; his successes were, in part, due to "the terror inspired by the "unspeakable atrocities and mutilations practised upon the "vanquished." Under this terror any attempt at tribal self-defence on the part of the friendlies collapsed; those nearest to the dervish districts evacuated their land and flocked to Berbera, demanding British protection, and refusing to

* Blue Book. Cd. 7066, pp. 1-5.

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lift a hand further in their own behalf. In short, as Mr Byatt, Commissioner at Berbera, summarizes the situation after giving the above facts in his report to the Secretary of State in April, 1912:

“Tribal organization—the first line of defence—has finally
“and completely given way and there has been a steady and
“serious diminution of the authority and prestige of the
“Government among the tribes who are its nearest neigh-
“bours.”*

It was estimated by the Acting-Commissioner that during the years 1911 and 1912 about one-third of the male population of the friendly tribes of the Protectorate (!) was exterminated in inter-tribal fighting.†

As the result of this situation Mr Byatt set out four courses as being open to the Government; (1) an expedition for the pacification and occupation of the interior; (2) the establishment of small military posts upon the main roads; (3) a continuation of the existing policy; and (4) complete evacuation.

He also suggested the adoption of a fifth experimental course: “The establishment and maintenance on the coast
“of a small mobile striking force, which could be used to
“maintain order by coercion,” . . . ‡ and, he added, “it
“should consist of a camel corps, for as the friendly dreads
“the dervish, so the dervish dreads camelry.”

Mr Harcourt approved the fifth course suggested, and it was decided to raise a force of 150 camelry. Mr Corfield was appointed as commandant. In November the force was organized and equipped and on the 21st of December fought a successful action with rebellious friendlies, for which service Mr Corfield was complimented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. By the end of January, 1913, the inland station of Burao was occupied by Mr Corfield’s corps, and caravans were beginning to travel from the coast

* Blue Book. Cd. 7066, p. 5.

† Blue Book. Cd. 7066, p. 43.

‡ Blue Book. Cd. 7066, p. 5.

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towns without fear of molestation. From this time onward Mr Corfield slaved and toiled with his tiny army among the friendlies, settling feuds, collecting fines, imposing peace and keeping order. What seemed an almost impossible task was gradually being accomplished, and in June so much progress had been made that the Secretary of State once more expressed his satisfaction with Mr Corfield's efforts and their results.

As was to be expected, the work of regeneration excited the fears of the Mullah. Mr Corfield had hitherto operated against the friendly tribes only, he had introduced peace and a semblance of social order by means of force; it now became a question of confirming their loyalty by showing them that the rod of punishment was also a weapon of defence.

The Mullah's men began pressing the outlying friendly tribes. These, being timid and poor fighters, fell back and endeavoured to encroach on their fellow friendlies' lands which were more safely situated, thus giving rise to further internecine wars among the friendlies.

On one such occasion Mr Corfield and his corps were present. Mr Corfield, seeing his whole work being ruined, emerged and endeavoured to attack the enemy who had retired.

For this Mr Corfield was rebuked and the censure was echoed by the Colonial Secretary. Mr Corfield was henceforth to secure peace among the friendlies by force when they fought among themselves. But when attacked by their enemies, he was to leave them to their fate.

The absurdity of the position resulted in the following impasse for a border tribe. If the tribe remained in its place it was destroyed by the dervishes; if it went anywhere else it trespassed and was to be punished by Mr Corfield.

Apparently the Liberal doctrine that the only righteous use of British military force is to employ it against loyal subjects who require protection, applies not only to white men in Ulster but to black men in Somaliland.

Put in² so absurd a position Mr Corfield had to obey his

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instructions as often as he could, and, when he could not, to risk his reputation and his life. The end came in this way. In July, 1913, Mr Corfield was controlling the situation as best he could from the up-country centre of Burao, where he had been for upwards of seven months. The dervish menace was growing more serious, and it was a question as to whether the camel corps should not be finally withdrawn and the whole task of maintaining law and order abandoned.

Mr Archer, the Acting Commissioner, decided to proceed to Burao himself to consult with Mr Corfield as to the general position of affairs and make a final decision.

Here is Mr Archer's account of the situation immediately preceding the action in which Mr Corfield fell. It is well worth reading :

I arrived at Burao on the 6th August, and two days afterwards a report was received by Mr Corfield that dervishes were severely raiding the friendlies in the district between Idoweina and Burao, their operations extending to within two or three miles of Ber. Now, upon that very morning I had been listening in Durbar for four hours to the representations of the friendlies—representations to the effect that, unless Government would come to their assistance and protect them with an adequate force, their annihilation at the hands of the dervishes would be complete within a year or two. I admit, therefore, that at first I was sceptical as to the imminence of the danger represented as pressing at 1-30 p.m. of the same day. The dervishes had not attacked the locality in force for two years. That they should have selected this very time, when I happened to be present, to arrive on the scene from the haroun, 170 miles distant as the crow flies—and I need scarcely say that we can get no reliable information, of course, of dervish intentions in advance—appeared to me to be too extraordinary a coincidence to be credited. However, after a discussion on the situation with Mr Corfield, I adopted the view that some action was obviously indicated, even though I still regarded the information as likely to be without foundation in fact, and supplied by the friendlies merely to impress me with the extreme seriousness of their plight. I accordingly ordered a strong reconnaissance by the Camel Corps in the direction of Ber to ascertain the facts, and instructed Captain G. H. Summers, Indian Contingent, to accompany the force with a view to forming his own conclusions and advising me later on the military situation, before I decided on future action.

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Mr Corfield set out on his reconnaissance with two British officers and 116 men. He located the enemy, 2,000 strong, and decided to attack. His standing orders were against attack; his military advisers were of opinion that the chances were too great to risk. Well, it may be a shocking suggestion, but in Mr Corfield's initiative in the face of such dangers do we not see something of the spirit of Clive, who repudiated his expert advice the night before Plassey, and of Nelson, who disregarded all orders when those orders meant disaster; do we not see something wholly at variance with the new spirit of caution which caused the South African war to drag on for two long weary years?

The man who, with 116 rifles at his disposal, will deliberately attack 2,000 has that something in him which inspired Clive, Nicholson, Hodgson, and Gordon, and without which our Empire would be bounded by the precincts of Whitehall.

"But then," says the critic, "it ended in disaster, all the newspapers say so."

Let us examine the "disaster."

Mr Corfield decided to force a battle by intercepting the enemy—he further decided in the face of contrary advice to fight in line and not in square, lest he should diminish his volume of fire. Again a military student must express respect and appreciation; this is not surely the thought of a mere bull-headed thruster, but is the working of a penetrating mind and shows an audacity which often goes with it. It has a touch of Wolfe, who, on the heights of Abraham, staked all his fortunes on a single volley and won.

Now Mr Corfield had luck all against him. His calculations were in miles; his point of interception was 200 yards short of the open country he had intended to reach. He counted, as must all commanders, on himself; he was killed in the first five minutes. He counted, as he was entitled to do, on the maxim gun; it was dislocated and put out of action by a chance bullet. If a man deciding to fight a battle, never fought unless he could discount so much ill fortune, no decisive battle would ever have been fought.

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What happened? Mr Corfield's force, less his own inspiring figure, less his maxim gun, in the bush instead of in the open 200 yards away, fought a five hours' battle, lost 33 killed, 21 wounded and 3 missing, drove off at least six attacks, killed 395 of the enemy, wounded, on a moderate estimate, some 400 more, held its own ground as long as it desired, buried its dead, and retired unmolested, without loss of stores or arms and without assistance; while the enemy, shattered and broken, fled back to their own country.

Under unfavourable circumstances, with the throw of the dice against him, Mr Corfield's force won by every canon of military criticism. Only one fault did it commit, but that to the British official and the British Press is unpardonable; it sustained casualties! This is the sole reason for using the expressions reverse, mishap, disaster, and disastrous action which run through the whole of the official correspondence relating to the affair.

Judged by this standard Waterloo was a disaster, only equalled by the reverse at Malplaquet. The battle of Trafalgar was a mishap only paralleled by the dreadful results of Nelson's mutinous, ill-advised and rash attack at Copenhagen. If Mr Corfield's action was a disaster the only two battles in the history of the British army, which could be called victories, would be the famous occasion when the Earl of Chatham waited for Sir R. Strachan, while Sir Richard waited for the Earl of Chatham, and the even more thrilling success of the Duke of York, who, with overwhelming forces, ascended and descended an unoccupied hill.

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Because charity is the most celebrated of all Christian virtues, therefore they extended theirs beyond all bounds; and, instead of shutting the church against dissenters, were ready to open it to all comers, and break down its walls rather than that any should want room to enter. The strength of a state, we know, consisteth in the number of people, how different soever in their callings; and why should not the strength of a church consist in the same, how different soever in their creeds?—*The Examiner*, No. 22.

4th January, 1711.

IN writing of the Kikuyu Conference it is necessary to state at once that the point of view from which we shall approach the subject is that of the historic Church of England. There are few public institutions now existing in Europe which are so old and none of greater vitality. Before there was a King of England there was a "Holy Church of England," so called in her own records to distinguish her from the Church of Rome. It is not only that her legal position and the title on which she holds her property has been continuous from that time to this, but she also possesses in the same continuity a definite body of doctrine properly authenticated by her constitution and councils, enshrined in a literature unequalled in the modern world and fenced about by rites and ceremonies as beautiful,

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as dignified, and as well adapted to the genius of her votaries, as any that have ever existed.

It may be said that the divergence of belief between the three parties, High, Broad, and Low, makes it almost impossible to find a doctrine held in common by them all which is not also held by every one who professes and calls himself a Christian. But this is really beside the mark. Membership of the one Body is more important than individual private beliefs. Comprehension and toleration within the body are not inconsistent with authenticated and public doctrines which are the marks and standards of an historic Church reaching back to the Apostolic Age. The Church of England as a Church has a great, a common, and a distinctive creed. The extremes of the three groups to which we have referred have attracted a notoriety altogether disproportionate to their numbers. The highest of the High Church hold all the doctrines of Rome except those concerning the papal jurisdiction and the consequent obligation of obedience. The lowest of the Low Church are at one with the English Nonconformists in esteeming the Sacraments as merely commemorative acts which are in no way dependent on an episcopally ordained minister. The Latitudinarians, where the term is not used to cover a nebulous unbelief, indulge in a mysticism which conceals the nature of their creed from others, and possibly even ends in mystifying themselves. All these groups are small, with few and no very influential adherents; while apart from them and between them lies the vast body of the Church of England, opposed to Rome yet supporting episcopacy, fortified by the Sacraments as something miraculous and beyond reason, full of common sense and treasuring historic dogmas which are the very centre of European Christianity. To this Church, in full communion with the Episcopal Churches of Scotland, Ireland and America, and extending throughout British territory and the whole missionary field, we rightly give the name of the Anglican Church. It is proposed to show in this article that what

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was attempted at Kikuyu would be destructive to her unity and influence and, in consequence, of ill omen to the growth and influence of Christianity itself.

For the Church of England, Christianity is not merely a theory, a system of philosophy. It is not merely a personal religion. It is a community and fellowship, an ordered and settled progress in religious life. It stretches back to Christ and the Apostles. It appeals to the God who was our help in ages past and is still our hope in years to come, not under some new form of attenuated belief evolved in a German university, not by direct personal inspiration without the means of grace provided for us from the beginning, and above all not without the two great Sacraments, ordained by Christ Himself, one of which must, as the Church holds, be administered by His servants, the clergy, who have been duly ordained and set apart in one unbroken succession from generation to generation down to our own time.

The same questions have arisen in English Christianity in the nineteenth century, the seventeenth century, the sixteenth century, and the fourteenth century; and of these questions two (most essential to our present purpose), the validity of the priesthood and the nature of the Sacraments, are as vital to men's lives to-day as at any of those older periods.

Many a man is, we dare say, under the impression that both these questions arose for the first time in Africa in 1913. He probably has not considered that John Wycliffe raised a controversy in his day which, in spite of the absence of the Daily Pressman, extended to the whole of Europe and has never ceased to ring its changes from that day to this in the hearts and minds of those who care for catholicity. And after all catholicity is the matter in hand. Catholicity means union against the heathen and union against the Moslem, and the reason why Christianity was almost extinguished by the Moslem, long before even John Wycliffe was born, was exactly the same as the reason why Christianity sometimes stands helpless before Islam in Africa

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to-day. The reason is that the Heathen and the Moslem can alike use, in scorn, the words of Tertullian "See how these "Christians love one another."

True it is that there are Dissensions and Schisms amongst us, but it must be remembered that there are factors more destructive than dissension. Amongst them perhaps the most frequent and most dangerous is feigned union. Islam owes its power not to the great number of those who cry the profession of Faith but to their simple-hearted earnestness. To combine within the fold of Islam a multitude of men who felt that Faith to be but a small part of their creed would weaken rather than strengthen the unity of Islam.

That there was no break at the time of the Reformation in the continuity of the Church of England has always been an important part of the Faith of a great number of its members, and the great body of its members regard the ordination of its ministers or priests as essential to the efficacy of its most vital Sacrament. The spirit of Queen Elizabeth who refused to give up the Crucifix and lighted candles from her private altar * has pervaded the Church until to-day.

So the Conference at Kikuyu has in fact raised a vital question in English Christianity not for the first but for the hundredth time. Ever since Elizabeth's day the English Church has tried to steer a *via media* between the Roman Church on the one side and the Protestant Churches of Europe on the other, including now what are called the Free Churches of the English speaking world. There are strong episcopal bodies in America and elsewhere which are in Communion with the English Church. Their experience with regard to Protestant Nonconformists is a very valuable one because there is no legal, and not much social, preference in favour of the Anglicans, and many of the differences which really separate the English Church from English Nonconformists are eliminated outside England itself. The experience of these Churches has been that it is possible for them to work with the Nonconformists

* Strype's Annals, Oxford, 1824. Vol. I, p. 259.

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in a very brotherly and helpful fashion without being really in communion with them. From Elizabeth's day to our own we can trace a steady improvement in the relations between the Anglicans and the Nonconformist bodies in England, while the relations between the English Church and the Protestant Churches of Europe have become much less intimate, especially since the Tractarian Movement began.

Nothing which was actually done at Kikuyu was inconsistent with true Church of England beliefs. A celebration of the Holy Communion was held by two lawfully ordained and consecrated bishops according to the Anglican rite. Certain excellent Christian men, in every way fitted to partake of the Holy Mysteries, were admitted to that Communion and willingly conformed to the rites of the Church.

But what was attempted and designed in the Conference was inconsistent with the teaching of the Church of England and would, if carried out, be to the loss and not the gain of Christianity. We say this with great respect for the character and intentions of all who took part in the Conference, for the Nonconformists as much as for the two Bishops themselves. We think they were mistaken, but we know that they were actuated only by the highest motives. Our admiration for and belief in the Church of England as the purest Church in Christendom as well as the most efficient in practice should not blind us to the merits of English Nonconformity. We may dislike its neglect of what we regard as essentials of faith, or its lack of reverence for what was good in the past. But for its honest independence, for its value to political freedom, for its constant and courageous protests against evil and wrong-doing, for the personal devotion to the one Master which directly produced its saints and martyrs, for its work among the heathen at home and abroad—for all this we can none of us have anything but admiration. There is much that the Church of England has to regret in the past with regard to the treatment (howsoever provoked) meted out to those who were not merely her fellow Christians but her own

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sons and daughters. Let us be thankful that we can see a great improvement in this respect. But do not let this blind us to what it is best to do in the future.

We should have thought that the recent history of the education question in England would have warned the Bishops concerned that to try to boil down Christian doctrine to its highest common factor was not the way either to meet the opponents of Christianity or to inspire enthusiasm in the Church itself.

What was proposed at Kikuyu? To federate all denominations in East Africa, except the Romanists and the Unitarians, with a view to the ultimate foundation of a native Church or Churches on the following basis:

“(a) The loyal acceptance of the Holy Scriptures as our supreme rule of faith and practice;
“of the Apostle’s and Nicene Creeds as a general
“expression of fundamental Christian belief;
“and in particular of our belief in the absolute
“authority of Holy Scripture as the word of God*
“in the Deity of Jesus Christ and in the atoning
“death of our Lord as the ground of our forgiveness.”

“(b) Recognition of common membership between the Churches in the federation.”

“(c) Regular administration of the two Sacraments Baptism and the Lord’s Supper by outward signs.”

“(d) A common form of Church organization.”

And in publishing this basis to the world the Church Missionary Society’s advocate of it naïvely adds:

“That we did not in any light-hearted way give up the heritage of the Church may be seen from the basis of federation.”† On the contrary, we take leave to say that the two Bishops and the Church Missionary Society are giving away the heritage of the Church which it has

* The Authority of Scripture is not mentioned in either of the Creeds cited.

† Church Missionary Review (Jan. 1914), p. 26.

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preserved at much sacrifice since (to go no further back) the days of Elizabeth. This is the old, old question coming up again after centuries. These are the things for which the Elizabethan Divines contended against foreign reformers and English puritans. These are the very points on which the Hampton Court Conference failed to attain agreement. It was this very Church of England, with the Bishops and the Sacraments, for which Charles I finally gave up his life. Ranke, the most impartial of historians, asserts that if Charles would at the last have given up Episcopacy in the Church of England he could have saved himself.*

It would be a mistake to suppose that the Church ejected the nonconforming ministers in 1662 with a light heart. It was with sorrow and many heart-burnings. In those days the Nonconformists had no intention of separating themselves from the Church. Their intention was to capture it, and all through the long struggle of a century from 1562 to 1662 Episcopacy and the Sacraments were the crucial points. In fact it is the same now. In spite of unbelief and easy-going indifference, the Sacraments are as vital to the happiness of the majority of the men and women in the Church of England to-day as they were in the sixteenth century.

It is vain to say that all that is over now; that the age of intolerance is past. The matter cannot be dismissed like that. Apart from the constant tradition of the Church which supports them, there is a living belief in these things. The Tractarian Movement and the Church revival that followed are often spoken of as artificial things. But it is not so. It is a mistake to speak as if that movement was to be disregarded and tabooed. It was and is a great and vital uprising of the English Church itself. It is far the most spontaneous and representative movement that has taken place in the English Church since the time when she separated from Rome. The formal representation of the English Church has never been satisfactory at any time, certainly

* History of England. Clarendon Press 1875, vol. II, pp. 412-416.

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not for more than two hundred years; but, if we regard its vitality and comprehensiveness rather than its form, there can be no question that the Tractarian Movement and the revival of Church feeling which has arisen out of it, does represent the real feeling not only of the laity but of the ordained priesthood and Bishops of the English Church in a way that has hardly ever been done before.

The main body of the Church of England is the vast majority of its members, who neither wish to join the Church of Rome nor to amalgamate with the dissenters. The Non-conformists themselves are in England a dwindling body, and there is much more hope of absorbing a large proportion of them in the Church of England than there is of absorbing any influential portion of the Church in Nonconformity. This being so, the Kikuyu Conference has raised no new question, and the result of it will be to confirm the traditional views of the Church of England. The raising of the question may turn out to be a most hopeful sign and may end in increasing her prestige and influence if always the question raised be answered in the old way.

The Church of England since the time of Elizabeth, if not since the time of Wycliffe, has been a Protestant Church as regards the Papacy, and a Catholic Church as regards all other bodies. The majority of her Bishops and adherents have always believed in the validity of her orders and the efficacy of her Sacraments; and her learned tradition, as well as her liturgy, is perfectly consistent on both these points. A few quotations will substantiate this.

Matthew Parker (1504-1575) describes his policy as one not of innovation but of restoration. It was his aim "that that most holy and godly form of discipline which "was commonly used in the Primitive Church might be "brought home again." He replied to Calvin, who proposed inter-communion, that the English Church would retain their episcopacy not as from Pope Gregory who sent over Augustine, but from Joseph of Arimathea. Go straight from this to Bishop Lightfoot in our own time as to what

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was the faith and practice of the Primitive Church and you get far from the theories of the Church Missionary Society.

Richard Hooker (1554-1600) has been much quoted on both sides; but there is no doubt that he believed in episcopacy as a Divine institution, and in the very controversy out of which his great book arose, Walter Travers, his opponent, took the side which is now taken by the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa, while he was on that of Bishop Weston of Zanzibar.

George Herbert (1593-1633) the poet of all Christians, with all his charity, took the same view.

We need give only one quotation.* It was when he lay dying that Mr Duncan came to him at Bemerton.

"Sir," said George Herbert, "I see by your habit that you are a priest and I desire you to pray with me," which being granted, Mr Duncan asked him what prayers? to which Mr Herbert's answer was "Oh, sir, the prayers of my mother the Church of England, no other prayers are equal to them."

Bramhall (1594-1663) Archbishop of Armagh, of a Cheshire family and born in Yorkshire, says to his Roman antagonist: "We receive not your upstart suppositions, traditions nor unwritten fundamentals; but we admit genuine universal apostolical traditions. . . . We believe episcopacy to an ingenuous person may be proved out of Scripture without the help of tradition. The communion of the Christian Catholic Church is partly internal partly external." The first he defines as to believe the same necessary truth, to be charitable, to exclude none from the Catholic Communion and hope of salvation which profess the ancient faith of the apostles and Primitive Fathers, "and lastly to hold an actual Communion with them *in votis* in our desires." The external Communion is different and includes participation in the same Sacraments and external worship and the episcopacy. Further on he says, "In sum dost thou

* Walton's Life, Complete Works of George Herbert, Ed. Crosart, 1874. Vol. III., p. 66. See also "The Priesthood," vol. I., p. 184.

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“desire to live in the communion of the true Catholic Church? So do I. But as I dare not change the cognizance of my Christianity that is my creed . . . so I dare not, to serve the interests of the Roman See, limit the Catholic Church, which Christ hath purchased with His blood, to a fourth or fifth part of the Christian world. Thou art for tradition, so am I. . . . Thou desirest to bear the same respect to the Church of Rome that thy ancestors did, so do I. But for that fullness of power, yea co-active power, in the exterior court over the subjects of other princes and against their wills, devised by the Court of Rome not by the Church of Rome, it is the pernicious source from whence all these usurpations did spring. Our ancestors from time to time made laws against it. . . . It is confessed that the Papal power in ecclesiastical affairs was cast out in Henry VIII.’s days. I answer that there was no mutation concerning Faith nor concerning any legacy which Christ left to His Church nor concerning the power of the Keys or any jurisdiction purely spiritual.” Does not this breathe the very spirit of England, of the Squires who fought under the Black Prince, of the Bishops who resisted James II?

Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667) wrote his *Holy Living* in 1651, at the time when the Prayer Book was proscribed and, in section 10, relating to the preparation of the Holy Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, he laid it down quite clearly that “this sacrifice because it was perfect could be but one, and that once, but because the needs of the world should last as long as the world itself it was necessary that there should be a perpetual ministry established whereby this one sufficient sacrifice should be made eternally effectual,” and that therefore Christ “hath constituted and separated an order of men who by showing forth the Lord’s death by sacramental representation . . . offer to God and represent in this solemn prayer and sacrament Christ as already offered.” At the same time Jeremy Taylor was writing his *Liberty of Prophesying* in which he shows the

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most perfect toleration of Nonconformists and is quoted by Hallam as the first person who really advocated it.*

It would be easy to quote other authorities equally representative:—Jewell, Andrews, Ussher, Pearson and Stillingfleet, and Ken, whose hymns are in the mouths of all Christians. The compilers of the Scotch Liturgy, and of the Liturgy of the American Church in the early eighteenth century, were all believers in episcopacy and the Sacramental theory of Baptism and the Eucharist. All these were pre-Tractarian but it was upon these foundations the Tractarians built. If there was nothing in episcopacy, why were the Hampton Court Conference and the Synod of Dort failures? why were the Nonconformists ejected under Charles II? Why endow an Archbishop of Canterbury?

On the other hand comprehension and toleration within the Church have always been her policy. To the clergy who conformed, and still more to the laity, the utmost latitude of opinion was and is allowed. And comprehension is an entirely different thing from the federation now advocated. Comprehension includes all those who are willing to join in the rites and ceremonies of the Church and submit themselves to her government as laid down in her ordinances. As far as the laity are concerned occasional Conformity has always been allowed.

People say: what a delightful thing it is that Christians should join together even for a time in a unity independent of all creeds and churches! And so it is. Christianity is something greater than any Christian Church. It is a beautiful thing in a moment of enthusiasm, far away from civilization, surrounded by the heathen, to transcend the ordinary bonds and landmarks. But it is a different thing to found, or attempt to found, a new church by giving up what the majority in the old church hold most dear. And it does not effect its own object. There is no native so stupid as to believe that all Christians are the same because two Low Church

* Hallam, *Literature of Europe*. Vol. II, pp. 442, 447, 449.

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Bishops amalgamate with the orthodox Dissenters. Taking East Africa alone there are only 90,000 Protestants altogether, including all members of the Church of England, while there are 180,000 Roman Catholics who would never give the natives the impression that they had the same religion as the Protestants. Besides, what is the use of amalgamating with Nonconformists in East Africa if to do so should separate you from the whole Church mission in Zanzibar, not to speak of splitting up the Church of England all over the world?

No, the only way to promote Christian unity is to devote yourself to that internal communion of which Archbishop Bramhall speaks, exercising not only an external fellowship wherever it is possible but also an internal feeling of constant loving-kindness and devotion to those who are called by the Christian name and are trying to further the work of civilization and religion in the heathen world.

Nonconformity as we know it is no more a half-way house to true Church teaching than Islam is a half-way house to Christianity. The power of Islam is in its unity of doctrine, its complete social equality and its unity of fellowship. The doctrine is very simple and that is its advantage. "There is no God but God and Mohammed is His prophet." No more Juju, away with idols, away with the perpetual conciliation of evil spirits which make life a burden. Trust in God, fight for Him. He cannot be conciliated. His law is absolute; it is fate. But if you die for Him He will take you to Himself. And then in Islam there is no colour. All are equal, all are brothers—practically, as well as in theory. It is a noble creed, a creed for men. So with Nonconformity. Come to Jesus, believe in Him. He is your friend, you can love Him and pray to Him. His law is love beyond and above fatalism. He will be with you now and to all eternity. A noble creed too, a creed for men and women.

Noble creeds both. But there is a further creed to which, in logic, they are but half-way houses of rest and refreshment. The Catholic Creed gives you not only one God by

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whom all things were made and are kept in being, not only Christ, very God of very God, Who for us men and for our salvation came down from Heaven, a man like unto ourselves whom we can love as our friend and Master. It gives you also a society of men and women protected by the one God Who is our Father, founded by Christ our Brother, carried on under His appointed Bishops and clergy, who are His servants and our helpers, and fortified by those gracious Sacraments and Ordinances which build up our spiritual lives.

Some men may think of Nonconformity as leading to the faith of the Church in the same sort of way that Bosworth Smith, of Harrow, thought that Islam was a school-master to bring men to Christ. In logic, and taken in the large in the history of the world, this may be so. The pilgrimage of mankind towards spiritual perfection has led through many strange places. Egypt and Greece, Hinduism and Buddhism, Judaism and Christianity have all been steps in the way. But to the individual human soul in the heathen world it is not so. No Moslem ever becomes a Christian; few or none of the Nonconformists become members of the Church. For the Low Church to join with Nonconformists would make the Church of England not more but less comprehensive, not more but less truly catholic. We should lose the Eastern Church, at present our ally, and be further than ever from the possibility of any fair and honourable communion with the Church of Rome.

Horace Walpole was fond of saying "Life is a Comedy" to those who think, and a Tragedy to those who feel." The greatest of all tragedies is that divided Christianity should still be fruitlessly attempting to re-unite its severed members, or, still worse, that re-union should be regarded as futile or undesired. But the re-union to be aimed at is that of the Holy Catholic Church of Christ; and this is hindered rather than advanced by federation with those who despise catholicity and turn their faces from the historic continuity of the Church. Do not let us abandon for

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a shadow the great realities which make for union. It is not for nothing that, in the centuries which have passed since the prayer of consecration was first said in England, the words of the Liturgy have rung in the ears and comforted the hearts of the men and women of our race. Under the vaults of the same splendid minsters, under the roofs of the same village churches, afar off in the tropics or the arctic, amid perils unspeakable by land and sea, in imagination we can hear them on the same day at the same hour, faithfully repeated here and all over the world. It is not for nothing that for hundreds of years the splendour of the Church's worship has accompanied those whom England loves, princes and peasants alike, in the most momentous acts of their lives. In their baptism, to plight their troth in marriage, in the solemn hour when they were laid to rest, the Church's words have alike been used for and by Eleanor of Castile and Florence Nightingale, Alfred the Great and Nelson, for the unrecorded and the famous, for saint and sinner alike. But let us make no mistake about it, the words and the meaning go together. Without the certain definite ideas they express, the words would be only "like the wind "in a ruined cell." As it is, they not only breathe the very spirit of our race, but they join us in one bond to great living communities of Christians in East and West, to those who have gone before and to those who will follow after.

THE WEATHER AND ITS PROPHETS

THE weather has always been and always will be a subject of interest, if not of concern, for every dweller on the earth. The progress of civilization makes it possible for those who live in great cities to pursue their ordinary avocations, for the most part, in spite of its vagaries, and for many of them it is, at first sight, only a subject of rather idle curiosity. But this is only at first sight. If you wish to enumerate the people who are interested in the weather you must run through the whole gamut "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Sailor, Gentleman, Apothecary, Ploughboy, Thief." In reality, even those who live in London find that the weather affects their means of locomotion, their health, their amusement, their food, their water, their air, their own and other people's tempers and consequently their politics; and yet the dweller in London is probably more nearly independent of the weather than any other person. In the tropics, at the poles, on sea, on land, on the mountain, in the plain, everywhere the weather is an essential part of man's life and can never be disregarded. Every country has its weather lore. It is enshrined in the mythology of the heathen and it still finds a place in the Book of Common Prayer. So great an authority as the late Sir G. G. Stokes is reported to have said that prayers for rain and fine weather were appropriate because we did not know what the weather was going to be.

But the study of weather has not always been conducted on scientific lines and it is, in fact, curious that the treatment of weather study as a mild joke dates from the time

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of its being made a subject of scientific inquiry. So long as bad weather was regarded as the manifestation of an offended Deity, jocular remarks about the Clerk of the Weather would obviously be out of place; but the discerning of the order of nature by patient investigation has always been the subject of ridicule and even of practical jest, for which a long series of examples from King Charles II. to Charles Dickens could be cited.

Oddly enough, in the case of the study of the weather it is the scientists themselves who take the lead in poking fun, partly serious and partly humorous, at the organized attempts to trace some sort of order in the chaos of our daily weather for a reason that will appear incidentally in the following pages.

The study of the weather on scientific lines undoubtedly dates from the invention of the mercury barometer by Torricelli in 1643. The use of that instrument is the beginning of the study of the *causes* of changes of weather as distinguished from the *signs* of coming weather which form the staple of the weather lore of the ancients and of a good many moderns as well. In the absence of a knowledge of causes, any event might be, and indeed is, regarded as a weather sign. Some of these signs are more or less connected with the weather, others not at all. The phases of the moon, the appearance of the moon, the stars and the sky, the conjunctions of the planets, the behaviour of beasts, birds, insects and flowers have all served as such. In modern days endeavours have been made to interpret some of the signs recognized in weather lore in terms of causes, but as a matter of fact, the whole conception of events as signs of the future is on a different plane from the scientific interpretation of the sequence of weather, and any attempt to reconcile the two is a matter of curiosity rather than of organized weather study, because it diverts the attention from the systematic order of procedure.

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Not long after its introduction the barometer was provided with a dial with which we are still familiar. Its picture may be seen any day in the newspapers. To various heights of the mercury column were most improperly ascribed various kinds of weather. From what may be called internal evidence the dial must have been invented in England, since the legends are more appropriate to this country than any other. For the half of the surface of the globe that lies between the tropics (with the solitary exception of the "storm" with very low barometer) they are quite out of range, but the dial has spread with very slight modification over Europe and, indeed, over the whole world. The legends will be familiar without further introduction, but we assign certain alternative numbers to the readings for a reason. They are as follows (the equivalent figures are approximate only):

Legend on the Dial	Height of the Mercury Barometer in Standard Conditions	Pressure of the Atmosphere	
		Per Sq. Inch	Centibars
Very dry	31·0	15 $\frac{1}{4}$ lbs.	105
Set Fair	30·5	15 „	103·3
Fair	30·0	14 $\frac{3}{4}$ „	101·6
Change	29·5	14 $\frac{1}{2}$ „	100·0
Rain	29·0	14 $\frac{1}{4}$ „	98·2
Much Rain	28·5	14 „	96·5
Stormy	28·0	13 $\frac{3}{4}$ „	95·0

This dial, which has had a very long vogue in weather prophecy, is an instructive example of another common but awkward principle in weather study, the principle of notable examples. It is quite true, for this country, that when the barometer reads 28 inches (95) the weather is generally stormy, and when it reads 31 inches (105) it is generally very dry, at least in the daytime. But it is not always so,

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and these indications are particularly misleading when the instrument used is at a place high above sea level. At Buxton, for example, which is 1,000 feet above the sea the barometer can never have reached 31 in., but it will be down at 28 in. and read "Stormy" when a similar barometer in the Cheshire plain just below is reading only 29 inches, or "Rain"; and the other items of the legend are also misleading. It sometimes rains when the barometer points to "Rain," but it can and does rain also when it points to "Change," to "Fair," or even occasionally when it points to "Set Fair;" and on the contrary, it may easily be "Fair" when the barometer points to "Rain," "Much Rain" or "Stormy." In fact the legends on the dial are not bad as "signs," but they are quite untrustworthy as "forecasts." We draw this distinction, that a *sign* of rain means that in similar circumstances rain has often followed, whereas a *forecast* of rain means that the circumstances are such that rain is a proper inference in this individual case.

We shall endeavour to trace the development of the study of weather from the traditional use of the barometric weather-signs to the modern weather forecast. The barometer is still the forecaster's most important instrument, because it records the atmospheric pressure; in fact the tendency of modern weather-study has been to use the barometer (and wind) almost exclusively, but to use it in a manner quite different from that of the old legends. In fact, the first step in modern meteorology is to erase the old legends from the barometer and to use only the figures for the barometric pressure.

We go back to the year 1860 when Admiral Fitzroy, who was then in charge of a meteorological department of the Board of Trade, following the example of the French astronomer, Le Verrier, began to collect simultaneous observations of weather by telegraph from various stations in Britain and France. The idea was originally started as

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soon as electric telegraphs became operative, and through the efforts of the *Daily News* an organized attempt was made in connexion with the great Exhibition of 1851; it has been gradually extended and developed until now a lithographic map can be obtained at the Meteorological Office at 12.30 p.m. every day, which gives a survey of the state of the weather as reported at 7 a.m. over a wide region reaching from Spitzbergen to Madeira and from St Petersburg to as far west as the service of wireless telegrams from the Atlantic will serve. Almost every civilized country has a corresponding service. Since 1st January, 1914, the Government of the United States has issued a daily map of the Northern Hemisphere based on observations received by telegraph from the various countries. It is on the readings of the barometer and the thermometer with observations of wind that all these maps are mainly based and the weather at each station is given, so that, although the legends on the barometer have become entirely obsolete so far as modern meteorology is concerned, the readings of the barometer remain the foundation of all practical weather study.

But first of all they must be "reduced to sea level," otherwise there would be hopeless confusion on account of the diversity of height. There are also other precautions which need not be detailed here. Let it suffice to say that the daily weather map of any meteorological office shows the distribution of pressure at sea level over as great a region as the office can afford to get telegrams from, the larger the better. Temperature, wind, and other particulars from all the reporting stations are included. The true value of the weather map is as a means of studying the facts of the weather as they really are and while they are still alive.

No sooner had FitzRoy begun to collect information by telegraph and compare reports from different places than he realized that an office with this information knew a great deal more about the weather than any solitary individual with a single barometer. He knew what the weather was like in all parts of the country and, with the experience natural


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to a seaman, he could make a shrewd guess as to how wet or windy weather would spread; so in 1863 he began to give the public the benefit of his knowledge by issuing storm-warnings and forecasts of weather for publication in the newspapers.

For this action he was severely criticized by prominent members of the British Association and of the Royal Society, who regarded the publication of warnings and forecasts as premature and the method as being empirical and not scientific. The criticism was justified from the point of view of the strict scientist, who is naturally unwilling to publish the results of his investigations until he can present the whole as a reasoned sequence of cause and effect. Meteorology has hardly yet been forgiven for this lapse of scientific etiquette, a *faux pas* that is not forgotten, and to this day scientists of eminence can be found to criticize the issue of forecasts based on weather maps as empirical guesses and to justify, in scientific language, the mild jests of the man in the street. FitzRoy's critics were themselves engaged in the study of the phenomena of weather from another point of view, namely, that of the continuous variation of the pressure, temperature, wind, etc., upon self-recording instruments, and the British Association was maintaining the Kew Physical Observatory in the Old Deer Park for that purpose amongst others.

The criticism produced its effect. FitzRoy died in 1865, and in 1866 Government agreed to provide £10,000 a year for meteorology, the larger part being devoted to the development of the study of the weather on the new principles, and the conduct of the investigation was entrusted to the Royal Society. The new management began by discontinuing the forecasts and storm warnings and establishing seven observatories of the Kew type. In response to public representation, the storm warnings were restored almost immediately but, with that exception, for twelve years the office confined its attention to the silent study of the weather over land and sea. Other changes

BAROMETER, WIND & WEATHER CHARTS



Explanation.

Barometer - Isobars are drawn for each tenth of an inch.


Wind - Direction is shown by arrows flying with the wind. Force on the scale 0-12 is indicated by the number of feathers.

Temperature - Given in degrees Fahrenheit. Isotherms shown by dotted lines.

Weather - Shown by the following symbols:—

- clear sky
- ☁ sky ¼ clouded
- ☁ sky ½ clouded
- ☁ sky ¾ clouded
- ☁ overcast sky
- rain falling
- * snow
- ▲ hail
- ≡ fog
- ≡ mist
- T thunder
- R rain
- slum

Sea Disturbance
 Rough ~~~~~ High ~~~~~



Reproduced from the Daily Weather Report of the Meteorological Office.

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and developments supervened, and in 1879 the Meteorological Office announced that the laws of weather were sufficiently well known to justify the issue of forecasts based on weather charts for publication in the newspapers. Since that time there has been no intermission of the practice. The area of the chart has been widened by daily telegrams from Norway, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Portugal, the Azores, and more recently from Madeira, Iceland, the Faeroe, Spitzbergen and, within the last month or so, from Rome, Vienna and St Petersburg. Great progress has been made, and the forecasters can now speak with assurance where previously they had to hazard conjecture. But the methods are the same and they are still open to criticism as being empirical. Forecasters are still dependent largely upon experience of weather maps and cannot as a rule refer the sequence of weather to the reasoned effect of physical causes.

Let us now turn our attention to the process of construction of a modern weather map and the method of using it.* For our present purpose we may consider briefly the maps issued by the Meteorological Office for 6 p.m. of 19th March, and 7 a.m. of 20th March, which are reproduced on the page opposite, as representing the material which the forecaster had in front of him when he drew up the following forecasts:

FORECASTS FOR THE TWENTY-FOUR HOURS NOON, FRIDAY,
20TH MARCH, TO NOON, SATURDAY, 21ST MARCH, 1914

District

Scotland, North	0	} Easterly and north-easterly winds, increasing in force, a gale in places; cold, cloudy, some snow or sleet showers.
Scotland, East	1	
England, North-East	2	

* Those desirous of more careful study of this subject are referred to the following works: Eighth Annual Report of the Meteorological Committee to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, 1913; Daily Weather Report of the Meteorological Office; Forecasting Weather, by W. N. Shaw, F.R.S., Sc.D.; British Weather Forecasts: Past and Present, by R. G. K. Lempfert, M.A.; Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 1913.

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England, East	3	} Easterly to north-easterly and northerly winds, increasing in force; rain and sleet to-day, improving somewhat in the course of to-morrow; remaining cold.
Midland Counties	4	
England, South-East	5	
Scotland, West and Isle of Man	6	} North-easterly winds, freshening; cold, cloudy, some snow or sleet showers.
England, North-West and North Wales	7	
South Wales and England, South-west	8	} Northerly gales, with hail and sleet showers; wind moderating later and weather improving temporarily; remaining cold.
Ireland, North	9	
Ireland, South	10	} Freshening northerly and north-westerly winds; cold, changeable, some hail or sleet showers.
Western Channel and Bay	11	
		} Gales from between west and north, with rainy weather. Wind moderating somewhat later and weather improving temporarily; sea very rough.

They are introduced by a statement of the general inference from the observations which for the occasion runs thus:

GENERAL INFERENCE,

The deep depression over the Channel will continue to move in an easterly or east-north-easterly direction, and will occasion falls of rain and snow over the whole of England. Gales from north-east, backing to north-west, will be experienced in the Channel, and increasing winds from the eastward on the Scottish coasts.

They are also accompanied by the actual information received from the several stations which is printed on the back of the map.

There is a space left at the bottom of the sheet for what is called the "further outlook." This is a recent innovation which enables the forecaster to notify his opinion as to the persistence of settled or unsettled weather beyond the period of twenty-four hours to which the "forecasts" are limited, if the circumstances justify his doing so. Experience has led to the recognition of certain meteorological

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situations either of settled fine weather or of general wet weather with occasional fair spells as being frequently persistent for days together. The extension of the area of the chart has enabled the forecaster to detect signs of change while they are yet a long way off, or, what perhaps is more to the point, the absence of any sign of change in the type of weather within 500 miles of the district under consideration.

The information upon which the map is based does not arrive in the pictorial form in which it is used for forecasting. A telegraphic weather report in accordance with the international scheme in which all the countries of Europe share consists of six groups of five figures each. Thus the message received from Valencia on the morning of 20th March was as follows: 90832 01243 90830 04143 40005 46374, and from that the forecaster got the following information from Valencia:—

That at 6 p.m. on the 19th of March the barometric pressure was 29·08 inches, the wind blowing from the north with a force of 1 (Beaufort Scale), the sky half-clouded and the temperature of the air 43° F.

That at 7 a.m. on the 20th of March there had been no change in regard to any of these matters except that the wind force had increased to 4, and the sky was one-quarter clouded: and, further, that the barometer had risen ·04 inches in the past three hours; and that in the past twenty-four hours ·05 inches of rain had fallen and the temperature had fluctuated between 46° F. and 37° F.; and, lastly, that the state of the sea was moderate.

Some additional information as to gales, the duration of sunshine and the weather in the morning, afternoon and night is given in telegrams from the British stations, which number 31, but those from 35 stations on the Continent and the Atlantic islands are practically limited to the six groups of figures; six telegrams from the Faeroe and Iceland are shorter still. The figures of the telegrams from foreign countries and all except those describing wind, weather and

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sea, have to be converted into British units before the forecaster can use them. The list of stations is in itself an exercise in geography.

Wireless telegraphy comes into the scheme to convey the messages from Spitzbergen and Gibraltar and from any ships of the navy or Atlantic liners on the high seas that are within range. On each of the maps here reproduced three messages from Atlantic liners are charted, but it may here be noted that of the three which are shown in the morning chart only one arrived in time for the forecaster. They are all shown in the chart because that is taken from a second edition of the map (with a larger area and smaller scale) which appears on the morning after. On the small scale charts which are here reproduced there is not room to enter all the British observations which appear on the working chart.

The most astonishing feature of the observations which are thus transmitted is that, with the exception of some from the Spanish Peninsula and the Atlantic Islands, all of those on the morning map, whether on sea or land, are taken at exactly the same hour, namely, 7 a.m. of Greenwich mean time. The guiding principle of the whole scheme is to reduce the time between observing and charting to the minimum possible, and for that purpose the observers are all at their instruments promptly at 7 a.m., and by 7.15 a.m. the messages should be coded and handed in. With good management they might all arrive at their destinations by 8 a.m. London is not the only centre which has to be served. Every capital in Europe shares in the distribution, making its own selection of the observations which are to be transmitted. When the observers have done their work, the duty is taken up by the telegraph services—land lines, submarine cables and wireless systems. Priority is given to the telegrams, but there are still some outstanding difficulties connected with telegraph administration which make

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for delay, and consequently in this country morning after morning nine o'clock strikes while the tale of messages is incomplete. This is a much more serious drawback than the looker-on would think, because the belated arrivals not infrequently alter the complexion of the map upon which the forecaster is basing his inferences. The meteorological services are not, therefore, likely to be content until the international organization for transmission is still further improved.

As the messages come in, the information is immediately transferred to a working chart by the Office staff, so when the messages have arrived the working chart is ready. The forecaster can then make his inferences and draw up his forecasts. He has often, unfortunately, owing to the delay of telegrams, to begin that duty while his map is still incomplete, because his forecasts must be ready for issue at a fixed hour. As soon as they are drawn they are immediately manifolded in type and issued to the newspaper press. The same process is gone through every evening with the six o'clock observations upon which the forecasts for the morning papers are based, and on each occasion, and also after the receipt of a restricted service of telegrams reporting observations at 1 o'clock, storm-warnings are dispatched by telegraph to the storm signal stations on the coasts if the state of the weather indicates the approach of a gale.

Besides the reports and forecasts which are intended for the newspapers, and the storm-warnings sent to the coast-stations, special information is supplied in various forms to the Admiralty for the use of His Majesty's ships and to the depots of flying schools and other stations.

At the Meteorological Office all the information as to sunshine, rainfall, maximum and minimum temperature and weather for the British Isles is entered upon special charts, so that for each day, in juxtaposition with the charts upon which forecasts have been made, there is a full representa-

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tion of the subsequent weather. The looker-on has no opportunity of seeing any such complete representation of the story of the weather as this collection of ten charts for each day affords, but anyone who is interested in arriving at a just conclusion as to what forecasting by the method of weather charts really means can gratify his curiosity by calling at the office. He will find the problem of the daily weather set out for him in its most inquisitive form. It asks many questions to which no answer has yet been given.

Let us glance at some of the conclusions to which this fascinating study has led. The first and most enlightening lesson that is learned from weather maps at once explains why the old legends on a barometer dial were so often misleading. It appears that the direction and force of the wind, which are of primary importance in determining the weather which we enjoy or suffer, are determined, not by the atmospheric pressure at the place, but by the distribution of pressure in its neighbourhood. Thus, if the barometer is lower to the west, the wind will be from the southward—not from east to west as an uninformed person might think. If pressure is lower to the east the wind blows from the northward. Consequently we learn that the reason for a storm of wind from the south-west in London is not that the barometer is low in London; but that the barometer in the west or north-west is much lower, and in the east or south-east much higher than it is in London. Corresponding statements could be made about “Much Rain,” “Rain,” “Change,” “Fair,” and “Set Fair.” There is a close and unmistakable connexion between wind and the distribution of pressure, simple in outline but complicated in detail, which is represented by a law known as Buys’s Ballot’s Law which we may express thus: “If you stand “with your face to the wind the barometer will always be “lower to your right and the stronger the wind the lower “it will be, and *vice versa*.”

Consequently the modern meteorologist uses his barometers not merely to tell the pressure but to give him a picture

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of the distribution of pressure, and he finds certain characteristic distributions of pressure, of which the maps here reproduced afford good examples, in which there is a more or less well defined centre of low pressure such as is marked by the dumbbell-shaped line over Ireland and the west at 6 p.m. on 19th March and by the oval-shaped figure over the mouth of the Channel at 7 a.m. on the 20th. The lines which are drawn in the map are called isobars, or lines of equal pressure, and the pressure which they represent is marked in figures against each line. The collection of isobars of more or less circular shape, as represented on the map, is a cyclonic area, or cyclone, an area of low pressure with the winds circulating round it in a direction contrary to the hands of a clock, as will be seen on examining the distribution of the winds in the light of the *explanation* which is given on the map.

It will be noticed that some of the lines are very irregular, and the most recent lesson learned from weather maps is that every one of the irregularities is associated with some local variation of wind and weather. In the early days of the study of weather charts, low pressure areas or cyclonic depressions were regarded simply as rainy areas; they are still regarded as rainy, but we know now that, as a rule, even in a cyclone the rain is local, and the forecaster has learned to attach importance to small details which used to be passed over as of little consequence.

Contrasted with these areas of low pressure or cyclones, we have the areas of high pressure or anti-cyclones; these are regions where the wind circulates "with the clock-hands" round a centre of high pressure. Parts of such areas can be seen in the north-east and south-west of the region represented, and sometimes the central region of the map is occupied for days together by an anti-cyclone. Then the barometer is high, the weather is quiet and it is often, but not always, fine.

The whole atmosphere of the northern hemisphere north of the tropics is made up of cyclones and anti-cyclones

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in juxtaposition with local variations of shape, and all the changes of size and intensity which we can imagine made up of the readings of a series of fluctuating barometers.

So now we recognize that when the barometer is going up or down, what is really happening is that cyclones and anti-cyclones are passing over us and bringing with them their appropriate weather. For these things travel, and in our region cyclones generally travel towards the north-east, their centres passing over the ocean between here and Ireland. But this is not by any means always the case. Sometimes they go up Channel, as that of 20th March is shown to be doing, and on other occasions they make their way sometimes rapidly, sometimes slowly, along other paths.

It is the function of the forecaster first of all to recognize the kind of weather that is to be associated with the different distributions of pressure and secondly to anticipate the changes from a study of the sequence of maps. It is that which constitutes his work, and the delicacy of it may be illustrated by reference to the two maps reproduced here. It will be noticed that at 6 p.m. there are light winds over Ireland in the rear, as it is called, of the depression that is going off eastward, but on that occasion a wireless message showed that the light winds had, further to the west, another "low" centre. On that information the south coasts were warned of the advancing depression which is to be seen at the mouth of the Channel next morning.

It has been said that every small detail of the shape of the isobars has its interpretation in weather, but that implies a very careful series of barometric readings. A few hundredths of an inch error of reading may make a map locally unintelligible, and hence the forecaster's *bête noir* is the observer whose barometer is wrong or who makes a mistake in reading. A very deep place is assigned to him in the meteorologist's inferno, though he does not always hear the sentence that consigns him to his doom.

The increasing importance of accuracy and precision

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in barometer readings has led to the introduction into practical weather-work of the so-called correction for latitude, and that again to the distinction between an actual measure of pressure in the atmosphere such as " $14\frac{3}{4}$ lbs." per square inch, and the height of a column of mercury such as "30 inches." In the end the measure in pressure units is to be preferred and the figures in the second part of the third column of p. 529 represent measures on the C.G.S. system which is on all fours with that used for practical electricity and magnetism.

Forecasters are not the only persons who predict the coming weather. Most people have rules of their own for foretelling the weather, many of which can be found in the Shepherd of Banbury's Collection; and there is also the "old shepherd" whom we all know more or less and who knows all about the weather from experience. In conversations about the weather he is generally a third party like the man who saw the ghost. But the ordinary weather-wise are not really so successful as story would suggest.

There are many aspirations and endeavours towards forecasts of longer period than simply for to-day or to-morrow. There are people who have elaborated systems for foretelling the weather a whole year in advance. Those of which anything is really known generally depend upon some form of periodicity. The use of the phases of the moon and the conjunctions of the planets have this idea at bottom, although it is often clothed in fantastic language; and the search for periodicity has its scientific side. No one would deny that the weather is, to a certain extent, periodic with the rotation of the earth on its axis—that is, the day—and in its orbit round the sun—that is, the year. The night is calmer and colder, and in the summer finer, than the day—not always but generally. It is a commonplace rather than a forecast to say that there will be summer weather in July and

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winter weather in January, but it may fairly be questioned whether a rigorous examination would show a better percentage of success than attends the forecasts for to-morrow. Still, the periodicity is there "in the mean," and as the seasons repeat themselves in the mean it is a legitimate inquiry whether the special characteristics of the individual seasons of the year do not repeat themselves after a long period. All sorts of periods have been tried depending on the various periods to be found in the motions of the solar system, and some periods have been suggested empirically—one month, three years or four years, eleven years, nineteen years, thirty-five years and still longer periods, but none of them are at present well-established for practical purposes.

There may be something in them, but so long as the weather of a single spot or small area of the earth's surface is under observation, we have no effective means of pursuing the inquiry. Meteorologists are, therefore, pressing slowly and gradually towards a survey of the weather of the whole earth, and when that is fully organized the subject may be pursued with more hope of a definite conclusion.

The same may be said for weather sequences in different parts of the world which are now the subject of careful statistical inquiry. In this country a dry autumn is generally followed by a dry winter and a wet spring, but not always. Is this mere chance, or is it a suggestion of a law? Again we are hampered by our lack of effective knowledge of what goes on elsewhere. There are many causes and many effects, and to disentangle the complicated processes we must take wider views, and no view will be wide enough until it embraces the whole wide world.

NATIONAL FINANCE, 1914

“Let us take any man’s horses; the
“laws of England are at my command-
“ment. Happy are they which have
“been my friends, and woe to my
“Lord Chief Justice.”—*Falstaff*.

THE DISCREDITED TREASURY

THE Treasury is the King Pin in the English system of National Finance. It is the Lord High Treasurer in commission with all his powers and authority. The first of the Commissioners, known as the first Lord of the Treasury, is its master, and—since the Sovereign ceased to preside personally over the sittings of the Board—its sole director. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue and of Customs are its servants, required by Statute to follow its directions and obey its orders. It decides finally the amount of every estimate before that estimate is submitted to Parliament. It gives or withholds sanction to departures from financial usage in an unforeseen emergency. Without that sanction no claim can be abandoned, no condition of a contract varied, no deviation made from any grant of money as embodied in the estimates agreed to by Parliament, nor can any payment be effected for a purchase spread over more than the one year for which the grant is made, nor any expenditure incurred which is not strictly within the terms of those estimates. The Treasury settles the estimates, and guards against irregularity during the

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period of expenditure. Treasury control is the great, and indeed the only, check on extravagance either when the estimates are being framed or while the expenditure of the money granted is actually proceeding. The control of Parliament, as represented by the Public Accounts Committee, comes later on. The Treasury moreover is the financing department of the State, whose business it is to see that the necessary money is duly provided for the spending Departments hitherto so called.

Than the Treasury there was, up to a very few years ago, nothing in the State, excepting only His Majesty the King, higher, more authoritative, more powerful or more respectable. It was the man of sound sense and prudence, who silently controlled and prevented the wild imaginings of the amateur statesmen and financiers, successively hoisted into positions for which very few of them are fitted either by training or by character. It was the guardian uncle of the system, the man of honour who sternly forbade all tampering with the public credit, or with the honesty, honour and fair dealing of the taxing departments under its orders and control. It was the conscience of the Ministry on which, however wild and ambitious, it always succeeded in imposing its own high-minded and honourable tradition.

All that is now unhappily changed.

Having lost all the men of sound tradition and replaced them with others willing to make themselves panders to that portion of the democracy which conceives itself entitled to levy contributions on its fellow-subjects, the Treasury has become the breeding-cage for that particular kind of financial adventure which substitutes state help for self-help. Taking upon itself to invent Old Age Pensions, to dole out Insurance Benefits, so-called, and to establish Labour Exchanges, it has set out to remove all need for thrift, self-denial or foresight, as well as all notion of filial or family duty, and has proudly assumed the character, no longer of Lord High Treasurer, but of a profuse and—with other people's money—generous Lord

The Discredited Treasury

High Almoner. It has ceased to be the Guardian of the Public Moneys, and has become thir Squanderer.

Still more unfortunately it has abandoned much of that integrity which was once its pride.

With the allowance and under the direction and orders of the Treasury, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue do not merely disregard, but even, as it would appear, violate, that Appropriation Act which limits their expenditure to the purposes set forth in the Act, and to the sums therein named.

Mr Charles Twinn obtained in November, 1913, a judgment against Herbert Jesse Farrow, collector of taxes in the Gore division of Middlesex, for £75 damages for trespass arising out of an illegal distress for £4 5s. 9d., Inhabited House Duty, with costs. The costs were taxed at £134 12s. 10d., which, after paying out of Court £50 paid in by Mr Farrow with his Defence, left a sum due of £159 12s. 10d.

A similar action against Mr Farrow for damages for trespass arising out of an illegal distress to recover £8 15s. Income Tax under Schedule E., was heard at the same time, and herein also the plaintiff recovered £75 damages with costs which were taxed at £203 odd. The whole sum to be paid under these two actions would thus be £487 odd. And it is estimated that the costs of the Solicitors who defended both actions would amount to something like £500. There was therefore some £1,000 in all which had to be paid for this illegal attempt to recover two paltry sums amounting together to £13 os. 9d. Who was to pay this £1,000?

A layman would suppose that the person to pay was Mr Farrow. But the Law provides (by section 20, sub-section 8 of the Taxes Management Act 1880), that in such a case the damages and costs awarded for illegal distress shall be raised by a local rate. The object of course is that if local Income Tax Commissioners who administer

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the act locally should, through their tax collectors, act illeg , the local public should be made aware of it by having to pay for their illegal actions and that the Commissioners should thereby incur the blame of their neighbours to which such acts justly expose them. But in the case of Mr Twinn and the other action heard at the same time no such local rate was levied. Who then paid the judgment debts, and the taxed costs, and the costs of the solicitors who defended Mr Farrow, amounting, as already said, to something like £1,000? There is good reason to believe that this sum was paid by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue.

Such a payment by those Commissioners would not only be contrary to the intent and purpose of the Taxes Management Act, but, unless there is some fund provided in the Estimates for, and appropriated to, the payment of damages and costs due to the illegal acts of local Tax collectors, it is hard to see whence the Commissioners themselves obtained the money. No fund appropriate to such purpose appears under any head of the Estimates. The question therefore arises out of what fund and through what kind of manipulation was the £1,000 provided? Is there a secret fund? If so, what is it, and what is its amount? If not, out of which of the funds provided by Parliament was the money taken?

It is to be added that this is not the only instance in the Gore division when the like course was pursued. And if such things happen in the Gore division they do most assuredly happen in other divisions.

These incidents, having arisen in the Financial Year, 1913-14, will be very fitting subjects of investigation for the Public Accounts Committee when it comes to deal with the Appropriation Accounts for that year. Meantime it would appear—subject of course to such explanations as may be afforded—that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue (under Treasury orders and direction), most improperly abet and cover up the illegal acts of local tax collectors, by paying the damages and costs recovered from

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them instead of leaving those damages and costs to be raised by a rate on the district; and that they thus deprive the tax-payer of the protection intended and provided for him by the law.

The Treasury, among its other orders and directions to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, orders and instructs those Commissioners to display a shocking contempt for the law of the land, by levying taxes not only without but against the law. This they did when between 6th April, 1909, and 7th August, 1912,* they levied without any lawful warrant to do so, at least £12,000,000 of Income Tax—a proceeding which it was cynically attempted to justify on the ground that it had been a constant practice thus to act.

Having been defeated in its intention to continue this lawless extortion, by an action in which the Bank of England was condemned in costs for its share in an unlawful levy, the Treasury paid in full, not only its own costs but also the costs of the Bank of England, its accomplice and instrument in the breach of the law, which costs amounted together to £572. It also paid (not in full—which would have been £446—but after a severe taxation) the taxed costs of the plaintiff of £308, making a total of £880. This sum, instead of being paid by the officials of the Treasury themselves for their misdeeds, was levied by them upon the Consolidated Fund derived from the taxpayer, who was thus fined for the wrong inflicted on him.

Its own costs the Treasury may properly have paid out of the estimate for Law charges in the Civil Service Estimates. But out of what fund it paid the costs of the guilty Bank of England, and the taxed costs of the plaintiff ordered by the Court to be paid by the Bank, is not apparent. Of these latter costs, on an appeal by the Bank's Counsel against the order of the Court to pay them, Mr Justice Parker said

* "*Bowles v. The Bank of England.*" Introduction, p. ix. Butterworth & Co., 1914.

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“ I think on the whole the Bank ought to pay the costs.” But the Bank did not pay them. The Treasury paid them. Out of what fund? Was it out of the same secret fund as that which was drawn upon in the case of the Gore division tax-collector? This payment of the Bank of England’s costs having, like that in the Gore division case, been made at the end of 1913, may furnish a further matter of inquiry for the Public Accounts Committee when the Appropriation Accounts of 1913-14 come before them.

The Commissioners of Inland Revenue under the orders and directions of the Treasury knowingly permit, and encourage their officials to commit, what appears to be indistinguishable from perjury.

The Income Tax Act, 1842 (Section 38) requires every Income Tax Commissioner, general, special or additional, every Assessor, every Collector, every Inspector, and every Surveyor and every Officer for receipt, under a penalty of £100, before he shall act in the execution of the Act, to take oath that he will not “ disclose any particulars ” contained in any statement or schedule or any assessment under Schedule D, “ except in such cases and to such persons “ only who shall be sworn to the due execution of the said “ Act, and where it shall be necessary to disclose the same “ *for the Purposes of the said Act . . .* or in order to or in the “ course of a Prosecution for Perjury.”

This oath, as was avowed by the Treasury in the House of Commons on 6th December, 1906, and on 15th June, 1910, is, at the instance or by the allowance of the Inland Revenue Commissioners, habitually broken by the communication made by their officials of particulars of confidential Income Tax information, to the Estate Duty Office and to others of their officials. This act of apparent perjury the Board of Inland Revenue considers to be no perjury at all; for they hold that “ any use they may make of Income “ Tax returns within their own Department and for their

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“own use” does not constitute a disclosure of such “returns within the provisions of the Law”! This excuse is quite impossible to maintain in the face of the Act. For the only exception made by the Act allowing any disclosure whatever of these particulars is when the disclosure is necessary “for the purposes of the said Act,” or in the course of a prosecution for perjury. To disclose particulars, otherwise than for the purposes of the Act or in such a prosecution, seems to be to commit plain perjury, and it is no answer, but rather an aggravation of perjury, to plead that it is perpetrated for the convenience of the Treasury. Yet that is pleaded, and the perjury continues.

To breaches of the Law the Commissioners of Inland Revenue (under the direction of the Treasury), as readily add breaches of good faith, and are as readily urged thereto and abetted therein by their superiors at the Treasury. In a letter of the 13th December, 1913, which was published in the newspapers, Mr Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, disclosed confidential information relative to the Duke of Sutherland's Scottish estates which could only have been obtained from the Estate Duty Office. Having thus improperly obtained it, he still more improperly used it in a personal and party controversy with the Duke then proceeding in the press. To require the Estate Duty Office to give such information for such a use was a shocking breach of propriety on the part of the Second Lord of the Treasury; to give such information in such circumstances was a breach of confidence on the part of the Estate Duty Office, only less shocking because it was perpetrated by that office under compulsion of the Inland Revenue Commissioners exercised under Treasury direction.

A department which shows itself thus lawless, and thus prepared to indemnify those who are detected in

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illegal acts, or in tricky and unscrupulous extortion of taxes, must be ill-provided with those principles of honour and fair-play which have hitherto usually been found throughout the Civil Service. Such a department cannot be surprised if among its own subordinates there are now at last to be found some who learn from it to emulate, even at its own cost, its own misdoings. The Civil Service has hitherto been justly proud of its honour and of the fact that, though composed of poor men with small salaries, those men have, despite exposure to the strongest temptations, ever proved themselves incorruptible. They have been paid partly in money, but still more in the honour of being members of an honourable service; and that honour they have been proud to maintain unsullied. But so high a standard cannot be kept in the rank and file of the service if it be openly and flagrantly abandoned by the chiefs. The result of such an abandonment is that things are occurring in the departments such as have never occurred before, and such as show that those high in authority cannot set an example of laxity and ill-faith without seeing it sooner or later observed, taken to heart and followed by their own subordinates. When the world cannot rely on the honour, honesty, and good-faith of the Treasury-directed, well-paid Commissioner, the Commissioner soon ceases to be able to rely upon the Commissioner-directed, ill-paid Clerk. One very deplorable case, which illustrates this danger, slipped into public knowledge a few months ago. The Special Commissioners of Income Tax, provided in order that they might act as an independent judicial body to whom the tax-payer might have recourse as to a Court of Appeal, were, in an evil hour, themselves made collectors of super-tax. The thumb-screws were committed to the judges; the judges took on an entirely new character, and a wholly altered demeanour; thenceforth they out-collected the collector, and in their new capacity found themselves driven to all the shifts and turns and

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wrestings of the statutes which had been gradually, and most unfortunately, adopted by the Income Tax Commissioners themselves and their other subordinates. The Special Commissioners still however struggled to maintain at least an independent aspect and an affectation of impartiality as between the tax-payer and those Commissioners on whom they depend for pay and promotion. Their Secretary was, as toward the public, the principal of their executive officers. He it was who conducted the correspondence by which the tax-payer was taught the law as understood by the Commissioners, and was recalled to those high principles of reason and morality which require every tax-payer to pay up precisely that sum which any Commissioner may require. The Secretary's letters were State papers, arrays of sections and sub-sections, expositions of the eternal verities as applied by supreme wisdom to Income Tax questions. Yet this very official, it now appears, has himself been attempting to obtain from his own superiors (the Commissioners of Income Tax) by forgery, a payment by way of return of Income Tax which he had never paid, and has been prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned for that offence. This event in the Civil Service is as entirely new and unprecedented as it is lamentable and disquieting. Yet the unhappy man, demoralized by the bad examples set to him by his own superiors, has but bettered their instruction. It is a sad and sorry story. But it will be followed by others more sad and sorry unless the Treasury and the Commissioners it controls and directs mend their own devious ways and return to the strict paths of legality and fair dealing.

On the top of all comes the story of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—who, although only the Second Lord of the Treasury, is left to order all its business—himself engaging in speculation on the Stock Exchange in concert with two of his Ministerial colleagues, and borrowing money at the high rate of seven per cent in order to carry

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out his speculations. Of these most unseemly, indecent and improper transactions, of the uncandid dealing with which their revelation was attended, and of the events which accompanied and succeeded them, it is only necessary now to say that they have brought to this country unexampled shame and discredit in the eyes of the nations, and have amounted, in all their course and effects, to a graver smirch than has ever in modern times tarnished our good name.

All these things have grievously impaired the high reputation hitherto borne by the Treasury.

SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES 1913-14

SUPPLEMENTARY Estimates—it cannot be too often said—are only justifiable when some unforeseen emergency has arisen after the Budget statement. For a Budget Statement is an undertaking by the Government of the day to provide for the finances of the year in accordance with that statement, and on condition of the estimates for supply therein, together with the Ways and Means proposed therein for levying the money needed for that supply, being accepted by Parliament. Once that acceptance given, the Budget statement with its estimates becomes a contract between Parliament and the Government. That contract is of course subject to alteration in the event of unforeseen compelling circumstances arising in the course of the financial year it covers. A sudden new risk of war, or a sudden outbreak of plague, pestilence or famine,—or of panic, which is worse than either—this may excuse Supplementary Estimates and justify Parliament in varying the financial contract for the year. Nothing else can justify it but some unforeseen and unforeseeable event of this character. And if, year after year, as now happens, the Government, without any new emergency whatever, introduces Supplementary

Supplementary Estimates, 1913-14

Estimates asking for sums additional to those which they themselves named in the Budget and with which they undertook to defray all the year's expenditure—then not only does that Government avow either its own dishonesty or its own financial incompetency, but it inexcusably breaks its bargain with Parliament. Were Parliament occupied with anything else than Faction, or at all conscious of its duty to the country and determined to do it, no such breach of contract would receive its tolerance. But in fact Parliament always tamely and shamefully accepts a breach of contract which no member thereof would endure did it concern the rent of his own house, or even his own Parliamentary £400 a year.

During the last twenty years Supplementary estimates have rarely amounted to less than £2,000,000 a year, though they have often exceeded that sum. Last year (1913-14) they amounted to £3,574,608 as shown by the following list.

24th July, 1913	 Civil Services		£578,555
18th February, 1914	.. Civil Services		96,053
18th February, 1914	.. Army		296,000
20th February, 1914	.. Navy		2,604,000
			£3,574,608

It will be observed that the first of these estimates (for over half a million) was presented within three months after the Budget Statement on 22nd April, and before the Finance Bill embodying its provisions was passed on 15th August. It was therefore a particularly impudent repudiation, at a moment when no new emergency could have arisen, of an especially recent bargain not yet even finally sanctioned. It will also be observed that the bulk of these estimates (£2,900,000) is for the Navy and the Army, in a time of profound peace, with no threat of war, no cloud upon the horizon, and not so much as a special Panic to be

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found in the halfpenny press. In short there was no new situation, no emergency, no urgency for any of this expenditure in February that could not and should not have been foreseen and provided for in the previous April. We do not believe that any part of this extra expenditure was needed for the defence of the country either by land or by sea. But if it was needed, it should have been provided for in the April Budget. The demand for it by Supplementary Estimates ten months later was in no way justified and should have been rejected. But this the Whips and Caucus would not allow to Ministerialists, while the Opposition, obsessed with the Monomania of Tariff Reform, remembering its own licentious financial adventures, and desirous some day to repeat them, was found dumb and acquiescent.

MORE FALSE ACCOUNTS

Attention must, however, be given to a new and startling fact. There is one vast item of new taxation, of revenue and of expenditure which finds no place in any official account setting forth any one of the three. It is that which was created by the National Insurance Act (1911) passed on 16th December, 1911, and coming into operation on 15th July, 1912. It appears from answers to Lord Henry Bentinck in the House of Commons on 18th February and 28th April, 1914, that the total receipts of the Insurance Fund for the United Kingdom up to 11th January, 1914, amounted to the vast sum of £33,424,000, whereof £3,927,000 was spent on administration, £16,200,000 was invested and £12,125,000 (little more than one-third of the whole) was "issued for benefits." Of this total, there was received in the first six months—15th July, 1912 to 12th January, 1913—£8,780,000, and during the first complete year—12th January, 1913 to 11th January, 1914—£24,644,000. The whole of the thirty-three millions (excepting only the small

Prospects for 1914-15

State contribution) was levied (as the owner of the Turriff Cow and her Calf can testify) by a wholly new and very oppressive kind of Taxation; yet it is excluded from all official lists of Taxes. The whole of it (except the small State contribution) is new Revenue; yet it is absent from all lists of Revenue. The whole of it is Expenditure, immediate or deferred; yet no part of it finds any place in any account of Expenditure. It is £33,400,000 treated as an accident, having nothing to do either with Taxation, or Revenue or Expenditure! It is dealt with as if it were something outside all, as though belonging to the Finance of some other Planet in the Cosmos!

And to add to the confusion we have now another and fourth new financial year invented, ending, neither like the general financial year on 31st March, nor like the Income Tax year on 5th April, nor like the Tea Duty year on 30th June, but on the new and hitherto unknown date of 11th January—as if of purpose prepense to prevent these vast sums from ever being accurately made up to, or added to the National Accounts on the date to which these latter extend. In short, it is so treated as to amount not only to the latest but also the largest falsification of the National Accounts, and the latest, largest and most audacious deception practised by those Accounts upon the plain people who have to find the money.

PROSPECTS FOR 1914-15

THE Estimates of the sums of Supply demanded by the King for 1914-15 have now been issued. All the newspapers, including those especially affected to Finance, continue to disregard Mr Asquith's sound principle of placing before the Public those gross figures of these Estimates which, as he said, "alone represent the true facts" and "the total outlay." They all give what are called net figures, excluding the Appropriations in Aid which are as much a

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part of the true facts and the total outlay as any other portion of the Estimates. Whereby they not only falsify the "true facts" and the "total outlay" for the year, but also render impossible any true comparison with any previous year. We ourselves continue to give in each case the gross estimate, that being the true figure. These Estimates for 1914-15, with their dates of presentation, are:

	£
3rd March, 1914, Navy	53,573,261
27th Feb., 1914, Army	32,513,200
2nd March, 1914, Civil Services	59,620,911
2nd March, 1914, Revenue Departments ..	31,720,487

Total Estimates for Supply 1914-15 .. £177,427,859

Those for 1913-14 were :

	£
Navy	48,333,194
20th Feb., 1914, Supplementary Estimate	2,604,000
	<u>50,937,194</u>

Army	31,912,828
20th Feb., 1914, Supplementary Estimate	296,000
	<u>32,208,828</u>

Civil Services	57,888,853
24th July, 1913, Supplementary Estimate	578,555
15th Feb. 1914, Supplementary Estimate	96,053
	<u>58,563,461</u>

Revenue Departments	32,660,595
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Total Estimates for Supply, 1913-14 .. £174,370,078

Prospects for 1914-15

The increase of outlay under these heads estimated for 1914-15 as compared with that of 1913-14, is therefore £3,057,781, which is an entirely different figure from that arrived at by comparing the so-called net estimates—and in this instance, as it happens, a less figure.

It is, of course, to be remembered that in the present year, 1914-15, as in other years, we must expect a renewal of the abuse of Supplementary Estimates.

There can be hardly any need to add that, besides the expenditure represented by these grants of Supply, there is a vast additional expenditure which is permanently settled and is, therefore, not found in the Estimates of the Supply to be granted to the King by Parliament. This additional Expenditure amounts to something like £41,000,000 in all. It consists of the Permanent Charge for the extinction of debt (at present £24,500,000) charged on the Consolidated Fund; of other permanent charges on that Fund for the Civil List and cognate purposes (£1,700,000); of payments to Local Taxation Accounts (£9,600,000) and to the Road Improvement Fund (1,300,000); of Expenditure on Lighthouses (£540,000) and of other smaller items; as well as some £3,000,000 of outlay under the head of Miscellaneous Issues.

The total expenditure therefore, on the present basis and estimates for the forthcoming year 1914-15, will stand thus:

1914-15 Estimates for Supply	£177,427,859	
Additional Expenditure (say)	£41,000,000	
		£218,427,859

As against the (still partly estimated)

Expenditure for the past year, 1913-14, of £215,753,861

These are the figures so far as they can at present be made up. But they are not yet fully and accurately ascertained even for 1913-14, for which year they will only finally be settled when the appropriation accounts have

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passed through the Public Accounts Committee and have been subject to such ultimate adjustment as that Committee may decide. Still less are they ascertained for 1914-15.

THE BUDGET, 1914.

Mr Lloyd George's voyages into the unknown seas of Finance were begun by abandoning all acquired information and all accredited guides. Compass, chart, sextant, and sailing directions he despised as so much lumber, and promptly hove them overboard. His adventures have therefore necessarily been for the most part very dangerous and very deplorable. His last adventure is the most dangerous and deplorable of all.

In a singularly slipshod, inadequate and obscure speech Mr Lloyd George, on the afternoon of Monday, 4th May, introduced a Budget very malicious, quite wanton, and altogether indefensible.

By the usual method of omitting the Appropriations in Aid (£9,119,128) from the Estimates, both on the Revenue and on the Expenditure side, and by omitting further the so-called "Other Capital" expenditure from loans for Telegraphs and Works (£5,265,000), he estimated his expenditure for 1914-15 at £205,985,000 and his Revenue (with the same omissions) on the present basis at £200,655,000, leaving him as things stand with £5,330,000 to provide for the forthcoming year.

Having said this much, he proceeded to a long and confused disquisition on Local Self Government and to the announcement that he proposes to add to his deficit of £5,330,000 by making a further contribution beyond the £9,665,000 now annually granted to Local Taxation Authorities. There is to be a new "National Valuation" and a new "Valuation Roll" for Rating purposes, as though we had not had enough already of theoretical and notional valuations divorced from all facts. Out of the Grant there

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is to be a relief of rates on improvements for rated property—although as will be seen he intends to pile new burdens of Income Tax and new Death Duties on all other property, real and personal, and the greater burden the more it is improved and increased in value—a contradiction to which he is characteristically blind. He stated that the “grant for “the first full year would be £3,615,000” and then named as the “total grant for England, £9,200,000, Scotland “£1,265,000, Ireland £630,000, which make a total of “£11,095,000.” On this head his statement was confused, involved and hard to follow, and all that plainly emerged was the fact that a large and mischievous Dole was to be made larger and more mischievous. In the end it appeared that, having already an estimated deficit for 1914-15 of £5,330,000, he has wantonly added thereto for the year £4,218,000 of increased expenditure of various kinds and has thereby raised the deficit to £9,800,000.

To meet this vast sum it is proposed (1) to take £1,000,000 from the fixed charge for the extinction of debt (thus reduced to £23,500,000) and thereby to perpetrate a most wanton and immoral raid on the New Sinking Fund. The remainder is to be wrested from the Wicked Rich by (2) an addition to the Income-Tax (which in 1913-14 produced £47,249,000) of no less than £8,000,000—rising in 1915-16 to £10,700,000, and (3) by the addition to the Death Duties of £800,000—rising in 1915-16 to £3,000,000. Here comes in the true Lloyd George craze against all those who have so “improved” their property as to become well-to-do. The Income Tax is re-graduated in the severest manner, put up to 1s. 2d. on Incomes from £2,000 to £2,500, to 1s. 4d. on Incomes from £2,500 to £3,000, and beyond this point (at which the Super-Tax is henceforth to begin) further additions of rate are made to the tax, so that an Income just over £3,000 will pay, besides the 1s. 4d., an extra eight-tenths of a penny, an Income of £5,000 an extra 3d. or 1s. 7d. in all, an Income of £7,000 an extra 6½d. or 1s. 10d. in all, an Income of £10,000 an extra 8½d. or 2s. 0½d.

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in all, and so on up to an Income of £100,000 which will pay an extra 15d. and a fraction, or over 31d. in the £ in all. In the lower stages of Income on the other hand there are to be new deductions which Mr Lloyd George did not succeed in explaining.

Besides this, some attempt is to be made to tax Incomes which are neither derived from sources situate in this country nor have ever in fact been received herein, This attempt will be neither easy to justify nor capable of being carried into effect without destroying the principles and recasting the provisions of the whole of the Income Tax Acts which, as Lord Herschell said, "themselves impose a "territorial limit." How this new tax is to be levied Mr Lloyd George did not say, beyond intimating that "the "decisions of the Courts ought to be over-ridden," and that he hopes at the death of the taxpayer to obtain such of the new tax as was not paid during his life.

The Death Duties are to be increased after next August by from one per cent up to twenty per cent, beginning with the estates of the value of £60,000 up to those of the value of £200,000, till they rise to a twenty per cent tax on a million—which is expected to add to the yield of the Death Duties (£27,359,000 in 1913-14) £800,000 immediately, and by 1915-16 some £3,000,000. Allowances are, however, to be made in the case of estates which pass by death at such short intervals as from one to four years—which will in effect make the duties cease to be strictly Death Duties at all. On the other hand the Settlement Estate Duty, paid as a composition for certain successive devolutions of Settled Property, is to be abolished; and henceforward at each life-tenant's death the property will be held to pass in full and be taxed in full.

Mr Lloyd George's statement was incomplete and incoherent. His explanation of what he calls new "T'xation" were therefore ill to be understood, and the only really definite impression left was his abiding hatred of what he calls "Lanluds" and his transparent hope that their total

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or partial ruin will be what he called the "Ressult" of this the most wanton and outrageous of all his Budgets.

Mr Lloyd George says "we have paid in respect of the "indebtedness of this country since the present Government came into power, £104,000,000 sterling. By next "year we shall have wiped out indebtedness to the extent of "£114,000,000."

That is not true. It is as little true as Mr Asquith's promise in May, 1908, that "to 31 March, 1909, we shall "have paid off nearly £47,000,000 of National Debt," when the event showed that on that latter date what was paid off was (as shewn in our February, 1914, number) not £47,000,000 but only £34,000,000.

The discrepancy arises from not counting in the Debt—such as "Other Capital Liabilities"—which, instead of being reduced has been increased. This will be apparent when the statutory National Debt paper up to 31st March, 1914, is published. Meantime we may make bold to say that that paper will falsify Mr Lloyd George's statement as to the fact, and will show that he is as much mistaken as was Mr Asquith in his statement of promise as to the future.

The opposition to this malicious and crazy scheme should have been immediate and strenuous. Instead of that, it was whipped off by Mr Austen Chamberlain who, as though still in collusion with his opposite number, accepted the formal Income Tax resolution, stalled off all discussion, and dismissed an astonished House to dinner.

That such a Budget will be "popular" is hardly credible. It is wanton, predatory, and malicious. It abandons all pretence of return to that "thrifty and economical administration" solemnly promised by Mr Asquith in April, 1906. It violates all sound fiscal principles. It is an explosion of envy and hatred such as will assuredly not commend itself to reasonable persons in the country.

It has, indeed, some special difficulties of procedure to meet. To comply with the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1913 the Income Tax Resolution passed in Committee

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of Ways and Means on Monday, 4th May, must be agreed to by the House within its next ten sitting days, that is to say at latest on Monday, 18th May. Furthermore the Bill imposing the tax must be read a second time within the next twenty sitting days, that is to say on Monday, 1st June, at latest, or such a number of days after that as may be taken from the "sitting" days by the Whitsuntide holidays. Failing this the Resolution will cease to have "statutory effect" and no Income Tax can be levied by virtue thereof.

In these circumstances the strongest and most uncompromising resistance can be and should be offered to quite the worst and wildest budget of modern times. Such a resistance, if there be found spirit and capacity to make it, might in the present political tangle have some very unexpected and startling result.

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